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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the leadership in the fifteen 
former republics found themselves challenged by complex processes of independent 
state- and nation-building. Twenty years later, the political regimes that emerged 
vary from democracies to autocracies. This dissertation focuses on the grey zone in 
between the pure types. Conceptualizing hybrid regimes as the ones that combine 
holding of free and fair, recognized elections, and autocratic governance, it asks the 
question of what keeps the former viable. This research singles out Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine as the countries with hybrid regimes. It shows that the three are highly 
ethnically heterogeneous and have relatively poor, very low-growing economies. This 
dissertation argues that these structural conditions are responsible for the actions of 
the domestic elites, which together with the incentives that the international donors 
provide the domestic elites with make hybrid regimes permanent. The political 
polarization is at the core of the explanatory account this dissertation presents. 
Ethnic divisions, reflected in political polarization are responsible for emergence of 
regimes with competitive elections. The elites emphasize the divisive issues in their 
campaigning, while the donors support the already thriving competitive environment. 
This keeps competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and Ukraine viable. Absence of 
polarization based on easily inflammable issues  results in the lack of 
competitiveness. However, an absence of divisiveness produces orientation on one 
vector of donors (the West). The stimulation of reform and praise for achievement in 
governance that the donors provide keep the non-competitive hybrid regime in 
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Introduction 
Two decades ago, in August of 1991, the Soviet Union peacefully broke up after an 
attempted coup d'etat, offering the social sciences a unique opportunity to observe a 
complex set of historical processes unfolding. After belonging to the same state for 
seven decades, the former Soviet Republics proclaimed independence, held multi-
party elections and proceeded to establish political institutions of their choosing. 
Scientists and political practitioners alike wondered: what type of regimes will 
emerge in the fifteen republics? Will they all establish democracies and market 
economies, or will some be more successful than others in achieving this goal? 
Observers around the globe hoped that the newly independent states would stick to 
their initial choice of constitutional democratic regimes, now that they had achieved 
the long-desired independence.  
 
However, what has followed was hardly expected. Some of the countries, such as the 
three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), have managed to build independent 
democratic regimes under the umbrella of the European Union. Others, like Georgia, 
have faced, ever since, difficulties in preserving its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Ukraine has continuously confronted the difficult challenge of choosing 
between the EU and Russia as special trade partners. At the time of writing, Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and independence are being challenged by Russia's insistence that it joins 
the Customs Union.  
 
The external pressures coming from the EU and Russia have greatly affected the 
decisions made by these countries’ domestic elites in the process of forming their 
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respective political regimes. Today, what we observe is a great variety of regimes in 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics that cover the whole range between full 
democracies to full autocracies. This dissertation is precisely devoted to the analysis 
of those regimes that are neither full democracies nor full autocracies and that are 
widely referred to in the literature as hybrid regimes. Allegedly, hybrid regimes are 
located in a sort of grey zone located between two clear-cut opposites, i.e. 
democracies and autocracies. This research wants to answer the following questions: 
what exactly are hybrid regimes and why do they endure? 
 
Scholars have only recently admitted that the countries of the FSU are not in 
transition towards democracy (Schedler 2002, Levistky/Way 2002, Hale 2006) but are 
rather distinctive types of –by now– relatively stable regimes that combine features of 
both democracies and autocracies. Several studies have emerged that attempt to 
conceptualize the so-called grey zone between democracies and autocracies and to 
explain these regimes’ failure to democratize. Despite the increase of rich case studies 
(McMann 2006, Robertson 2010) and comparative studies that include grey zones 
from around the world (Levitsky/Way 2010), the FSU countries, with their unique 
similarities and differences and their puzzling variety of regime outcomes, have not 
yet been considered as samples for such inquiries.  
 
This dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature on hybrid regimes. The analysis 
is therefore region-specific: it focuses on the FSU republics. Hybrid regimes are 
conceptualized in contrast with the region’s democracies and autocracies. A regime is 
here defined as a set of institutions that define, on the one hand, the access to state 
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power and, on the other, the exercise of state power. I argue that hybrid regimes are a 
mixed between the democratic and authoritarian ways of access to state power and the 
democratic and authoritarian ways of exercise of state power. Furthermore, I 
differentiate between two types of hybrid regimes, competitive and non-competitive, 
each with its own mechanisms of endurance. 
 
I explain the endurance of hybrid regimes as a combination of structural factors and 
actors’ choices, both domestic and international. The structural factors determine 
whether the hybrid regime that emerges after the break-up of the Soviet Union is a 
competitive or a non-competitive regime. The main thesis that I present here is that 
hybrid regimes are stabilized because it is in the interest of domestic elites that the 
hybrid regime does not move either into an authoritarian or a democratic direction. 
The reason is that the functioning of a hybrid regime guarantees that the state will 
receive its necessary financial resources from the international actors (EU, Russia and 
the USA). This financial support, in turn, gives the domestic political elite the 
necessary political clout to stay in office and monopolize state power. What 
mechanisms are at play? According to the argument presented here, the international 
actors give incentives to domestic elites to incorporate democratic institutions (the EU 
pressing for free and fair elections, USA emphasizing democratic governance, Russia 
demanding the control of electoral results) in exchange for their financial help. These 
states, for structural reasons, need the help provided by donors and, therefore, 
domestic elites are only too willing to accept the conditions set by donors. At the 
same time, however, domestic elites want to keep control of state power. The way to 
achieve both ends simultaneously is by combining democratic institutions with 
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authoritarian ones: an appearance of democracy combined with authoritarian attitudes 
and practices. 
 
The thesis is then divided into several sub-theses, depending on whether the hybrid 
regime is competitive or non-competitive, and on who the principal donors are. 
Competitive hybrid regimes assume free and fair elections but fail grossly in 
democratic governance; non-competitive hybrid regimes, in contrast, advance in 
democratic governance but do not have free and fair elections.  
 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first and the second chapters are aimed 
at specifying the dependent variable: political regime types in general and hybrid 
regimes in particular. The last three chapters are devoted to explaining the persistence 
of hybrid regimes among FSU countries. The goal of the first chapter is to provide a 
definition of the concept of political regime and its different forms. Scrutinizing 
different attempts to study regimes, Chapter 1 frames the conceptual basis for the 
thesis in three steps.  As a first step, this chapter emphasizes a paradigmatic shift in 
the democratization literature that re-installed the study of regimes at the core of the 
field. The chapter’s second step is to compare approaches to building a concept of 
regime types from the perspective of autocracy and democracy. The third step is to 
provide an analytical tool for studying regimes.  
 
The main task that I pursue in the second chapter is to classify the regimes of the FSU 
countries. The main challenge that I face here is the question of thresholds. Defining 
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and empirically assessing a regime that is neither a democracy nor an autocracy, but 
rather something in-between, requires precise rules of delineating these two clear 
types. The regime indicators that are widely used in the scientific community 
(Freedom House, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, among others) do offer thresholds that differentiate the regimes 
inside the grey zone. However, these indicators and proposed thresholds are not 
theory-driven and are intended to measure a wide range of regime-related factors. To 
overcome this difficulty, I use both theoretically and empirically driven thresholds. In 
addition to the exiting indicators, the constitutions of the 15 countries and their laws 
for regulating political parties are analyzed to enrich the classification.  
 
The third chapter summarizes the existing explanations for the emergence and 
persistence of pure forms of regimes (democracies and autocracies). It then argues 
that these explanations cannot account for the persistence of hybrid regimes, a task 
which Chapter 4 addresses. Building on a set of peculiar structural conditions 
discussed in Chapter 3 (relative lack of affluence and thriving ethnic heterogeneity), 
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical argument that identifies the mechanisms through 
which these structural conditions, together with the behaviour of external donors, give 
incentives to domestic political actors to maintain the hybrid regime across time. 
Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses of Chapter 4 empirically.  
 
Using Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as examples, which Chapter 2 identified as 
hybrid regimes, Chapter 5 addresses the role that political 
polarization/competitiveness plays as an intervening factor in channeling the way in 
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which domestic elites in the countries choose either to comply with democratic 
practices or to retain autocratic ones. Putting the countries with different levels of 
polarization into a comparative perspective allows singling out the degree of 
competitiveness as the core variable in the causal mechanism. This mechanism ties 
together the geo-political choices that the domestic elites make with the campaigning 
platforms that they choose based on the degree of ethnically-based political 
polarization. In order to test the hypotheses derived from the argument I compile data 
on structural and behavioral factors that underpin the degree of polarization in the 
three countries. I argue that polarization is the result of an overlap (even if not a 
perfect one) between territorial (i.e. regions inside the state), economic and ethno-
linguistic structures, on the one hand, and voting patterns, on the other. The analysis 
shows how a combination of ethnic identities and regional modernization determine 
the way the elites are exploiting these territorial patterns in their choices of 
international orientation (i.e. towards the EU, Russia, or the USA). Zooming in to the 
electoral geography of the three countries, regional voting patterns are revealed to be 
at the origin of political polarization. In order to specify the divisive issues that elites 
use to mobilize voters around the West –EU and USA– or Russia, I use data from the 
content-analysis of party programs by the Comparative Manifestos Project. I then 
identify the different incentives that the international donors offer to domestic elites 
and that help them to stay in power.  The analysis also draws on expert interviews 
conducted during fieldwork in these hybrid regime states. 
 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the results of the research, discusses the 
general implications of the dissertation and highlights the directions that might 
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helpfully connect the findings with future research. 
 
The originality of this research lies in its exploration of how structural pre-conditions, 
together with international conditionality, create a set of incentives in which domestic 
actors develop certain preferences that lead them to make a hybrid regime permanent. 
Using analytic narratives and elements of formal modeling, this dissertation shows 
how the hybrid regime becomes a solution that brings the interests of domestic and 
foreign actors into equilibrium. As I show here, democratic conditionality by 
















Chapter 1 Political regimes in the studies of democratization: 
theories, concepts, typology 
 
In this chapter I develop a framework for conceptualizing and measuring political 
regimes. By scrutinizing different attempts to study regimes, the chapter frames the 
conceptual basis for the thesis. Retaining the question that triggers this research, i.e., 
what kind of political regimes emerged in the FSU countries and what explains their 
persistence, the goal of this chapter is to build a concept of regimes. To approach to 
an answer to the first part of the research question, the chapter is designed in three 
steps. As a first step, it starts with emphasizing a paradigmatic shift in the 
democratization literature which re-installed the studies of regimes at the core of the 
field. The chapter proceeds by comparing approaches to build a concept of regimes 
from the perspective of autocracy and democracy, as the second step. In the third step 
it prepares an analytical tool to study regimes, borrowing from criteria-based 
approach. The unit of analysis in the study is political regime, cases – are regime 
types and the 15 countries are instances. The main intention I pursue with this chapter 
is to provide theoretical background for empirical classification of political regimes in 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. 
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1.1. Approaches to conceptualization: a ‘rebirth’ of the concept of 
political regimes 
 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union scholars studying political regimes had 
concentrated their attention on studying processes that fill the gap between the pure 
forms of the regimes1, i.e. the process of transition, democratization, etc. For a while, 
in the early 90s', the sole attention was focused on such crucial questions as, why 
some autocracies break down, what are the origins of democratization, how is a given 
country’s transition to democracy progressing and what are the determinants for a 
successful consolidation of democracy? (Przeworksi 1992, Linz/Stepan 1996, 
O'Donnell 1996).  
 
As time passed, the revival of academic interest to the studies of political regimes was 
due to two connected developments in democratization scholarship, the first of which 
is the insight that democracy is not the only possible end-point of a transition process. 
A belief that the mere trajectory of transition heads to democracy is rooted in a 
common misperception of the fundamental collective study co-edited by O’Donnell 
and Schmitter ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy’. 
Although, on the one hand, the title clearly states that the general idea is in transition 
from autocracy and, on the other, the authors suggest that transition, an ‘…interval 
between one political regime and another’ (O’Donnell/Schmitter 1986: 6) may not 
necessarily lead to democracy, the wishful thinking prevailed. It is true that ‘[t]he 
collapse of an undemocratic regime is a necessary condition for the introduction of a 
new democracy’ (Rose et. al. 1998: 4). Yet, the outcome, characterized by 
                                               
1  To be precise, the processes that scholars focused on usually connected or intended to connect 
pure forms of autocracies with pure forms of democracies. Little, if any, attention was given to the fall 
of democracies since the seminal  work of Juan Linz in 1978 
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uncertainty, is perceived to be highly dependent on elites’ behavior and maybe either 
the establishment of democracy, or of autocracy, or of some type of defective regime 
which they define as dictablanda – a liberalized authoritarian regime, or democradura 
– a restrictive illiberal democracy (O’Donnell/Schmitter1986:9). In the early years 
after the fall of Berlin Wall, transitology as originated by O’Donnell and Schmitter 
was successfully applied to countries that were known to have completed their 
transition to democracy. However, in countries where destination of transition 
remained an open question, the analytic tools of transitology were ill-suited, mainly 
because they treated democracy as normatively desired goal and failed to positively 
assess 'rules of the game' that major players relied on. Therefore, the first fundamental 
departure point for this study is: if a country liberalizes and moves away from 
autocracy, it does not mean that it certainly will end up establishing democracy.  
 
The second development is related to the article of Thomas Carothers ‘The End of 
Transition Paradigm’ (Carothers 2002). In a work with a self-evident title, Carothers 
calls the attention of both academics and practitioners to an analytic capacity of the 
transition paradigm which became limited with a passing of time. Carothers 
convincingly argues that empirical cases crash the core assumptions of the paradigm, 
such that moving away from autocracy does not imply to democracy, or that the 
countries are well-functioning states. However it is not the paradigm itself, but rather 
its applicability to certain cases that raises doubts. It should be clear that the 
‘transition paradigm’ should not be applied to the countries, which are not in 
transition any more, i.e. to those countries in which major actors agree upon ‘rules of 
the game’. Particularly the use of the ‘transition paradigm’ should be avoided in the 
cases that are neither democracies, nor autocracies, have stable socio economic links 
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(Merkel 2004: 33), and in which the decision-making process proceeded over several 
electoral cycles (Way 2004:143). In other words, there are countries that are not stuck 
in the transition from one regime to another, but rather, had established hybrid 
regimes that are stable and persistent. Thus, the second point of departure that the 
study relies on is: most of the countries of the Third Wave are not in transition, and 
not to democracy. Such governing arrangements, which later became known as hybrid 
regimes (Karl 1994), invited scholars in democratization field to enter a debate on 
types of actual political regimes and the ways to conceptualize them. This debate is 
relevant to the first part of my research question, that is, what types of political 
regimes emerged in the FSU states? 
 
The two aforementioned advancements shifted attention from the processes that 
connect two regime types and operate under uncertainty, to the processes that 
characterize each emergent political regime that functions under certain agreed-upon 
rules of the game. It stirred up a debate, deeply-rooted in democratization studies, on 
the use of dichotomous or gradual approaches to conceptualization and measurement 
of political regimes (Collier/Adcock 1999, Munck/Verkuilen 2002, Coppedge 2002). 
The pivotal point as summarized by Munck and Snyder (2004) is that the whole 
enterprise of conceptualizing and measuring political regimes can be narrowed down 
to the decision of where to place thresholds in order to account for a variety of 
regimes, and especially for the grey zone. Therefore, two questions that will guide the 
following discussion are: 1) how to conceptualize political regimes, and, 2) what are 
the criteria that allow distinguishing between different types of regimes? I.e., how to 
decide on where to put thresholds? 
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To proceed with this chapter’s task of crafting a concept of regimes that allows for a 
cross-country comparison within the universe of the FSU states, I show the ways to 
theorize political regimes from the end of democracy, autocracy and from the position 
of the grey zone (Goertz 2006: 19).  
 
1.2.Conceptualizing and measuring regimes 
 
In this section I develop the subject of the study in a multi-layered manner. The first 
layer covers development of the concept of political regimes as a universal tool that 
assesses variety of emergent governing arrangements. The second layer theorizes two 
extreme points of democracy and autocracy as well as the continuum in between. 
 
Conceptualization of political regimes is a challenging task: no matter where one 
starts, whether from democracy, autocracy, or by assessing the grey zone, the choice 
of a background concept has to be made. According to Adcock and Collier 
‘background concept… encompasses the constellation of potentially diverse meaning 
associated with a given concept’ and is used to adopt a more specific, systematized 
concept for the study (Adcock/Collier 2001: 530). This background concept is 
designed to anchor our understanding of governing arrangements, will serve as a point 
of reference for this study, and is chosen to be the concept of political regimes.  
 
The second step in the concept formation is to define a working (systematized) 
concept and to pinpoint its negative pole (Goertz 2006: 35). It is a crucial stage in 
every concept formation because it allows us to expose our analysis to the whole 
universe of cases and not only focusing on the positive instances, as well as fruitfully 
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theorize the continuum in between the two poles (Goertz 2006: 32).   
 
To begin with, the choice of a negative pole is connected with the threshold-setting 
endeavor2.  There are several ways in which to approach to this task: in the first, a 
negative concept of democracy can be logically derived by negation and be called a 
non-democracy, in which case hybrid regimes end up in this category (figure 1).  
 









Figure 1 is a schematic visualization of the discussion above. The two-point scale 
with two endpoints captures the whole universe of political regimes that are aligned as 
a continuous variable. Democracy is chosen as a working concept (on the right side) 
and non-democracy is a negative pole (on the left side). The black vertical line is a 
threshold which separates the two poles and for schematic reasons its place is chosen 
to be approximately in the middle between the two poles.  
 
As figure 1 demonstrates, when the working concept is chosen to be democracy, and 
it is clearly defined what democracy is, hybrid regimes subsequently fall in the same 
                                               
2  In this example I am referring to dichotomization of the working concept, therefore the use of 
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category as autocracies, i.e. regimes that are clearly in the negative pole.   
 
Alternatively, it is becoming increasingly common to use autocracy (as well as 
authoritarianism, or dictatorship) as a working concept in studies of political regimes 
in general or autocracies in particular. In this case, hybrid regimes are likely to mingle 
in with democracy (figure 2).  
 







As seen from the figure 2, similar to figure 1, when full scale of political regimes is 
taken into account, threshold separates the positive pole, autocracy, from the negative 
pole of non-autocracy with hybrid regimes and democracies belonging to the latter. 
Here again regimes are assessed on a two-point ordinal scale with two endpoints.  
 
Either way, hybrid regimes are not specified as a distinct category and end up as non-
classified, i.e. they are not defined separately and lost within a wider category. Yet, 
what becomes clear after the two ends are conceptualized, is which cases belong to 
the pure instances of autocracies or democracies and which fall into the grey zone.  
Theorizing of the continuum in between the two poles leads to the debate on how it 
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Therefore, the study proceeds in the following way: the concept of political regimes is 
employed to locate different instances along the continuum between democracies and 
autocracies; concepts of democracy and non-democracy are elaborated to filter out 
and to fine-grain the grey zone. 
 
1.2.1. The scope of the study: levels of analysis and concept formation  
 
Prior to introducing a discussion on measurement of political regimes, I would like to 
devote some time and space to outline conceptual hierarchy and structure that 
underlies the present analysis (Table 1). The unit of analysis, the core entity that the 
research aims to explain is political regimes. The concept of political regimes anchors 
in itself crucial parameters that are universal for every form of governing 
arrangement. It allows to pinpoint different types of political regimes that constitute 
cases of the study. On this level a specified, case-based working concept is developed. 
The 15 countries of the FSU are instances, in which this or that type of political 
regime emerges. This chapter deals with crafting of a conceptual basis for the unit of 
analysis and develops analytic tools to tap into the cases of different political regimes. 
The next chapter rests on the concept of political regimes and is devoted to filling the 
cases with matching instances.  
   
Table 1.  Structural components of the thesis      
The unit of analysis Political regimes (background concept) 
The case Type of political regime (working, specified concept) 
The instance A country that belongs to a type 
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As mentioned above, conceptually, transitology focused on democracy. The scholars 
used it as a point of reference for the goal to be attained and at the same time the 
concept of democracy was used to fit a variety of cases that were perceived to be on 
their way to democracy. This situation led to the phenomenon known as ‘conceptual 
stretching’, coined by Giovanni Sartori (1970: 57), which indicates that a concept in 
question is inflated with additional attributes to fit certain otherwise non-suitable 
empirical examples. To avoid conceptual stretching, Sartori suggests several 
strategies that can be synthesized into two general advices: 1) in order for a concept to 
grasp a greater diversity, one should use a more-encompassing concept with fewer 
defining attributes, i.e. move up the ladder of abstraction (generality) and loose 
conceptual differentiation; 2) or, if using the initial concept, to give up the scope of 
empirical diversity.  
 
Table 2 below graphically presents the ladder of generality that hierarchically 
assembles concepts in the thesis. It shows the overarching concept of regimes, with 
less attributes and more inclusive in terms of the number of empirical cases, and 
specified working concepts of regime types - democracy, hybrid regimes and 
autocracy - with more differentiation and less number of cases.  
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Table 2. Conceptual hierarchy of the thesis 
 levels of 
abstraction 
Type of concept Example Conceptual intensity 














In other words, an overarching, more-encompassing concept of regimes is used as a 
background that accommodates more specific regime types. 
 
 
1.2.2. How to measure regimes: approaches to threshold setting 
 
The debate on how to measure regimes can be presented in the following way. The 
scholars advocating a dichotomous approach (Sartori (1987), Linz (2000), Huntington 
(1991), Geddes (1999)) claim that regimes are ‘bounded wholes’ and cannot be ‘half-
democratic’ at the same time. Their opponents (Bollen/Jackman (1989), Dahl (1989), 
Coppedge/Reinicke (1990)) suggest that ‘democracy is always a matter of degree’. 
Assuming that, regimes that occur empirically will sometimes lack one or several 
characteristics that will prevent them from being called democracies under 
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dichotomous approach, but will still operate using democratic practices 
(Collier/Adcock 1999: 537-538). However, it should be made clear that measuring 
these regimes against dimensions of the concept of democracy is dubious because the 
essential features are unmeasured and the grey zone is believed to be ‘less 
democratic’.  
 
Yet, the use of gradation is justified when a degree of belonging to one category is 
measured, i.e., once a country is classified as a democracy, it can be measured as 
being more or less democratic. This is typical research design for a within-case (or 
within-regime type) comparison, for example, the case of democracies. However, a 
large variety of governing arrangements that exists today beg either for 
conceptualization of regimes, and not of democracies, or autocracies, in order to be 
measured continuously, or concentrating on one type of regimes and using gradation 
to judge on more or less belonging to the type. Otherwise, when several regime types 
are compared a researcher faces a decision of where to place thresholds, i.e., of 
understanding when the analysis no longer proceeds within the same regime type.  
 
However this ‘false dilemma’ needs to and can be overcome. I consider Munck, who 
argues that an m-point ordinal or ratio scale (m>0) with n-endpoints (0<n<=2) can be 
constructed to allow both continuity of the measurement (quantitatively) and rupture 
points (qualitatively) to set thresholds.    
 
Therefore, I suggest moving one level up the ladder of generality, in Giovanni 
Sartori’s terms and treat political regimes as the unit of analysis and an overarching 
concept in this study, as was discussed above. These political regimes will be 
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classified as a trichotomous variable in two steps: the first, uses certain criteria to 
maintain distinctions between regime types while the second, applies set-theoretic 
relationships (that constitute the basis of QCA) to filter out the pure types from the 
grey zone. 
     
Another issue to address before demonstrating examples of conceptualization of 
political regimes, is an urge to avoid electoral fallacy (Karl 1994, Snyder 2006) while 
conceptualizing from either end of the spectrum in the universe of political regimes. 
As many scholars noticed, holding competitive elections even for several electoral 
cycles does not automatically translate into being a democracy. Therefore very thin, 
minimalist definitions of political regimes that concentrate only on the way in which 
rulers get to power also leave the grey zone void of instances. It is true that holding 
free and fair competitive elections is a crucial ground-level test that defines a regime 
type. However, elections are necessary but not sufficient feature of democratic rule 
(Merkel 2004: 38). Yet, other features of a regime guarantee that those elected rule 
according to the institutionalized rules and this is done through rule of law, respected 
political rights, and civil liberties.  
 
Therefore, in what follows, I concentrate on conceptualization attempts that are 'thick' 
in the sense that the authors managed to overcome an electoral fallacy and looked at 
regimes through more complex lenses.  
1.3. Hybrid regimes as subtypes of autocracy 
 
The difficulty of conceptualizing regimes by looking at the authoritarian end was 
addressed by Linz in his fundamental attempt to create a typology of authoritarian and 
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totalitarian regimes. As a first step in his conceptualization, Linz uses authoritarian 
regimes as a systematized concept which he defines as  
‘…political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without 
elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor 
intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in 
which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-
defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’. (Linz 2000: 159)3  
 
In other words, Linz introduces a three-dimensional concept of authoritarian regimes: 
limited pluralism, mobilization, and ideologization. Yet, we do not learn whether 
these dimensions are interconnected; and, if so, in which way. Moreover, it remains 
unclear whether presence of all three dimensions is necessary or it is sufficient to 
observe a combination of several of dimensions for a regime to qualify as 
authoritarian. 
 
On the level of threshold setting, Linz’s work is not a strong example either. 
Struggling to define totalitarian regimes, he approaches the problem in a classical way 
by defining the ‘negative pole’ (Goertz 2006: 35).  Linz assumes that by knowing 
what a democracy is and concentrating his attention on the cases that do not share at 
least one of dimensions of his definition of democracy, he can craft definitions of both 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Democracy, for Linz, is a system that 
 
‘… allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic 
freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free 
competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their 
claim to rule; a democratic system does this without excluding any effective political 
office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community 
from expressing their preferences by norms requiring the use of force to enforce 
them’ (Linz 2000: 58). 
  
Nonetheless, what we observe is an absence of correspondence between positive and 
                                               
3 The original edition is of 1978 
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negative poles in the concept formation, which is surprising precisely because this is 
how Linz starts building his analytic framework. Following his logic, the 
conceptualization strategy, which he outlines in the beginning, begs for an association 
between dimensions of democracy and authoritarianism (and totalitarianism).  
 












The figure shows the spectrum of regimes behind the main focus of Linz’s study. The 
bold black line indicates a watershed that separates democracies from totalitarianism 
and authoritarianism. The dotted line that separates totalitarianism from 
authoritarianism symbolizes its ambiguous place in Linz’s study. It is visualized 
through a three-point ordinal scale with two endpoints.  
 
Consequently, as the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism becomes 
evident because the two concepts are formed in different theoretical spaces, a 
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study develops, it becomes clear that Linz places authoritarian regimes somewhere 
between democracy and ideal typical totalitarian regime. He claims that this definition 
came about while contrasting definitions of both totalitarianism and democracy. 
However, he does not provide a framework that shows the way in which dimensions 
of the two concepts merge in together to form a concept of authoritarianism, as well 
as it is not obvious where authoritarianism ends and totalitarianism begins (Linz 
2000:159), i.e., where does a threshold belong? 
 
Juan Linz’s approach does not imply that authoritarian regimes fall as hybrid regimes, 
into a grey zone between democracies and totalitarianism. This rather means that 
there is no grey zone and no place for a study of hybrid regimes when using Linz’s 
conceptualization as the analytic tool.   
 
The typology that culminates the study enhances the ambiguity of the problems with 
conceptualization mentioned above. Linz himself admits that the seven types 
(bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime, organic statism, mobilizational 
authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies, postindependence mobilizational 
authoritarian regimes, racial and ethnic “democracies”, “defective” and 
“pretotalitarian” political situations and regimes, posttotalitarian authoritarian 
regimes) '...are not logically derived from the dimensions of ... [the] concept of 
authoritarian regimes...', namely mobilization, ideology, limited pluralism, '...but 
derived largely inductively from an extensive descriptive literature on such regimes, 
which did not offer a comparative typological conceptualization' (Linz 2000: 179). 
Nevertheless, he argues that these types do fit the definition and the differences that 
are in the essence of distinguishing between these types vary along his three 
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dimensions (Linz 2000: 179). 
 
A more recent attempt to conceptualize hybrid regimes from the perspective of an 
autocratic end can be found in the work of Levitsky and Way on ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ where they point out at the lack of academic attention to ‘… the 
emergence and persistence of hybrid regimes combining democratic rules and 
authoritarian government’ (Levitsky/Way 2002: 3). The scholars claim that the most 
common type of hybrid regimes is competitive authoritarianism as the one in which 
‘…formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of 
obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often 
and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum 
standards of democracy’(Levistky/Way 2002: 51). While the label of their concept 
implies that it had been derived from the root concept of authoritarianism, Levitsky 
and Way provide a list of dimensions that are more suitable to define a democracy 
(Levitsky/Way 2010: 4). The chosen dimensions are: ‘(1) regular elections that are 
competitive, free and fair; (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, 
including freedom of speech, press, and association;… (4) the absence of  non-elected 
“tutelary” authorities (such as militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit 
elected officials’ effective power to govern;… [and] the existence of a reasonably 
level playing field between incumbents and opposition (Levitsky/Way 2010: 5-6). 
 
Although they convincingly demonstrate that political regimes in certain countries do 
not share more than a conduct of competitive elections with democracies, and 
resemble pure forms of authoritarianism in the rest of defining features, the way they 
build a concept is still ‘looking back’ at democracy and not at autocracy as the 
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background concept. This conceptual mismatch is evident through the claim that 
Levitsky and Way make that features competitive authoritarianism as ‘..a diminished 
form of authoritarianism’; but the concept is operationalized in ‘four arenas of 
democratic contestation’(Levitsky/Way 2002: 52-54). The picture below illustrates 
this point. 
 









The decision on threshold setting is not very clear and seems to be very intuitive for 
the authors. They argue that competitive authoritarianism falls short of both a full-
scale authoritarianism and a full-scale democracy (Levitsky/Way 2002: 53). The 
watershed between authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism is a sharper one 
and is drawn on the basis of whether opposition is allowed to participate in elections. 
However, the yardstick between competitive authoritarianism and democracy is hard 
to place specifically, due to the operationalization of the concept which is based on 
dimensions of democracy. 
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of why hybrid regimes (Competitive authoritarianism) persist, and is not as suitable 
when answering why did they emerge, i.e., my research question. For instance, the 
presence of what they call an ‘uneven level playing field’ can be considered as a 
result of a hybrid regime emergence, or it can contribute to endurance of a hybrid 
regime. This means that different logic lies behind the processes of a regime 
emergence and regime endurance, therefore the working concepts used need to reflect 
the challenges of a research question. In addition, a level playing field brings 
challenges in operationalization, making it quite difficult to set a threshold between a 
reasonably and an unreasonably level playing field. Besides, the existence of a 
‘reasonably level playing field’ seems to overlap with dimensions one (regular 
elections that are competitive) and three (broad protection of civil liberties, including 
freedom of speech, press, and association) but this interconnection is not given the 
necessary attention. Considering the above, the conceptualization suggested by 
Levitsky and Way, notwithstanding its practical use for the original purpose, is of a 
limited utility for seeking an explanation of regime emergence.  
 
Autocracies are of a special importance in the studies of regimes. Yet, when the focus 
of the study is on a wider range of the instances that include instances that 
institutionalized certain democratic features, the working concept needs to have a 
more encompassing character.   
 
After showing several approaches to conceptualization of regimes from the autocratic 
side (Linz, Levitsky/Way), while operationalizing them through dimensions of 
democracy (Levitsky/Way), I present attempts that utilized the full-scale democratic 
side as their point of reference for both, conceptualization and operationalization of 
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political regimes.  
 
1.4. Conceptualizing hybrid regimes form a democratic side 
 
The seminal statement of Francis Fukuyama on the victory of ‘liberal democracy as 
the final form of human government’ (1989: 3) was widely criticized among the 
students of democratization. However, some of them appreciated the forward-looking 
endeavor of conceptualizing regimes from a democratic end, taking into account that 
only approximately one third of the countries of the world (N=151) can be considered 
as democracies (liberal and electoral 36+32), while another two thirds can be 
classified as either closed authoritarianism (25) or as hybrid regimes (58).4  Besides, 
many countries established democratic institutions on a paper, joining the vast group 
of façade democracies. 
 
One of successful conceptualizations of the grey zone from the democratic end is 
presented in works on defective democracy by Merkel and collaborators. It provides a 
solution to two contradictory issues in concept formation, namely, how to increase 
analytic differentiation in order to capture hybrid regimes that emerged, on the one 
hand, and to avoid conceptual stretching precluding a use of the concept of democracy 
to the cases that are not democratic by minimal definition, on the other 
(Collier/Levitsky 1997: 430). They do so by constructing a background concept of 
embedded democracy. For Merkel, there are two ways of embeddedness: internal, by 
interconnection of dimensions that compose together a notion of democracy (partial 
regimes) and external, by providing the functioning conditions to the regime (Merkel 
                                               
4  Based on Schedler 2002, table 2 
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2004:36). Following this logic, a defective democracy is a diminished subtype of an 
embedded democracy, which falls short of one or few decisive attributes (partial 
regimes).  
 
As a d iminished subtype the concept of defective democracy ‘…might be seen as 
having fewer defining attributes, with the consequence that they would be higher on 
the level of generality and would therefore provide less rather than more 
differentiation (Collier/Levitsky 1997: 438, emphasis in the original). But as Collier 
and Levitsky claim, diminished subtypes of democracy, while indicating that some 
defining characteristics are missing, specify also the ones that are present, further 
differentiating among cases. This yields a greater differentiation that is provided by 
the background concept, and allows placing diminished subtypes on a lower level of 
generality (as a systematized concept).   
 





















The partial regimes as the core dimensions of the concept are not simply listed as well 
as each partial regime is not assumed to have an equal weight in the total sum. The 
authors claim that a defect in one partial regime may ‘infect’ other dimensions, but 
the structure of the concept allows to detect precise ‘…location of defects within a 
democracy’ (Merkel 2004: 43).  
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regimes of the grey zone that hold free and fair elections. There is a cluster of regimes 
that hold elections that are free but not fair and they would fall out of the grey zone if 
the concept of defective democracy is employed. When Merkel et. al. conceptualize 
regimes they are looking at defective democracies, assuming that the latter satisfy the 
minimalist definition of democracy as a political regime ‘…in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ 
(Schumpeter 1943: 269) or, in other words, ‘…a system in which parties lose 
elections’ (Przeworski 1991:10). This rule implies that there will be no defect in the 
partial “electoral regime” and sets a threshold between democracies and autocracies. 
Therefore, autocracies will not receive any attention if the concept is applied to a 
larger universe of cases than democracy and the grey zone (Figure 6). 
 







In this part of the chapter I systematized knowledge on conceptualization of political 
regimes basing on two aspects: 1) the background concept used (democracy, 
autocracy), and 2) how decisions about thresholds re-align the universe of cases. This 
analysis is meant to set forth concept formation and bring into light the importance of 
the threshold-setting endeavor. The next step is to build on this scholarship by crafting 
a concept of regimes, while keeping in mind the necessity to have a widely-applicable 
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emerged in the FSU states and which factors brought these regimes to existence. The 
next section will introduce theoretical foundations for thresholds that separate grey 





1.5. Concept formation 
 
1.5.1. Background concept of political regimes 
 
The notion of political regimes is not as widely contested as the concept of 
democracy, but despite of a general agreement, students of political regimes differ in 
the degree of attention they devote to either institutions, formal rules, i.e. procedures 
(Cardoso 1979, Fishman 1990), or to actors, practices, i.e. behavior (Mann 1993) or to 
both (Collier/Collier 1991, Linz 1975, Mainwaring 1992, O'Donnell/Schmitter 1986, 
Schmitter/Karl 1991) (Munck 1996: Appendix).  Reconstructing definitions of 
political regimes, given by mentioned above scholars, Munck was able to synthesize 
three sets of 'rules of the game' that scholars agree upon: 'the number and type of 
actors who are allowed to gain access to the principal governmental positions; the 
methods of access to such positions; and the rules that are followed in the making 
publicly binding decisions' (Munck 1996:15). The first set refers to the type of 
political system – presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarianism, numbers 
of political parties, electoral formula, etc.; the second, determines whether those in 
power are elected, (directly by the citizens or by their representatives) or appointed, 
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while the third set reflects on decision making procedures namely constitutionally 
prescribed legislative process or rule by decree. Behavioral component of the concept 
of regimes is regarded by Munck as embedded into the institutionalized rules. 
According to him, rules shape behavior of political actors. I agree with Munck, whose 
three-dimensional concept of regimes presents a middle ground between the two 
approaches I will discuss in a condensed fashion below.  
 
The first one, a minimalist, is an elaboration on Dahl’s procedural minimalist concept 
of democracy by Munck and Snyder (2004). Climbing one step up the ladder of 
generality (Sartori 1970) they apply two dimensions of contestation and participation 
not only to measure polyarchies but other regime types as well. Building on Satroti’s 
call for thresholds to be set in the points of discontinuity Munck and Snyder create 
middle-level categories that cover the grey (or foggy) zone5. 
 
A more intensive in description and  thicker in the number of dimension approach to 
study of regimes is taken on by Wheatley (2005). His concept of regimes is a merger 
of an institutional and elite-centered one by O’Donnell and Schmitter and a ‘society-
based’ by Waldrauch (2000:135). For him,  political regime consists of ‘…three 
dimensions: a) state structure, specifically the interconnectedness of political elite, b) 
governance, i.e., state penetration of society, and c) representation, i.e., society’s 
influence over government’ (Wheatley 2005: 3). Disaggregating further the three 
dimensions into eleven sub-dimensions6 Wheatley’s concept allow, in theory, to 
                                               
5 Munck and Snyder fall short of specifying what kind of middle level categories they actually mean. 
6 Four features of political elites: 1) mechanism of control and subordination within state 
organizations, 2) adherence to formal rules, 3) concentrated or dispersed power, 4) degree of 
contestation of power. Four feature of governance: 1) arbitrary use of repression to control social 
forces, 2) use of ideology to legitimize the elites claim to power, 3) state's capacity to provide 
public goods, 4)  state's capacity to provide institutional (legal, economic, etc.) framework. Three 
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create an extensive typology of regimes. Yet, he omits building a typology and 
engaging with a challenging exercise of threshold setting while focusing on one 
country study of Georgia for that matter.  
 
Another rather thick conceptualization of political regimes with a full picture of 
typology creation is elaborated by Merkel (1999). As a contrast to the discussed above 
work that concentrated on democracies, both embedded and defective, the focus of 
this one is on the whole spectrum of regimes, form autocracies to democracies. The 
idea behind is to enrich the participation-contestation space by introducing a 
dimension of rule of law and liberal constitution. To do so, Merkel develops ‘…six 
criteria that help to distinguish different types of political regimes’ (Merkel/Croissant 
2000: 32). Political regimes, for Merkel, are interlinked with the idea of political 
power and are intended to measure 1) legitimization of political power, 2) access to 
political power, 3) monopoly on political power, 4) structure of political power, 5) 
claim to political power, 6) exercise of political power (Merkel 1999: 28). He further 
aggregates these six criteria into a three-dimensional space in such a way that the first 
two are used to characterize universal suffrage, the second two pinpoint effective 
monopoly on government by democratically legitimated representatives, and the last 
two assemble liberal constitution and the rule of law (Merkel/Croissant 2000: 35). 
Despite the obvious ‘democratic bias’ in the way the three dimensions are labeled, six 
criteria indeed allow to comparatively assess different political regimes and place 
them into different cells in a typology.   
 
My background concept of political regimes is standing on two pillars. The first is 
                                                                                                                                      
features of representation: 1) procedures (elections, voting in referenda), 2) organizations (civil 
society), 3) informal influence (power-brokers and informal authority) (Wheatly 2005: 4) 
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Munck’s ‘rules of the game’ and the second is Merkel’s criteria of power.  
In line with Munck, I regard political regimes as distinctive combinations of 
institutions and practices that are established in a certain territorial entity in a given 
period of time.  
Treating for the time being the number of political actors as a constant7, I combine 
criteria based approach with the partial regimes of embedded democracy to account 
for a variety of political regimes in the FSU.  
 
1.5.2. Working concept of political regimes: criteria, thresholds, 
operationalization 
 
Following the definition given in the previous section political regimes are considered 
through the prism of two fundamental questions: 1) what are the ways in which the 
rulers get to power? And, 2) what are the ways in which the rulers exercise their 
power? 
 
For this reason I develop the concept, which consists of four dimensions, that address 
the questions above. These dimensions are elections, political rights, civil liberties and 
horizontal accountability. The connection between these dimensions and questions 
addressed is not straightforward and requires additional attention, as well as the ways 
in which the four dimensions interconnect in the conceptual space. 
 
 
                                               
7 I treat institutions such as type of government, electoral system, etc. as a product or a 
consequence of a regime type, as they are the matter of permanent re-shaping in the cases of the FSU 
and require a separate study. For similar argument see Frye 2002, Way 2005.   
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Figure 7. Interconnection between the four dimensions of a political regime 
              Elections                        Political Rights 
             Horizontal    
           accountability 




Figure 7 demonstrates that there are connections that can be traced between elections 
and political rights, political rights and civil liberties, and between civil liberties and 
horizontal accountability, and between horizontal accountability and elections. 
Elections are clearly an answer to the question of how do rulers get to power. 
However an interconnection between elections and political rights nests together the 
ways the rulers get to power and the way in which they are ruling. This connection is 
most vivid through the right to vote in competitive, free and fair elections. As Robert 
Dahl put it in his seminal work ‘Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition’, ‘[t]he right 
to vote in free and fair elections… partakes of both dimensions [participation and 
contestation]. When a regime grants this right to some of its citizens, it moves toward 
greater public contestation. But the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the 
right, the more inclusive the regime’ (Dahl 1971: 4).  
 
To assess the ways in which rulers get to power I concentrate on the most widely 
accepted and legitimate form of access to power: elections. All of the countries in the 
so-called third wave of democratization institutionalized elections as the main way in 
which people delegate their power to certain individuals to represent their interests. 
This is an ideal-typical situation: the reality is much more complicated, for example, 
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by direct, straightforward or indirect, complex restrictions on who can vote and how 
can one get elected. To grasp this complexity, I use a conduct of free and fair 
elections8 as a proxy and construct four theoretical possibilities of electoral outcome 




Table 3. Mode of the conduct of elections 
 Fair Not fair 
Free Democracy, hybrid Restricted competition 
(near autocracy) 
Not Free  Autocracy 
 
Out of four theoretical possibilities, the table captures three empirically sound 
situations: democracy and hybrid regimes are characterized by free and fair elections, 
in these parsimonious terms; in autocracies, elections are neither free, nor fair; a 
situation, when elections are free but not fair features restrictions on competition and 
is best described as a near autocracy. The theoretically possible but empirically not 
quite viable and in a way contradictory situation, in which elections are fair but not 
free, is not considered further. 
 
Hence, the first threshold to separate autocracies from democracies and hybrids is the 
conduct of free and fair elections. To imagine access to power in a single-dimensional 
                                               
8  The term 'free and fair elections' became major criteria according to which elections are judged 
around the world. A composite definition is based on  international declarations, agreements, and 
norms and in the nutshell postulates, that: 
 'In any State the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the people as 
expressed in genuine, free and fair elections held at regular intervals on the basis of universal, equal 
and secret suffrage' (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill. Free and Fair Elections. Interparliamentary Union. 
2006. -iv-) 
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space, or on a scale, the conduct of elections is a rupture point that splits the two-point 
ordinal scale (autocracy; hybrid and democracy) with two endpoints (autocracy; 
democracy), as shown in a figure 8 below.  
 
Based on this criterion regimes can be accurately separated opening a door to analysis 
of other dimensions and prevent committing an electoral fallacy. 







To have a thicker and more encompassing picture of elections, one needs to conduct 
second test to ensure credibility of electoral process, which is to check how 
competitive these elections are. Scholars use different indicators to assess 
competitiveness of elections, for example, by setting (what looks as if at random) 
70% of votes cast for one candidate or a party as a cut-off point that indicates lack of 
competition and manipulation of the elections outcome (Way 2004:147). This 
indicator, however, is not capturing the situation that occurred in several re-election 
events that took place after the ‘colored revolutions’ where the popular candidate 
sometimes received an overwhelming support that exceeded the set-above threshold. 
Important caveat here is to look at whether it was an incumbent president or party that 
received the number of vote higher than 70% or whether it was a challenger, in which 
case the additional information is needed. I will use the raw elections results data 
Autocracy Hybrid 
regimes  
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from Database ‘Parties, Elections, and Governments’ of WZB Research Unit: 
‘Democracy: Structures, Performance, Challenges’. 
 
To provide for it, I check whether there was a meaningful alternative on the ballot or 
it was a case of ‘elections without a choice’ (Hermet, Rose, Rouquie 1978), by 
looking at the voting results as well as at the OSCE pre-election discussion on 
restriction of participation and candidate’s withdrawal on a demand in favor of the 
running incumbent. This criterion is interlinked with the dimension of political rights: 
it shows that the ways to access power and the ways in which the power is exercised 
are connected vessels; they are indeed a combination of institutions and practices as 
defined above. Hence, I assume that elections are competitive, if there is at least 
another candidate/party running and the campaign is assessed to be held in a 
competitive environment, and non-competitive, if otherwise.   
  
To assess a country’s performance on freedom of political involvement two levels of 
participation need to be taken into account.  
The first is participation by voting, in other words suffrage. It is not surprising that 
universal suffrage is granted in the majority of the world’s countries and measured by 
this indicator will not yield a variation between different regime types. Rather, what 
needs to be considered is whether the right to citizenship was granted to all legal 
residents at the moment when a country became independent.  
 
The second level is participation through the right to association, one of the 
fundamental features of a democratic polity, is measured through an ability of a group 
to organize into a party. For this matter, I consult the constitutions and the laws on 
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political parties in the countries of interest. Any restrictions specifically on ethnic, 
religious, regional grounds will result in a polity falling into an autocratic camp. To 
have a higher reliability measure of this dimension and in order to tap into the grey 
zone, the BTI scores will be used with the coding scheme available in appendix 2. 
Thresholds that BTI is suggesting are empirically derived from the ‘cross-boards’ by 
relative assessments of performance in different countries.  
  
Civil rights are at the core of a regime if it is to be called a based-on-the-rule-of-law 
democracy. When the rulers guarantee the rights, to put into simple terms, ‘to listen 
and to be heard’ there is a synergetic effect which is transmitted over to other 
dimensions of a political regime. The right to express opinion freely and not to be 
restricted by any means in receiving information provides a control on both, political 
rights and on horizontal accountability. Expressed mostly through independent media, 
civil rights ensure that alternative opinions to those in power are heard, i.e. it permits 
an opposition to get their message through to the electorate. Participation of the 
opposition, on the other hand, is a necessary condition for competitiveness of electoral 
process that secures a meaningful alternative on the ballot. For some scholars the 
relationship between civil rights and the conduct of free, fair and competitive 
elections is a direct one. McMann, for example, argues that ‘[a]t the polls, 
independent journalists observe balloting, increasing the likelihood that the right to 
vote will be protected and that elections will be free and fair’ (McMann 2006: 50). 
Either way, independent mass media is a guarantor of opposition participation and 
transparency of electoral process. This, according to Jurgen Habermas, is the function 
of the open public sphere to provide a critical judgment from the outside of the 
power-driven sphere (Habermas 1992). Without this interaction between the public 
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and the rulers we cannot speak of a liberal democracy. 
 
Independent media as one of the manifestations of the pubic sphere and of observance 
of civil rights also plays its role in securing horizontal accountability among the 
branches of power.  Often referred to as ‘a watchdog of democracy’ or ‘the fourth 
brunch of power’, mass media serve as built-in mechanisms that control the 
performance of separation of powers, especially independence of judiciary branch, 
and informing the domestic and international communities about any irregularities.   
 
To approximate the measurement of civil liberties I use two indicators: the BTI and 
the one from World Freedom Press country rankings run by Reporters Without 
Borders to cross-check the restrictions on media. In both cases the experts’ surveys 
were used to assess the levels of freedom to express opinion, namely the 
independence of media and strength of civil society groups.  
 
The fourth element in the concept of political regimes is horizontal accountability or, 
in other words, the rule of law in a strict sense of American tradition of 
constitutionalism. A famous statement of James Madison published in Federalist No. 
47 indicates a centrality of separation of powers for a political regime as its defining 
feature: ‘The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, 
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny’9. However, as 
many contemporary political theorists notice (see, for example, Taras 1997), on the 
one hand, this classical definition of three brunches of power acting independently 
                                               
9 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Penguin Publishers. 
1987. First Published 1788. 
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yet, cooperating and controlling each other within their delineated authority, varies in 
each of the established democracies of the Northern Hemisphere depending on the 
necessity to delimit one or another branch of power. On the other hand, adoption and 
adaptation of this institutionalized practice in some countries presents an absolutely 
new experience and thus an interesting challenge due to a long tradition of fused 
powers in the hands of the chief executive – be it a Tsar, a Chan, a Hetman, or a 
General Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. 
 
The link between a secured horizontal accountability and the conduct of free and fair 
elections is of high significance. The competitiveness of elections, under certain 
conditions, is translated into the competitiveness within the legislative power and 
between legislative and executive branches of power. This competitive spirit can 
affect as well the judicial branch through the appointment of judges by the winning 
side. Similarly, the skewed powers between the three branches, or fused powers in the 
hands of a chief executive makes electoral victory through fraud a possible scenario. 
The reason is that even if the opposition contests the official results of the elections in 
the Supreme Court, but the judges there are on the side with the incumbent – the 
court's decision is very likely to be in favor of the official (even if fraudulent) results. 
 
To measure horizontal accountability, apart from using the BTI index, I develop 
additional indicators on two levels: institutional and procedural10. The straightforward 
approach to measurement of institutional dimension of horizontal accountability does 
not yield much diversity as formally most of the countries of the FSU recognize the 
principle of separation of powers in their constitutions. However, what can shed some 
                                               
10  Institutional indicators will look at the formal institutions (constitutions) to assess the 
principles of separation of powers. Procedural will concentrate on the practices that are assessed by the 
existing composite indicators by various think-tanks.   
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light on the practice of the principle is whether there are coalitional vs. appointed by 
the president cabinets. Coalitional would imply that the legislative branch has certain 
powers in decision-making and that the president did not curb these powers and 
turned the parliament into a pure rubber-stamp organ.  
 
The capacity of an incumbent to change rules of the game in order to stay in power is 
a procedural indicator that determines a degree of horizontal accountability11. The 
instances considered are referenda to postpone elections, i.e. to change the 
constitution in order to secure staying in power; referenda, public initiative or 
constitutional court’s rulings that allowed the president to run for the third term. 
These events allow to distinguish between democracies – where the questions were 
never on agenda, autocracies, where once initiated were successfully completed, and 
hybrid regimes, where although initiated were confronted with the pressure form 
either legislative or judicial branches.  
 
                                               
11  The desire of the rulers to prolong their stay in power is not that uncommon in democracies. 
However, after (re)gaining independence is of particular importance because it meant especially in the 
first years it meant the political will to stick to the new rules of the game and to show a respect to the 
newly established institutions 
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Table 4. Operationalization of political regimes 
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Free and unfair 
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After each dimension of the concept is scrutinized and operationalized separately it is 
time to bring them back together into one concept and pave the way for the cases to 
fall into the classification. One systematized way to do it, is to use qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) to build a typology. QCA, usually referred to as a 
method, has a wider application as a tool for a concept formation and typology 
building. Using Boolean algebraic tools (0 for absence or non-occurrence; 1 for 
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presence or occurrence) and applying the foundations of the set theory (membership, 
or non-membership in a given unit) to various concepts and relations in social science, 
the method allows by means of using a continuous measures of political regimes to 
cross-tabulate democracy with autocracy and filter out hybrid regimes at their 
intersection12. In other words, by treating hybrid regimes as the ones that combine 
features from autocracies and democracies, i.e., lying at an intersection of the two 
ranges of the concept of political regimes developed above, it is possible to single out 
their position on the conceptual space and place the empirical occurrence of a regime 
into a democracy, autocracy or a hybrid ‘box’.  
 
This can be demonstrated in the picture below, where the scale of democracy is drawn 
on the y-axis, and of autocracy on the x-axis; both scales return measurements of zero 
or one. A country receives a score of 1 on democracy scale and the regime that is 
established is called a democracy, if all of the dimensions in the elaborated above 
concept of regimes score as 1, and a score of 1 in autocracy if all dimensions score 1 
and its respective regime is called an autocracy. The score of zero is assigned 
otherwise. There will be countries in the sample that will score as one on both scales 
of democracy and autocracy in certain dimensions and as the picture suggest will be 






                                               
12  I am grateful to Charles Ragin for recommending to use the method to operationalize the 
concept of regimes 
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Table 5. The universe of political regimes on the scale of democracy and 
autocracy 
 
























 0                                      AUTOCRACY                                                           1 
 
 
These simultaneous presences on both scales represent the mixed nature of regimes in 
the sense that features of democracies and of autocracies are combined under one 
governing arrangement, which initiated this research endeavor.  
 
According to the coding procedures developed in this chapter, the countries will be 
measured against the suggested indicators and put into one of the corner-spaces of the 
concept of regime. The picture below shows the concept of political regimes 
represented in a tabular way. It also shows how the concept of regimes is translated 
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Table 6. The four types of political regimes 
Elections Political rights Civil rights Horizontal 
accountability 
Regime type   
Free and fair Respected Respected Respected Democracy 
Free and fair Restricted Respected Respected Ethnic Democracy 





Attempts to fuse 
powers 
Hybrid    
Free not fair Restricted Restricted Fusion of 
powers 
Near autocracy 
Neither free nor 
fair 




Throughout the study, a political regime is referred to as a democracy if access to 
power is exercised through free and fair elections, political and civil rights are de jure 
and de facto guaranteed and rulers keep each other accountable through the system of 
checks and balances. An autocracy is a political regime in which elections are held 
but are neither free nor fair, there are restrictions on political and civil rights and 
powers are fused in the hands of a president. In hybrid regimes, access to power is 
effectuated through free and fair elections, however there are some irregularities with 
the civil rights and horizontal accountability. In other words, in hybrid regimes there 
are elements of both democracies and autocracies that co-exist through several 
electoral cycles. Ethnic democracy is a certain breed of democracy with restricted 
access to citizenship and near autocracies are autocratic regimes with no viable 
alternative on the ballot but where elections are considered to be free of fraud and 
manipulation.   
 
As one can see, the presented framework allows highlighting the achievements of the 
scholarship to reach out conceptually to the grey zone while providing its own 
solution to the challenge. To sum up, crucially important move beyond transitology 
scholarship sets a stage for assessment of regimes by inserting a typical for a 
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governing arrangement criteria-based litmus paper with a developed scale to classify 
political regimes. The designed approach shifted analysis from the study of regime 
types in particular to the study of regimes in general which enables greater inclusion 
of empirical cases and a closer fit between the concepts used and the reality observed. 
In the same vein, the approach looks at the debate on whether a concept should be 
dichotomized or measured continuously from a different point of relevance by 
treating the concept of regimes continuously and using thresholds to separate one type 
of regime form another as in a dichotomous conceptualization.    
   
1.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarized the scholarly debate on conceptualization and measurement 
of political regimes. It created an analytic framework for empirical assessment of the 
FSU states, which will be the subject of the next chapter.  
 
Precisely, the concept of political regimes is elaborated as a continuous one, 
accounting for two poles in the extremes and the grey zone. Combining a criteria-
based approach that rests on political power with the concept of embedded 
democracy, a newly crafted concept of political regimes overcomes a focus solely on 
democracies and embraces a variety of regimes. Two thresholds are introduced that 
help distinguish between democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies. The first is the 
conduct of internationally recognized free and fair elections and it separates 
democracies and hybrid regimes form autocracies. The second is restricted rule of 
law, the fusion of powers and curbed media freedoms that set democracies aside from 
the hybrid regimes and autocracies. This is the theoretical set of thresholds.  The latter 
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will gain more shape and empirical component in the next chapter which will fill each 
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Chapter 2 Variety of Political Regimes: Empirical Evidence 
from the States of the Former Soviet Union.  
 
‘With challenger Abdullah Abdullah dropping out of November's runoff election, 
Afghan president Hamid Karzai was effectively reelected to a second term last 
Monday, evidence, world observers said, that Afghanistan has become a shining 
beacon of democracy, theocracy, autocracy, and authoritarianism in an otherwise 
troubled region’. 
Afghan Presidential Election: A Celebration Of All Forms Of Government 
Democratic, The Onion, November 11, 2009  
 ‘Then the hour for the usual election for breakfast having arrived, and there being no 
opposition, I was duly elected, after which, there being no objections offered, I 
resigned. Thus I am here’. 
Mark Twain, Cannibalism In The Cars, 1868 
 
Various political regimes can take root in the same country. Thus we can believe the 
satirical example given by The Onion (see above). ‘The Afghan scenario’, typical for 
any newly established regime in which rulers come to power through elections that 
are a manifestation of not only democracy, but of any other form of rule. However, 
there is an element of truth in every joke. On the one hand, the example of 
Afghanistan so vividly illustrated in The Onion clearly hints at the existence of 
regimes that are difficult to be captured, measured, and classified with the existent 
knowledge and approaches. The same example, on the other hand, shows that there is 
an empirical case of a regime where media are free and not only provide an 
alternative to the official opinion but also allows existence of a satirical (cf. the Soviet 
term ‘steb’) outlet such as The Onion. 
The main task that I pursue with this chapter is to classify regimes that can be 
empirically found in the FSU states. This task is challenged by the question of 
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thresholds. Defining and empirically assessing a regime that is neither a democracy 
nor an autocracy, but rather something else, requires precise rules of delineation from 
the two clear types. The regime indicators that are widely used in the scientific 
community (Freedom House, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, among others) do offer thresholds that differentiate 
regimes within the grey zone. However, these indicators and proposed thresholds are 
not theory-driven and are intended to measure a wide range of regime-related factors. 
Hence, the thresholds become a defining part of the regimes instead of the other way 
round, i.e. the differences in regimes establish the thresholds. Additionally, when 
several indicators are applied to the same country 'the Afghan scenario' can be 
detected: the same country is considered to be a democracy, a hybrid regime, and an 
autocracy. One can argue that the same country can be placed in a different category 
by different indicators. Yet, it signals how problematic the blind use of these 
indicators can be. 
To overcome this difficulty, I suggest using both theoretically (as defined in the 
previous chapter) and empirically driven thresholds based upon a combination of 
existing indicators and measures. The background concept of political regimes, 
comprised of four dimensions (elections, political rights, civil liberties, separation of 
powers), is going to be measured using approximations to the four dimensions by 
available indicators. In addition to the exiting indicators I will analyze the 
constitutions of the 15 countries and their laws on parties to enrich the classification.  
The chapter therefore consists of three sections. The first section discusses briefly the 
existing indicators and lays out the guidelines for setting thresholds when using these 
various indicators. The second section scrutinizes elections, which represent the first 
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crucial distinction between autocratic rule and other regime types. The third section 
investigates how rulers govern once in power (i.e. the exercise of power) by 
evaluating the countries’ adherence to political and civil rights as well as their 
separation of powers.   
2.1.Indicators and Thresholds 
 
Given the importance of all four dimensions (elections, political rights, civil liberties, 
rule of law) for determining a regime type, there had been several attempts pursued by 
the world's renowned research think tanks to measure them. Among them are 
Freedom House (FH)13, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)14, and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)15. Indices provided by FH, EIU, and BTI, all based 
on expert surveys both structured and non-structured, are usually made available in 
aggregated form. In what follows I briefly discuss each one of them and address the 
challenges that a researcher faces when using them for a medium-N study similar to 
the one pursued here.  
The Freedom House is probably the most commonly used reference in long N studies 
mainly because it covers almost all counties (193) and territories (15) in the world 
since 1972 and measures political rights and civil liberties. After filling out the survey 
questions, the coders rate a country' guarantee of political rights and civil liberties. 
The resulting aggregated scores range from 1 (the highest) to 7 (the lowest). The 
linguistic qualifiers separate the countries (and territories) into three groups, thus 
                                               
13  Freedom House: Freedom in the World. At 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 last accessed on 
December 16, 2009 
14  Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Country reports. At http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/459.0.html?&L=1 last accessed on December 16, 2009 
15   Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008. At 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf last accessed on December 16, 2009 
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allowing for the existence of a grey zone. According to FH methodology, scores 1 and 
2 imply that a country is ‘free’ of violations of political and civil rights; the scores of 
3 and 4 stand for ‘partially free’ political setting; scores of 5, 6, and 7 mean that 
countries are ‘not free’.  
While capturing very well the situation in the free and non-free sections of the 
continuum, the grey zone is defined very vaguely by the FH index. Moreover, the two 
indices are very inclusive and combine several dimensions of the concept developed 
in this study. The index of political rights, for example, includes ‘electoral process' 
(corresponds to 'elections' in the concept of regimes here) and ‘functioning of 
government’ ('rule of law' here) in addition to ‘political pluralism and participation’16. 
Since there are  no disaggregated scores available for the components of the index, its 
use in medium-N studies requires case knowledge to navigate through the scoring.    
Nations in Transit (NIT) is a subdivision of Freedom House that measures regimes 
and regime performance in the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia. According to the NIT methodology17, scores assigned to each dimension are 
tied to respective regime types: 'consolidated democracy' scores between 1 and 2.99; 
'semiconsolidated democracy' scores between 3 and 3.99; ‘transitional or hybrid 
regimes’18 score between 4 and 4.99; ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes’ score 
between 5 and 5.99; and ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’ score between 6 and 7.  
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) relies on surveys in which experts’ 
                                               
16  Freedom House. Methodology. At 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008  Last accessed on 
February 9, 2010  
17  Freedom House. Nations in Transit. Methodology. Accessed at 
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/nit2009/methodology.pdf  on January 28, 2010    
18  This thesis is based on the assumption that hybrid regimes are different from the regimes in 
transition. While this distinction is not shared by the founders of the FH, I nevertheless use it, 
mainly because the labeling seems to be arbitrary in any case.  
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opinions include an assessment of both formal and informal institutions and practices. 
The codebook suggests the use of linguistic qualifiers that separate scores from 10 
(the highest) to 1 (the lowest) into four groups. Thus, operating with the notion of 
‘defects’, the scores of 10 and 9 indicate absence of defects; 8, 7, and 6 are assigned 
when the defects are present and moderate; the scores of 5, 4, and 3 indicate the 
presence of severe defects, and at an occasion of extreme defects, the scores of 2 and 
1 are assigned19. This is a relatively new indicator and is unfortunately not available 
for all of the countries in my sample in a disaggregated manner (which corresponds to 
the dimensions of my concept of regime) until 2008. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) index of political participation is, similar to 
the BTI, a new index available from 2007 onwards. It assigns scores from 0 to 10 
(where 0 is the lowest score and 10 is the highest)20. The scoring in each of the 
dimensions is directly linked to a regime type (full democracies, flawed democracies, 
hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes) without giving a profound methodological 
linkage between the scores and regime outcome.  
The best way to shed light on the fuzziness of the grey zone is to use all three indices 
together for each of the measured dimensions: political rights, civil liberties and 
horizontal accountability. Despite being methodologically different, the three indices 
correlate highly on civil rights21 and political rights22. When used together, FH shows 
the trends while the BTI and the EIU are best used to anchor and cross-validate the 
scores of issues in the problematic grey zone at the years available. 
                                               
19  BTI 2008 Manual for Country Assessments, At http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Anlagen_BTI_2008/BTI2008_Manual.pdf 
 Last accessed on December 23, 2009  
20  Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008. At 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf last accessed on December 16, 2009 
21 The indicators of civil rights correlate even at higher rates than those of political rights: BTI and FH 
at 0.97, FH and EIU at .91, and EIU and BTI at .92. 
22 The three indicators correlate highly: BTI and FH at .96, BTI and EIU at .86, EIU and FH at .81 
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2.2. Thresholds 
 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapter determined several building blocks for 
threshold setting. First and foremost, it is electoral conduct that separates autocracies 
from both democracies and the grey zone. However, determining what separates 
democracies from the grey zone, thereby identifying the grey zone from both the 
autocracy and democracy poles, is a more challenging task to complete. As was 
mentioned earlier, the thresholds suggested by the existing indices do not provide 
good grounds for classifying regimes into a framework concept of political regimes, 
as explained in the previous chapter. The use of the existing indices helps capture the 
two ends in the continuum of regimes and place the variety of cases in between into 
order, but requires fine-tuning with additional data based on the knowledge of each 
case to properly place regimes that oscillate between the two ends of the spectrum. It 
also shows that the placing of thresholds is generally empirically driven and 
eventually divides countries based on mean values of aggregated dimensions of 
different concepts of regimes. However, what arises out of combining different 
indicators is the possibility of inductively constructing thresholds by comparing each 
country’s position as given by EUI, BTI and FH in 2008, a year when the three are 
available23, while simultaneously including the theory behind regime 
conceptualization. 
In order to standardize the diverse sources of data and measurements that will be used 
throughout this chapter in order to analyze countries’ performance in each of the four 
dimensions of a regime, I use the term ‘high’ to refer to such characteristics as 
‘complying with standards’, ‘competitive’, ‘non-restrictive’, ‘non-violated’, or 
                                               
23  This analytic scheme can be applied later a greater reliability, when more data/time points 
will become available in the future. 
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‘separated’. The grade ‘low’ is used when the dimensions of a regime are ‘non-
competitive’, ‘not in compliance’, ‘severely restricted’, ‘severely/extremely violated’, 
‘fused’; and I will grade dimensions as ‘mixed’ when either the descriptions from 
‘high’ and ‘low’ merge or  when such middle-ground qualifiers as ‘few restrictions’, 
‘moderate violations’, ‘struggle’, or ‘fused with some instances’ are used.  
In assessing the performance of each of the 15 countries along the four dimensions 
through the use of the three aforementioned indices (FH, BTI, EUI), the following 
thresholds are considered. 
A country is considered a democracy if it satisfies two conditions: 
1) using the same index, the country’s performance remains ‘high’ across dimensions 
AND 
2) (1) holds for all, or the majority of, indices. 
Thus a country in which: (a) executives attain power through competitive elections 
that (b) comply with internationally recognized standards and in which (c) rulers, 
once in power, do not restrict participation and do not violate civil liberties while, at 
the sime time, (d) rulers are controlled by legislative and judicial powers, is a 
democracy. 
  
Likewise, a country is considered an autocracy if it satisfies two conditions: 
1) using the same index, the country’s performance remains ‘low’ across dimensions 
AND 
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2) (1) holds for all, or the majority, of indices. 
Hence, a country in which (a) executives assume power through elections that are not 
competitive and (b) fail to comply with internationally recognized standards, and in 
which (c) the executive, once in power, engages in restricting participation and 
violating civil liberties (d) while fusing legislative and judicial powers under the 
executive’s dominant subordination, is an autocracy. 
  
Finally, a country is considered a hybrid regime if it satisfies two conditions: 
1) using the same measure, the country’s performance remains ‘mixed’ across 
dimensions AND 
2) (1) holds for all, or the majority, of indices. 
Consequently, a country in which (a) executives attain power in either competitive or 
not competitive elections that (b) most of the times comply with internationally 
recognized standards and (c) in which rulers, once in power, informally restrict 
participation and moderately violate civil liberties while (d) legislative and judicial 
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2.3. Measuring political regimes: getting to power 
 
Historically, the assumption of power involved some form of competition, be it feudal 
warfare, family rivalry, or a peaceful electoral process. Today, however, elections 
have evolved as the most widely accepted form. A widely shared explanation of why 
this is the case is given by the founders and followers of the new institutionalism, who 
regard elections as a mechanism to minimize transaction costs, a pathway to 
legitimate rule in the majority of the countries. However, this relatively homogenous 
way of attaining power becomes less widespread when the conduct of elections is 
considered. To be precise, some elections are conducted according to the letter of the 
law while others violate the law and are marred with fraud, and yet are still used to 
further legitimize the current ruler or his hand-picked successor24. Moreover, 
elections may either be competitive or non competitive and may vary in the extent to 
which they follow the rules. This distinction is of special importance for the countries 
of the FSU, for the reason that I will now consider.  
 
Many of the countries in the sample had their first experience with elections under the 
USSR25, where the electoral process was lacking in competition. There was usually 
one candidate on the ballot who, when elected, did not represent the interests of the 
people but merely conveyed the policies of the Communist Party. This experience 
was far from competitive, and elections (vybory) were reduced to the merely 
symbolic act of voting (golosovanie). Despite the fact that competition took place 
                                               
24  The successor can be picked out of the loyal elites (twice in Russia) or out of one’s family 
circle (Azerbaijan). 
25  Elections were held in independent Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russian Empire 
before these countries became a part of the Soviet Union. Although elections were held to 
representative organs in the Romanian part of Moldova and in Russian and Austro-Hungarian parts of 
Ukraine, both examples lack being independent states when contrasted to the earlier mentioned cases.  
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‘under the carpet’ for the position of being put on the ballot, such a practice has little 
resemblance to commonly-acknowledged good practices of electoral competition. 
While mass organizations, unions, societies, meetings of workers and farmers, and 
other collectives could have invoked their constitutionally-defined right to nominate a 
candidate, in fact the nomination process was under the tight control of the 
Communist Party (Beigbeder 1994: 46). Thus, the majority of the fifteen countries 
under consideration do not have a historically-rooted tradition of free and fair 
elections. Nevertheless, the first founding elections after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, which many scholars cite as exemplifying the emergence of the new political 
order (Gelman/Elizarov 1999: 31), were mostly free and fair by today’s standards. 
Such a mix of experiences in the quality of the electoral process enhances our 
understanding of different political regimes and is a starting point in this analysis. 
 
The following section assesses electoral processes in the fifteen countries of the FSU 
from a comparative perspective according to three criteria: freedom, fairness, and 
competitiveness.  
 
2.3.1. The analysis 
 
To evaluate and compare the electoral processes in the fifteen countries that comprise 
the sample I draw on the reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe Elections Observation Mission (OSCE EOM). Election monitoring by 
international observers, which became the norm in the years after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, nevertheless has a long history; it dates back to the 1857 monitoring of 
plebiscites in Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian, British, French, Prussian, Russian, 
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and Turkish delegates (Beigbeder 1994). This tradition was continued by the United 
Nations after its creation in 1945 and persisted - albeit unsystematically - throughout 
the Cold War period. International observation contributed to the emergence of a 
practice of domestic monitoring of elections by opposition groups. Such a practice of 
election observation played a part in the mobilization of anti-regime opposition in 
East Germany and called attention to the spurious nature of elections in the GDR in 
May 1989 (Fulbrook 1992:14). The self-organized observers mobilized the 
disenchanted voters to protest against the fraudulent elections results, the scope of the 
protests grew and six months later the map of Europe underwent major revisions 
again with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
Since then, election monitoring has proliferated to such a degree that today almost 
every international organization - partisan or non-partisan - has its election-
observation unit, usually as part of the democracy promotion effort of the same 
organization (Carothers 2004: 84). 
 
For the purposes of this investigation, the OSCE has been chosen from among the 
alternatives for several reasons. First, the OSCE, compared with similar organizations, 
has one of the more rigorous coding rules for its observers, which can be easily 
accessed online. Second, the organization has regularly observed elections in the 
countries of interest since 1991, providing for a uniquely large range of data points: it 
encompasses all the fifteen cases and most of the elections since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. Third, the OSCE reports have been selected over, for example, 
observation reports of the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
because of the intrinsic nature of the two organizations: while OSCE positions itself 
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as a non-political organization and, therefore, claims to deliver reports that impartially 
assess the electoral process, the PACE is a conglomerate of professional politicians 
that tends to craft its reports according to political considerations to satisfy interested 
parties26. Finally, the EU, one of the major international political actors who shape 
policies in the FSU states decides on cooperation with the country contingent based 
on the OSCE EOM reports27. 
 
More specifically, the OSCE EOM reports cover various aspects of the preparation 
for elections, such as their administrative and legislative backgrounds, the events on 
the day of elections and the official results. The reports assess whether and how 
elections conduct satisfies ‘OSCE commitments, universal standards, and other 
international obligations’28. The OSCE is referring to the so-called Copenhagen 
principles, criteria adopted by participating parties in the 1990 Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the predecessor to the OSCE). The 
OSCE identifies and describes the challenges to the adherence to these principles, that 
result in a failure ‘to meet the OSCE standards’, as follows:  
-  Attempts to limit competition of parties and candidates, and ultimately their 
ideas, which may result in diminished possibilities for voters' choices; 
- Refusal of registration and/or deregistration of candidates in unclear 
proceedings with the potential to impose disproportionate sanctions for minor 
violations; 
- Misuse of state administrative resources by incumbents; 
- Pressure on the electorate to vote in a specific manner; 
- Media bias, particularly with regard to state-controlled media, in favor of 
incumbents; 
- Election administrations whose composition is not sufficiently inclusive to 
                                               
26  In other words, PACE will tend to give its evaluation of a county's elections based on the strategic 
interests that the organization has regarding the country in question, giving a higher judgment of 
electoral process in the countries of interest, than it actually is. This point is elaborated from an 
interview with an OSCE official, October 2008 
27 http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/election_observation/index_en.htm 
28  OSCE Elections Observation Handbook. Fifth Edition. Accessed at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/04/14004_240_en.pdf  on June 10th, 2009 
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ensure confidence;  
- Lack of sufficient voter-registration guidelines and safeguards to prevent 
abuse; 
- Lack of transparency and accountability during the vote count, the tabulation 
of the vote, and the announcement of results;  
- Complaints and appeals procedures that do not always permit a timely and 
effective redress of complaints; 
- Perpetuation of a culture of impunity by failing to hold individuals 
accountable for election-law violations; and 
-  
- Lack of sufficient will to rectify identified shortcomings29. 
  
Each of the OSCE reports is the result of six-week-long pre-election monitoring as 
well as extensive coverage of the day when voting takes place. The monitoring 
process concludes on the next day after elections with the issuance of a preliminary 
statement that is based on preliminary results officially announced by the Central 
Electoral Committee. Yet, what politicians, scholars, practitioners, media and 
concerned voters usually look for is one key sentence that provides a concise 
description of the electoral process and the country’s governing arrangements. This 
sentence usually appears toward the beginning of the report and briefly states whether 
the elections satisfied the above-mentioned standards and obligations and whether 
there have been improvements or deteriorations compared with the previously-
observed elections.  
 
The aforementioned qualifiers fall into two broad categories according to which 
elections are classified as either complying or failing to comply with the OSCE 
standards30. These assessment criteria in the first category are measured as follows: 
‘met standards’, ‘free of problems’, ‘in accordance’, ‘consistent’, and ‘in line with 
                                               
29  OSCE webpage, http://www.osce.org/ Accessed on February 8, 2010. 
30  The OSCE standards are not permanently fixed; rather, they are subject to change. The main 
trigger for modifying them is the ability of rulers to formally comply with the standards while at the 
same time stealing elections in innovative ways that cannot be detected with the current standards. 
Therefore, the OSCE is permanently involved in the alteration of the standards to provide a maximum 
fit between the reality of elections and the rules on paper.   
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standards’. The second category elections are assessed as: ‘fell short’, ‘did not meet’, 
‘not in accordance’, ‘failed to comply’, ‘shortcomings’, ‘did not comply’, ‘failed to 
meet’, and ‘fell significantly short’. In addition, the observers indicate whether there 
has been an improvement or deterioration in elections conduct compared with 
previous elections.  
 
This distinction between elections that are held in compliance and not in compliance 
clearly separates the cases of fully ‘free and fair’ elections from ‘neither free nor fair’ 
ones as an initial glimpse into the data suggests. Table 7 below places elections that 
were conducted in the fifteen countries into one of the two categories, by assigning a 
value of 1 to the elections that complied with the standards, and 0 to the elections that 
failed to comply. The first row of the table consists of columns numbered 1 through 8, 
standing for the year of elections that the reports are available, which is provided 
along with the dates and types of elections in the appendix 4.    
 
Table 7. Elections conduct in the FSU states 
Country El 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Estonia 1 1       
Latvia 1 1 1      
Lithuania 1 1       
Belarus 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  
Russia 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  
Armenia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  
Moldova 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Tajikistan 0 0 0      
Turkmenistan 0 0 0      
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0     
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The first impression that one gets from observing the table is that in the fifteen 
countries of the FSU a majority of the elections was found not to have been in 
compliance with OSCE standards. This table is a fair representation of the dynamics 
of electoral conduct over the years, and provides a ground to distinguish among three 
paths of electoral processes. The first path is of compliance: it consists of the 
countries whose elections always complied with the standards, namely, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. They appear at the top of the table. The first election reports in 
Estonia and Latvia called for the removal of restrictions on titular language 
proficiency and the consideration of the problem of persons without citizenship; and 
in Lithuania there were hints of a failure to follow the procedures that are prescribed 
in the law to specify the vote counting. However, after these problems were ratified 
there was agreement among observers from then on that elections were conducted in 
compliance with OSCE standards.  
 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, elections in the second group, which includes 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, were consistently 
reported as failing to meet the OSCE standards (the bottom of the table). This is the 
path of non-compliance.   
 
The third path (middle of the table) is characterized by fluctuations in the assessments 
of the counties’ elections. Elections in these countries either deteriorated, as in the 
cases of Belarus after 1995 and Russia after 2000; or improved, as in Ukraine after 
2004; or experienced alternation in trajectory, as in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Moldova.  
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The countries with deteriorating elections and those with improving elections were 
found to be in compliance/not in compliance with the standards only to receive a 
completely opposite assessment after the years indicated above. In the remaining 
countries the OSCE observers concluded that some elections complied and others 
failed to comply with the standards. In some countries several consecutive elections 
were found to be in compliance, only to be followed by deteriorating assessment with 
regard to OSCE standards in the next electoral cycle31.  
 
2.3.2. Variety of Irregularities   
 
To shed some light on the murky business of electoral irregularities, I will separately 
examine two types of irregularities, which correspond to different phases in the 
electoral process. The first is commonly observed during the campaigning phase, 
whereas the second takes place on the day of the actual voting. 
 
When those in power engage in considerable campaign irregularities, such as by 
curbing participatory rights of potential opposition candidates, they often will find it 
unnecessary to openly steal votes and stuff ballots on election day. Therefore, in many 
elections where the campaign was reported to have lacked competitiveness, and the 
political environment in general to have lacked pluralism, fewer irregularities were 
reported to have occurred at the ballot boxes and during counting. Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are cases in point at every election 
(appendix 5). 
 
                                               
31 From the OSCE reports database that I had compiled. 
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Actual voting irregularities usually take place within competitive campaign 
environment, where the ruling elites have devised schemes of rigging the election 
through ballot stuffing and during vote counting and tabulation. Several electoral 
cycles in Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine saw these kinds of fraud. 
 
In some cases, both two types of irregularities are observed during the same election. 
Such elections are judged to be extremely fraudulent, with attempts both to curb 
competition and to inflate the vote count (Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia). Sometimes, 
the driving force of competition may remain very strong despite widespread attempts 
by the rulers to undermine it. As a result, such rulers need to stuff ballots and 
influence the vote count in order to ensure their re-election. Therefore, an election 
may be highly competitive, yet may not comply with OSCE standards, and apart form 
the necessity to separate irregularities during campaigning from those during voting 
and vote counting, it seems fruitful to look for the presence of competition even in 
fraudulent elections.    
2.3.3. Alternative on a ballot 
 
The patterns of irregularities discussed above lead to another crucial indicator of the 
ways in which rulers assume power, namely, the presence of a viable alternative on 
the ballot. Commonly associated with the presence of a unified opposition that acts as 
a single force with chances of winning elections, an alternative on a ballot has a 
different implication to the FSU states. This dimension brings to light competitive 
elections in regimes that are not considered democratic, and contrasts with regimes 
holding elections considered free and fair yet lacking a real alternative on the ballot. 
Competition in a non-competitive setting, and the lack of the former in an 
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environment where there are no restrictions on contesting, are two modes of 
hybridization of power access at the core of this analysis32.  
To measure competitiveness in terms of presence of a meaningful alternative on the 
ballot, I use a two-dimensional approach. This approach is based on OSCE reports 
and on factual voting results in elections in the FSU states from the database ‘Parties, 
Elections and Governments’ of the WZB Research Unit ‘Democracy: Structures, 
Challenges, Performances’.  
When electoral observers from the OSCE describe the campaigning period and 
elections as having taken place in a generally competitive, pluralistic environment, 
elections are concluded to be the result of a contestation. It implies that there was 
another contestant aside from the incumbent who was able to register for the 
elections. This contestant had an opportunity to campaign and remained a candidate 
until and including the election day. Otherwise, when there were major restrictions on 
participation, whether legal (e.g., constitutional provisions) or illegal (e.g., 
intimidation and blackmail, or when the major opposition, handpicked by the ruler, 
runs for office only to withdraw from the race before the voting day), elections are 
considered non-competitive. 
A cross-tabulation of the previously discussed electoral conduct with measures of the 
competitiveness of the electoral process is presented in appendix 5. As a result, of the 
85 elections considered in the sample, approximately one-third (28) was conducted in 
compliance with the OSCE standards in a competitive setting.   
Approximately another third of the elections (32) were held in a non-competitive 
                                               
32 The two ways of hybridization give are derived from the observer' reports and will be 
discussed in  details in the subsequent chapters.  
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environment and failed to comply with the OSCE standards.  
The results tend towards two opposite corners of the conceptualization space rather 
than a fairly even distribution. This is due to their representing two typical and 
intuitively expected outcomes in which elections either comply with the international 
standards and are competitive, or they are non-competitive and do not meet the 
standards. However, the reality of the FSU countries generated a common situation 
with 18 out of 85 elections being competitive, but failing to meet the OSCE standards, 
as well as two even more puzzling instances of non-competitive elections that 
satisfied the OSCE standards33.   
Some scholars argue that the 70% threshold of all votes cast for one candidate or a 
party is an acceptable cut-off point indicating a lack of competition and manipulation 
of the elections outcome (Way 2004:147). Many instances indicated an absence of 
competition and a failure to comply with the standards, exhibiting nearly 100% of 
votes cast for the same candidate. A similar situation occurred during two elections 
that were not competitive (Georgia 2004 and Kyrgyzstan 2009), yet somehow were 
considered by the OSCE observers to be in compliance with the standards34. In 
Kyrgyzstan, as in Georgia, presidential elections followed the rigged parliamentary 
ones, spurring a mass protest known as the Tulip revolution. The elections were 
characterized as ‘free of major problems and partially free’ by the OSCE EOM, and 
the acting president Bakiev received 88,71% of the vote. On the surface, this scenario 
is very similar to the Georgian one, when a popular leader emerged on the peak of 
                                               
33 Dataset from OSCE reports, calculations by the author. 
34  Both elections are sometimes justified for the lack of competitiveness by means of post-
revolutionary argument: after revolutions occurred in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the nation united in 
its support for progressive forces. According to this logic, issues that previously divided the 
population were not at the forefront any longer and  the voters united around one candidate. 
However, this did not work in the case of post-revolutionary Ukraine. For more detailed analysis 
read chapter 3 and 4 of this piece. 
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mass protests and then received the overwhelming support of the population, thereby 
challenging the competitiveness of the electoral process. In Georgia, during the Rose 
Revolution and in elections immediately thereafter, there was unifying support for the 
then-aspiring president Saakashvili, as well as a common belief among the elites that 
he should run for the presidency. In other words, there was no choice on the ballot, 
and there was widespread acceptance of this situation both among the elites and the 
masses. The Kyrgyz case is in contrast to the Georgian one, as in Kyrgyzstan a pact 
dating to the times of the ousted president Bakiev had been made in which the main 
opposition candidate, Felix Kulov, was forced to withdraw from the presidential race 
and to accept an appointment as First Vice Prime Minister35. According to observers, 
this move ‘lessened the degree of electoral competitiveness’36 and, therefore, these 
elections are viewed as having been ones without a choice or a meaningful alternative 
on the ballot. 
In other words, the 70% threshold seems to be an arbitrary one. In some countries, as 
discussed above, elections can be competitive, and have an opposition candidate 
registered and running, but voting and ballot counting is highly marred with fraud. 
These instances underline the importance of checking for qualitative narratives from 
relevant reports in evaluating the presence of alternative on a ballot.  
Generally speaking, out of fifteen countries in the sample, six can be classified as 
‘persistently competitive’ over time: Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova 
and Ukraine. 
In short, the way in which rulers attain power in the Soviet Union successor states is 
                                               
35  OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report of Presidential Elections in Kyrgyz Republic on July 10, 2005. 
Warsaw, November 7, 2005, p. 4 
36  ibid 
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formally and structurally exercised through elections. These elections, however, have 
different qualitative values that serve to anchor or bind the political regime.  
The multifaceted assessment of elections combining electoral conduct with the 
presence of alternatives on the ballot allows separating electoral events in the 
countries, and also within countries, into three groups. The first group includes 
elections held according to the standards and consistently exhibiting genuine electoral 
competition. The second group, as another clear case, includes elections that were 
marred with fraud and persistently lacked competitiveness ever since the founding 
elections. The third group, the most problematic one, includes two mixed types of 
electoral events. The first includes elections that were competitive but failed to 
comply with the OSCE and other international standards. The second is a cluster of 
elections that, according to all accounts, did not provide for a viable alternative on the 
ballot, yet were judged to comply with the standards. The table in the appendix 6 
demonstrates the division on a country level. 
Again, this distribution pattern is consistent with previously observed patterns in this 
chapter, wherein the same countries take their positions at the extreme corner spaces 
of the continuous dimension of elections (the Baltic states on the one side, Central 
Asia and Belarus on the other). In addition, one observes the same countries 
oscillating in the middle regions (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia).    
Hence, elections as the mode of access to political power provided the first baseline 
for country distribution with regard to the type of polity they had established.    
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2.4. The Governance 
2.4.1.Political rights  
Political rights, a dimension highly interlinked with elections, is most fruitfully 
assessed as popular participation in political life. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
two major modes of participation are in the focus for the emergent independent 
countries: the right to vote (to elect) and the right to organize into political parties (to 
be elected). 
The first vector of rights stipulates that a state grants universal suffrage to its adult 
population, which on the border of the 20th and the 21st centuries is an expected norm 
of political inclusion in the majority of the world’s countries. Yet, what we observed 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was followed by the dissolution of three ethno-
federations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, was the growing 
number of people that never changed their place of residence, but were deprived of 
the right to vote. Apparently, citizenship laws can shed light on the participation, or to 
be precise, the inclusion into or exclusion from the category of those who are granted 
universal suffrage.   
At first glance, the right to citizenship in almost all of the former republics was 
granted to everyone who resided in the country at the moment of declaration of 
independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The prominent exception, 
however, constituted today’s members of the European Union – the Baltic states.  
 The three countries used the pre-Soviet occupation state as the reference to define 
who is a citizen, i.e., who belongs to the new country37. In their respective 
constitutions, the three republics looked back at the constitutions proclaimed in 1918, 
                                               
37  For a detailed discussion on references to pre-Soviet states see chapter 3  
 
 77  
and automatically granted citizenship to those that had it between 1918 and 1940. It 
should be noted that Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were the most exclusive, 
with Lithuania being the least exclusive towards those who were citizens during the 
Soviet period. 
Zooming into each of the three countries, the Estonian constitution postulated that 
citizens are those with citizenship status as of 1940, as well as their direct 
descendants. Those who came to Estonia afterwards needed to prove at first two, and 
later six, years of residency in the country for successful naturalization, as well as 
pass a language test (Jeffries 2004: 133). Therefore, voting in Estonia in national-level 
elections was the exclusive prerogative of citizens, and to become a citizen was a 
challenge to almost a third of its population in 1991. Currently, about 8% of Estonia's 
population is comprised of stateless people who are allowed, by a constitutional 
provision, to vote in local elections if they have a valid residence card and have 
resided in the country for more than 5 years38 . 
In Latvia, 10-year requirements of residency along with the language proficiency 
exam were used as part of a naturalization process. Although the law was further 
amended to a degree that facilitated access to citizenship for some groups (those that 
received general schooling in Latvian) and for others banned access to citizenship 
(KGB, Russian military pensioners), as in the case of Estonia, these strict rules of 
naturalization were an obstacle on the way to European Union membership. 
Nevertheless, the two countries became EU members in 2004, despite the fact that 
nearly 20% of their populations at the time were comprised of stateless individuals.    
                                               
38 Number of Grey Passports fall below 100,000. Estonian Public Broadcasting. April 25, 2011. 
Available at http://news.err.ee/politics/759a6f74-c555-4f4a-90e4-5f57ad5b921a 
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As mentioned above, Lithuania took a mild, integrative road to citizenship. While the 
Law on Citizenship also required 10 years of residency and written and oral tests to 
prove language proficiency, it also extended the right to all residents of the Soviet 
Lithuanian Republic, thus preempting the problem of stateless population faced by 
Estonia and Latvia.  
Hence, only two out of fifteen former Soviet states limited the right to participate with 
their vote by limiting access to citizenship. Another way in which political rights may 
be limited is by curbing freedom of association, generally exercised through the 
formal limitations on the right to organize political parties. There are two common 
ways to restrict political participation through regulation of party formation:  
1)     an overarching ban on certain grounds for political mobilization as 
prescribed in constitutions,  
2)     procedural, technical, indirect restrictions as prescribed in the laws 
governing political parties.  
As mentioned above, formal institutions are not considered by students of 
democratization as a reliable source for the assessment of a political regime.  It is 
commonly perceived to be the case that informal rules play a greater role in 
determining actors’ behavior. Indeed, formal rules, crafted by the rulers are very often 
ignored or violated by them, but still serve as an initial departure point not only for 
analysts to assess them, but for rulers as well (Frye 1997). Likewise, when such rules 
are essentially restrictive of potential opposition participation, they are taken seriously 
and widely followed. Therefore, to assess the political rights dimension, I use both 
formal (constitutions) and informal (composed as indexes) types of indicators.  
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Constitutions 
The analysis of the constitutions’ texts of all fifteen countries revealed that the first 
type of restrictions is a common way to curb participation in most of the Central 
Asian republics. In Kazakhstan39, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan it is forbidden by the 
constitution to organize parties on an ethnic and religious basis. This measure can be 
interpreted as, on the one hand, a protection for ethnic minorities, in the sense that 
majorities are not conveying ethnic or religious programs, but on the other, it hinders 
the possibilities of ethnic minorities to mobilize against very common cases of ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious discrimination in a peaceful manner40.  
In Georgia, in addition to the above-mentioned restrictions, measures are intensified 
by a ban on the territorial basis for party formation. This fact can be seen as a 
protectionist move of the Georgian state to prevent further disintegration of the 
Georgian territories that come with the rise of secessionist movements and imminent 
war threats from neighboring countries. Precisely, this has been aimed to prevent 
regional parties (especially from Adjara) to question the central authority and 
contribute to even deeper disintegration of the country (following separatism in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the civil war in the early 90s'). 
 
                                               
39  In Kazakhstan during parliamentary elections in 1994 the party ‘Lad’ (which in Russian 
stands for ‘harmony’) was supported largely by ethnic Russians won four seats (Jeffries 2003: 180), the 
candidates  were actually forced to run without party identification on the ballot to prevent association 
of the party’s name with ethnic Russian  voters (Kazakhstan country guide 1995. Accessed at 
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/kazakhstan/kazakhstan47.html on December 3, 2009)  
 
40 Because of the arbitrary way in which the Soviets drew borders in Central Asia, each of the 
independent republics ended up with the minority group from the neighboring state (Uzbeks in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajiks in Uzbekistan etc.) (See Tishkov 1997) 
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Laws Regulating Political Parties 
The second way to curb participation is to use constitution as a façade of democratic 
principles, but meanwhile adopt specific laws restricting participation otherwise 
granted by constitutions. This contradiction is best exemplified in the case of the law 
governing political parties in Russia and Kyrgyzstan41.  
In Russia, the law amended under president Putin stipulated a requirement that in 
order for a party to receive federal registration, it must gather a certain number of 
signatures in each of the units of the federation. The number of signatures should 
altogether comprise 200,000 while no more than 10,000 (1/20) should come from the 
same federal unit. In the multiethnic, multireligious, plurilinguistic landscape of 
Russia, where minorities concentrate territorially and secessionist conflicts are 
moving from slow-paced to open war and back again, this restriction is an example of 
securing the absence of separatist issues in electoral politics. It also is a method of 
limiting alternatives to the officially- endorsed way of emergence of regional elites, 
both individual and collective, that are capable of becoming a viable opposition to the 
Kremlin.  
In Kyrgyzstan, the amendments to the law on political parties came after the events 
known as the Tulip Revolution during which regional divisions of Northern and 
Southern clans sharpened. As a compromise, a power-sharing arrangement between 
the clans was reached, and the amendments to the electoral system influenced any 
further attempt at regional party creation. Thus, since 2007, in addition to the 
constitutionally-banned organization of parties on an ethnic basis, regional 
                                               
41 The Federal Law on Political Parties in Russian Federation 2001, Law on Political Parties in 
Kyrgyzstan 2007. 
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mobilization was restricted through a new electoral formula under which a 
proportional representation system with a 5% threshold was enhanced by the 
requirement of at least 0.5% of all votes coming from every region. 
The two described amendments to the constitutions resulted in single-party rule in 
both Russia (2007) and Kyrgyzstan (2007).  
To reiterate, the constitutionally grounded restrictions on participation, i.e. formal 
rules, are found in only a few countries. This, however, does neither mean that only 
these countries violate political participation principles nor that other countries adhere 
fully to formal rules anchored in their respective constitutions. What it means is that 
in order to assess the political rights and their violations in practice (and usually 
informally) we need to turn to the composite indicators compiled by the research 
think tanks.  
 
Composite Indicators  
The table in the appendix 7 summarizes the discussion concerning restrictions on 
participation rights that are empirically observed in the 15 countries – successor states 
of the Soviet Union with the score of 1 assigned for the presence of a restriction and 0 
for the absence thereof.  
The highest scorer is Lithuania, which, as was shown above, had inclusive citizenship 
laws towards minorities. Russians and Poles make up 6.3% and 6.2% respectively of 
the population42 which even combined together is smaller than the proportion of 
                                               
42  CIA World Factbook based on 2001 census. 
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Russians in both Estonia and Latvia (25.6% and 29,6% respectively)43. The dispersed 
and heterogeneous groups of ethnic minorities such that Poles and Russians are, were 
never perceived as an imminent threat either for out-of-the-system secession claims or 
for in-system opposition force formation by the elites after Lithuania became 
independent in 1991 and, therefore, were fully included without a need to prove the 
loyalty to the new state.  
Just the opposite was the situation in Estonia and Latvia, where geographically 
concentrated and physically numerous Russian and Russian-speaking populations 
were perceived as a threat to the stateness of the two countries by the majority of the 
political parties. Especially acute were events in the Narva region in Estonia in 1994, 
where the local referendum decided on secession from Estonia and union with Russia. 
State authorities did not recognize the legitimacy of this referendum44. The states’ 
reaction, as mentioned before, was a slow accommodation of the stateless people 
through elaborate naturalization procedures.  
This mixed evidence in ‘the mid-table zone’ presented in table 8 calls for the 
following solution in threshold-setting endeavors: separating the top, the middle and 
the bottom of the table based on the agreement or disagreement of the three 
indicators. Thus, Lithuania, with the highest score, followed by Estonia and Latvia 
with some restrictive indirect measures on political rights constitute the first group; 
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia constitute the second; 
and the bottom part of the table comprises the third (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
                                               
43  CIA World Factbook base on 2000 census for Estonia and 2002 census for Latvia. The figure is 
higher than the number of stateless people in both Latvia and Estonia because in the course of the 
passed decades many Russians had integrated. 




 83  
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). In the second group, Russia and 
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia are separated into a distinct group with strong 
formal restrictions on political rights. 
Table 8. Political rights in the FSU: formal and informal restrictions. 























 2.4.2. Civil liberties  
The contemporary understanding of civil liberties is related to the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the USA, which guarantees ‘…an establishment of religion, or… 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances’ (Amendment I, The Bill of Rights, ratified effective December 15, 1791). 
It postulates guarantees for the freedom of speech, of expression and of assembly. The 
three bundles of rights are interconnected and are also linked to other dimensions in 
the concept of political regimes.   
In order for the rulers to alternate as a result of competitive elections, there needs to 
be a guarantee for the freedom of information and expression. A free access to 
information that is varied and, most importantly, alternative to the state-provided 
sources, is the key to voters’ preference formation on the principles of pluralism (Dahl 
1971: 2-3). In the countries where the population is exposed exclusively to media that 
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are either owned or controlled by the state45, the preference formation in an event of 
elections is limited to the state-endorsed candidate or party. Plurality of viewpoints 
and ability of diverse media sources, independent of their ownership and 
concentration, to transfer information to the population guarantees that there is an 
alternative on the voting ballot. Hence, to assess the adherence of a country to civil 
liberties that are formally addressed in the constitutions of each of the 15 countries, 
one needs to refer to the informal institutions (curbing of media freedoms, etc.) that 
are best captured by the existing indicators.  
The problem arises at the level of aggregation: the measures include several additional 
questions that go beyond the coverage of the three civil liberties components 
mentioned above. For example, Freedom House civil liberties index includes, apart 
from ‘freedom of expression and belief’ and ‘associational and organizational rights’, 
which are a part of the original civil liberties bundle, also ‘rule of law’ and ‘personal 
autonomy and individual rights’, which are intended to be measured separately in this 
study46. Similarly, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s civil liberties category, along 
with questions on freedom of expression, captures additional information on the 
independence of the judiciary from the state, equality of citizens under law, and the 
spread of general criminal activity47. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index includes 
questions on freedoms of speech, expression and assembly, but aggregates them into 
two distinct indices: 'association and assembly rights' and 'freedom of expression' 
become parts of 'political participation measurement,' while 'civil rights ensured' is 
                                               
45  In this context media ownership by the state as well as control of media by the state are 
treated as similar restriction on the freedom of information.  
46  Freedom House: Freedom in the World. Methodology. At 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 last accessed on 
December 16, 2009 
47  Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008. At 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf last accessed on December 16, 2009 
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used to construct the rule of law measure (along with separation of powers and 
independence of judiciary)48. Yet, scores from 2006 onward are available in 
disaggregated form, which allows for rearrangement of components and creation of 
new aggregated measures. 
As mentioned before, the FH indicator of civil liberties, despite having the 
disadvantage of being over-inclusive of different additional dimensions then the ones 
postulated in The Bill of Rights, is endowed with the advantage of being available 
from a cross-time comparison. The collection of data since 1974 allows for 
assessment of trends that are usually employed to generate further hypotheses, which 
partially explains the popularity of the index. The table in appendix 6 is one such 
example: it shows 20-year trends in the FSU states in the civil liberties component, 
while the BTI and the EIU are used to cross-validate the trends in the years they are 
available (appendix 9). 
 
Precisely, it is Moldova and Armenia that are performing better on the civil rights 
scale than Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, the higher scores for ‘the oasis of democracy in 
Central Asia’ – the second name among scholars for Kyrgyzstan – that are assigned 
by the BTI experts is highly influenced by the ‘Tulip Revolution’ that took place after 
elections in March 2005. However, according to both indices, Armenia, Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan are holding the positions in the middle of the civil liberties scale. Yet, BTI 
places Kyrgyzstan and Moldova into a group with moderate irregularities, and 
Armenia as having severe defects, while FH persistently cross-time evaluates 
                                               
48  Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Country reports. At http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/459.0.html?&L=1 last accessed on December 16, 2009 
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Moldova and Armenia equally as ‘partially free’, by giving them the score of 4, while 
Kyrgyzstan scores 5 (‘not free’) up until 2006, and 4 ever since. This questions the 
general validity of the thresholds positions.    
This cross-check between BTI and FH scorings of the FSU republics reveals two 
crucial points that determine further distribution of the countries and thus will lay 
ground for threshold settings.  
Firstly, the possible rupture point that is produced by the empirical absence of an 
instance with a score of 6 in the newly-created BTI score of civil liberties can be 
attributed to measurement error, particularly when aggregation is in place. The cross-
check with FH and EIU indicates that it is hardly a break point (or a rupture point, 
which separates the scope of violations of civil liberties), particularly with only 15 
cases.  
Secondly, it is the order the countries take that matters, as well as the persistency with 
which the tops and bottoms of the table are occupied.   
According to the degree of their respective adherence to compliance with civil rights, 
the countries can be divided into the three following groups. The first one separates 
the three Baltic countries into one group. The second binds together Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Moldova and adds Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, based on the combined outcome of 
measurement from BTI and FH. Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Belarus belong to the last group of ‘not free’ countries with severely violated civil 
liberties. The similarly low scores given by both indices to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan provide a reason to group them together into the ‘extreme violators’ 
(table 9). 
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Table 9. Scope of civil rights violations in the FSU countries 
No violations, 
free 
Moderate to severe 
violations partially free 










Table 9 is a foundation for threshold-setting on the aggregated regime level. It is an 
example of how the use of ready-made indices with recommended thresholds can be 
fine-tuned to the specific set of countries under consideration.  
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2.4.3.Separation (fusion) of powers 
 
The last, yet not the least, dimension that constitutes the concept of political regime, 
to be measured in this part of the chapter, is the degree to which different branches of 
powers are separated from each other. Being of particular interest and importance in 
democracies49, this element has secured its position in the studies of alternative 
governing arrangements50. While complexity of executive-legislative relationship is 
common to the studies of variety of democracies, additional emphasis on the 
independence of the judiciary is a major concern in hybrid regimes and electoral 
democracies (Levitsky/Way 2002: 55).  
 
Consequently, think tanks responded to the demand for assessment of separation of 
powers focusing on measuring the independence of judiciary, building their indicators 
on both formal and informal institutions. As in the case with civil liberties, FH index 
includes separation of powers into the rule of law sections, which are offered in the 
aggregated form as a part of the civil liberties (CL) index. The Nation in Transit (NIT) 
edition of the Freedom House includes only independence of the judiciary in their 
reports omitting the measurement of separation of powers. 
 
While BTI provides two isolated measurements for separation of powers and 
independence of the judiciary, there is only one point in time – 2008 – for which the 
disaggregated data is available. Therefore, scoring results form BTI and NIT are 
going to be used complementary in order to fine-tune the measurement and threshold 
setting between different patterns in separation of powers in the FSU countries.  
                                               
49  See Carey and Shugart 1998, Lijphart 1999, Levitsky and Helmke 2006 
50  On a special from of fusion of powers – an intra-executive conflict patterns in post-Communist 
countries, see Protsyk 2006 
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Additionally, in order to examine separation of powers, I will also use data collected 
from monographic chronologies by Jeffries, which cover the period from the re-
instalment of independence in the FSU republics until 2003-200451. I will base the 
assessment on two factors: attempts of executives to either prolong their stay in power 
or to expand their authority (powers) while in power. These simple models of one-
time interactions between executive, legislative, and judicial branches of power, while 
articulating single instances, can be treated as a general pattern of interactions due to 
the pivotal meaning of the issues at stake, as well as showing how interconnected are 
formal and informal institutions in this domain. Furthermore, I will build on 
secondary evidence of data collected from OSCE Elections Observations Mission 
reports, namely on qualifiers that convey improvement or deterioration of the 
electoral process depending on whether elections are to the executive or to the 
legislative branch.  
 
To begin with, BTI scoring is taken as a starting point for assessing both the level of 
separation of powers and the degree of independence of the judicial branch (the table 
is provided in the appendix 10). The alignment of the 15 countries on both indicators 
repeats that of the civil liberties. The Baltic states are leading in their scores, followed 
by what seems to be unrealistically high scores for Ukraine, which in BTI terms is 
interpreted to have moderate defects in these two domains. This scoring contradicts 
the factual data and an established opinion among experts that there is a dependency 
in court rulings on the will of the executive branch, especially at the level of regional 
                                               
51  Jeffries 2003, Jeffries 2004. 
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and district courts52.  
 
As in the case with civil liberties, the middle position in the table is occupied by 
Moldova, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan all rotating positions depending on the indicator 
we are looking at. Thus, for instance, Kyrgyzstan has moderate defects in separation 
of powers and severe defects in the sphere of independence of the judiciary, while 
Moldova is severely ‘defective’, in BTI terms, on independence of judiciary and 
moderately ‘defective’ on separation of powers. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan all have severe fusion among branches of power, whereas 
Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan present an extreme fusion of powers. In many 
cases, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Moldova, the 
scores given to independence of the judiciary are higher than the ones assigned to 
separation of powers; this implies that the dependence of the judiciary is a part of the 
problem of fusion of powers, reflected also in the fusion between executive and 
legislative. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan, the lower scores for independence 
of the judiciary compared to the joint indicator on separation of powers points to 
problems in the field of the judiciary that seem, however, not to affect the combined 
scoring on separation of powers. This situation appears counterintuitive, and thus 
once more undermines the overall reliability of BTI measurements and calls for a 
cross-check with the more inclusive (in terms of additional dimensions that are not 
considered in separation of powers) FH Nations in Transit (NIT) indicators. An 
advantage of using FH, however, is, as already previously mentioned, its availability 
for a cross-time analysis (appendix 11).  
 
                                               
52  Interview with experts at European Commission Mission to Ukraine, November 2008 
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Accordingly, the NIT scoring pattern gives better justice to Ukraine53 and its 
acknowledged poor and corrupt performance of the court system by assigning scores 
between 4,25 and 4,75, both qualifying as ‘not free’.  
 
Another peculiarity that the NIT reveals is a long-run tendency towards an 
evaporation of precisely the grey zone, i.e. an absence of the scores 3 and 4 after 
2003. This tendency speaks for the major difficulties and challenges that almost all of 
the FSU countries face with building an independent judicial system: scoring above 4 
is a manifestation of severe problems in separation of powers in the majority of the 
FSU states. Such a scoring gap of two degrees, which can hardly be attributed to a 
measurement error, provides a basis for setting a threshold and divides the sample into 
two groups.  
The first group, which includes the three Baltic states, has an independent judicial 
branch, but little if anything can be inferred about the relationship between executive 
and legislative from the NIT index.  
The remaining 12 countries, that display variation in the levels of independence of the  
judiciary running from 4.25 to 7, comprise the second group.  
 
While it strikes as a very narrow choice to base a decision about regime type relying 
exclusively on the NIT scores of independence of the judiciary, the verbal qualifiers 
can be adopted as yardsticks that separate degrees of independence of the judiciary. 
Thus, assuming the qualifiers suggested by the FH NIT reports, the 15 countries in the 
                                               
53  The European Commission Mission to Ukraine in its final report on implementation of ENP 
required reforms concluded that '...no or only limited progress was made with respect to judicial reform 
and anti-corruption measures'. The report pertained to 2009 but this judgment summarized the reforms 
since the independence in 1991.  At ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_524_en.pdf 
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sample can be divided into 4 groups: independent judiciary, judiciary that struggles to 
maintain independence, judiciary with a restrained ability to act independently, and 
subordinated judiciary (table 10).  
 
Table 10. Independence of the judiciary by Freedom House Nations in Transit 
for the FSU states. 
 2005-2008 
Judiciary is independent 1-1.99 Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia 
Judiciary struggles to maintain 
independence 4-4.99 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia 
Restrained ability of judiciary to act 
independently of executive 5-5.99 
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
Subordination of judiciary to regime 
6-7 




The table above shows how the fifteen countries in the sample are distributed along 
the four levels of one aspect in separation of powers, namely, the independence of 
judiciary. A closer look at the verbal qualifiers fails to reveal much of substance to 
differentiate on the matter of independence of the judiciary between restrained ability 
and subordinated judiciary. Even in the cases where the ability of the judiciary to act 
independently is restrained there might be a potential for the former to act 
independently. Incidentally, this potential is not observed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan due to the absence of commitment to substantial 
reform of the judicial system. This reform is systematically advised by International 
Advocacy groups and assessed in the Judicial Reform Index (JRI)54.  
 
The JRI is comprised of 30 criteria that are designed to assess the reform process by 
giving negative, positive or neutral grades to each of the categories. While scores are 
                                               
54  EurasiaNet Human Rights. Rights Advocates Strive to Promote Judicial Independence in 
Armenia, by Emil Danielyan, December 3, 2004. Accessed at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav031204.shtml  on February, 4, 2010 
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not available for all 15 countries of the FSU, and the timing of reports is not the same 
for the countries, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, when assessed in 2002, delivered 18 and 
19 negative grades respectively out of 30 categories55. These numbers show the extent 
to which the judiciary calls for reform in order to be considered independent. One 
such example is a constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary by the 
president in the Armenian constitution, which raised questions about the interpretation 
of independence as such and allowed the president to exercise control without 
violating the constitution56. This example once again emphasises the difficulty to 
differentiate between non-existent and highly restrictive independence of judiciary. 
 
The notion of struggle that the judicial branch experiences in maintaining its 
independence implies that in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, in everyday practice, 
instances in which the judicial branch acts independently and instances when it is 
clearly dependent of the will of the executive are intertwined. More evidence is 
delivered from the set of data that I draw upon in order to emphasise the mixed 
character of the separation of powers: the instances of the executive’s will to change 
the formal rules of the game. Two types of practices, the will of the chief executive to 
stay in power longer than constitutionally permitted, and linked with it, the desire to 
expand powers, usually are exercised at the expense of other branches.  
 
The practices I am referring to are the ones that most closely approximate the way 
horizontal accountability could be effectively measured, even though profound data 
collection is a matter of a larger endeavor. Yet, the simultaneity in which the 15 
countries under consideration started their shaping of institutional arrangements, 
                                               
55  ibid 
56  This provision was amended in the new version of Armenian constitution in 2005. Source: JRI 
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adopting their constitutions and then amending them later, allows for a systematic 
comparison of the existing amendments.  
 
Thus, while working on creating country profiles in order to conceptualize and 
measure regimes, what appeared striking to me were similarities in the attempts to 
change the rules of the game in almost all of the countries, mainly intended to allow 
the incumbent to stay in power. Such instances included: referenda to expand 
presidential powers; referenda to postpone elections; referenda, public initiative or a 
constitutional court’s rulings that allowed the president to run for the third term. It is 
important to highlight that such procedures were usually initiated by the first 
presidents in the countries where there was no turnover in power, that is, where the 
first presidents and the last heads of Republican Supreme Soviets were the same 
people. However, in the occasion of alternation of power, where the first incumbents 
were peacefully replaced by the challengers through elections, as it happened in 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, ironically, it was a president elected in a 
competitive setting who was attempting to curb potential competition by, first, lifting 
the term limit and, second, expanding the executive’s authority.    
 
These attempts to change constitutional settings were successful in the majority of the 
Central Asian countries and in Belarus (marked with a ‘+’ sign in brackets in 
appendix 12). These referenda delivered overwhelming support for the incumbent and 
any changes suggested by him. 
 
 In Baltic states prolongation of the chief executive’s term of office was never an 
issue, and elites followed initial constitutional arrangements after agreeing upon them.  
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However, in five out of fifteen countries, namely in Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, 
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, such referenda and public initiatives (despite originating in 
the same way as in the examples discussed above from Central Asia and Belarus) fell 
short of being turned into constitutional amendments57. This pattern serves as relevant 
evidence that an executive was constrained, in the cases of initiated but failed 
amendment procedures, by either legislative or judicial branches of power and was 
unable to bypass the latter’s decision. Such incidents wherein the chief executive 
curbs the powers of other branches often keep a fragile balance in powers intact. 
These instances reciprocate a verbal qualifier of FH NIT ‘judiciary struggles to 
maintain independence’ by emphasizing strivings that the branches of power have in 
certain countries in order to pursue their goals. Moreover, the prolongation of 
mandates by lifting the two-term limits, as well as power-expanding referenda, are 
further proof that presidents in settings where formal rules are perceived not to matter 
put an effort into legitimizing their rule through referenda. This also indicates, as in 
the case with political rights, that constitutions do matter as reflections of interplay 
between the formal and informal rules, in which informal rules are employed to alter 
the formal.  
 
The tables below present the distribution of cases according to the ability of the 
incumbents to introduce changes of an empowering nature.  








Expanded powers: Failed Moldova 97 
Ukraine 96 
 
      
                                               
57 I will turn to the reasons of why this is the case in chapters 4-5. 
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Table 12. Attempts to prolong presidential term 
Referenda on term 
prolongation/3rd: 
Successful 




Turkmenistan 94  
Uzbekistan 2002 
Referenda on term 
prolongation/3rd: Failed 
Ukraine 2000  
 
The procedures that lead –or fail to lead– to the changes in the constitutions are 
naturally divided by timing in two cycles according to the type of changes that is 
introduced. The first cycle started right after the constitutions were adopted in the 
majority of the countries (93-96) and involved questions of expanding presidential 
powers (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine) and 
postponing elections (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan). The second cycle started when the 
presidents approached the expiration of their terms in power, which were 
constitutionally limited in most cases to two consecutive terms. In most of the 
countries under consideration there was no experience of peaceful electoral turnover 
of power. Because of this, the rulers grew deeply rooted into the system making the 
stakes of the loss of power raise considerably, both politically and economically. 
Therefore, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, where this question 
became evident during the first cycle of constitutional change (in 1996 and 1994 
respectively), in other cases it was during the second cycle of referenda to prolong the 
rulers’ term in office when it was set into motion in the beginning of the 21st century.    
 
The following supplementary data contributes to understand the distribution of the 
countries according to their adherence to the separation of powers principle: one that 
they all endorse in their constitutions but fail to exercise in practice. While coding 
elections from the OSCE election monitoring reports, an interesting pattern was 
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revealed. In some countries (Armenia 1998-1999, Azerbaijan 2003-2005, 2006, 
Belarus 2008, Kazakhstan 1999,  Kyrgyzstan 2000), the OSCE reported 
‘improvements’ in the conduct of parliamentary elections as compared to the 
preceding presidential ones, as well as the ‘deterioration of electoral process’ if 
presidential elections followed parliamentary ones (Azerbaijan 1998-2000, Belarus 
2000-2001, 2004-2006, Kazakhstan 2004-2005, Tajikistan 2005-2006). Such an 
improvement or deterioration may be due to the fact that the excessive powers that 
presidents possess generate higher stakes over presidential elections, and 
consequently the legislature turns into a mere façade institution. Therefore, 
parliamentary elections do not require much interference by the rulers specifically on 
the election day and thus result in a better assessment scores given by observers when 
they follow the presidential elections. 
 
The table below summarizes the discussion and measurement of separation of powers 
that was pursued in this section. It divides the 15 countries into four categories: the 
first, following the separation of powers that is constitutionally stipulated. The second 
unites cases that have a permanent struggle between the branches of power that not 
always ends with the victory of the rule of law. The third refers to the cases that at 
certain points in time possessed a potential for the exercise of the separation of 
powers but which, with the course of the time, were subdued to the will of a powerful 
president. The fourth is the case of fusion of powers in the hands of the executive. 
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Table 13. Separation of powers in the FSU states (2009) 















2.5. Political Regimes in the FSU: classification 
The thresholds, defined at the beginning of this chapter, provided a ground for 
definitions of three types of political regimes: democratic, autocratic and hybrid 
regimes. Yet, considering the individual country tables displayed in Appendix 13, 
political regimes in the 15 FSU countries exhibit four configurations. Democratic 
regimes, with the overwhelming majority of ‘high’ values, were established in the 
three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia and Latvia, which 
struggle with enfranchising their respective stateless populations, have a mixed value 
recorded for the dimension of political rights.  
Clearly autocratic regimes are established in six countries with four out of them 
concentrated in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, and Azerbaijan. ‘Low’ values were assigned in almost all of the dimensions 
except for Azerbaijan which received a mixed score for the competitive environment 
in which some of its elections were held.  
Hybrid regimes with the majority of ‘mixed’ values emerged in three countries: 
Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. If the scores indicating ‘low’ performance were 
assigned in the case of hybrid regimes, it was most likely to be due to the separation 
of powers dimension of the political regime.    
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The three countries that are left – Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – combine values 
of ‘low’ with the values of ‘mixed’, with 'low' outweighing 'mixed' by a measure 8 to 
4.  They constitute a group that is clearly moving in an autocratic direction after 
exhibiting some potential for democratization (the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan or 
Yeltsin-era Russia) and will be classified as ‘near-autocracy’. The crucial substantial 
difference between ‘near-autocracies’ and ‘hybrid regimes’ is in the competitive way 
in which rulers come to power in the latter. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The main task of this chapter was to classify regimes. The greatest challenge attached 
to this task is in setting appropriate thresholds. Instead of using the existing 
recommendations offered by the different indices, the solution suggested here is 
empirically driven and based upon a combination of existing indicators and measures.  
The background concept of political regimes, comprised of four dimensions 
(elections, political rights, civil liberties, separation of powers), was measured using 
proxies available from BTI, FH, and EUI. In addition to the exiting indicators the 
classification was enriched by comparative analysis of constitutions and constitutional 
amendments, laws on parties and country-specific knowledge.  
 
Thus, comparing countries’ performance and ratings allowed us to classify the 
universe of 15 cases into democracies, hybrid regimes, near-autocracies, and 
autocracies. This classification adds value to the existing knowledge that the Baltic 
states are democratic and the majority of Central Asia is autocratic by way of 
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specifying the grey zone. It is precisely the conduct of internationally recognized free 
and fair elections together with the inability of the presidents to put into force the 
initially desired constitutional amendments (while the separation of powers is weak 
and civil rights are not guaranteed) what strikes as peculiar to the grey zone. This will 
be discussed in the next chapters which will provide an explanatory account of the 







 101  
Chapter 3 Structural Determinants of Political Regime 
Outcomes In The FSU: Towards An All-Encompassing 
Explanation 
 
Belarus, currently landlocked and trying to wriggle out from under Russia’s thumb, 
would benefit greatly from exposure to the Nordic region, whose influence played a 
big role in helping the Baltics shed their Soviet legacy. So it should move northwards 
to the Baltic, taking the place of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
Redrawing the map. The Economist. April 29th, 2010 
  
 
The diversity in regime outcomes discovered in the previous chapter begs the 
questions how did it come about and why does it persist? Precisely, what factors 
cause some countries to establish democracies, while others autocracies or hybrid 
regimes? This chapter, through explanatory accounts, sheds light on the emergence 
and persistence of pure forms of regimes. It will emphasize the unexplained void of 
hybrid regimes, which the next chapter will address.  
 
Two lines of reasoning underlie the majority of explanatory accounts of regime 
outcomes produced by democratization scholarship: the first emphasizes the 
similarities in the initial conditions, the second, the differences. The Republics in the 
USSR were known to be both, similar and different with the respect to their starting 
conditions that were supposed to either ease or impede their transition to democracy. 
The similarity was assumed to stem from belonging to the homogenous Soviet Union.  
The difference was assumed to stem from pre-Soviet states or entities.  
 
The literature that has emphasized the first claim, showing that some institutional 
conditions were indeed similar, also makes the case that other rapidly changing 
behavioral factors during the years of transition mattered more (O'Donnell/Schmitter 
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1986, Przeworski 1992). Other works emphasize that the conditions in the republics at 
the moment of the Soviet collapse were not as similar as one might think, for 
countries that belonged to the same state, and show that the pre-Soviet conditions 
were also very different (Luong (2000, 2002) Darden/Gzymala-Busse (2006), (Pop-
Eleches (2007)).  
The regime outcomes, therefore, were believed to be different if the pre-Soviet 
legacies were more relevant than the Soviet ones, and similar if the Soviet legacies 
had overridden the pre-Soviet during the transition. 
 
Empirically, however, as was shown in the previous chapter, regimes emerging from 
the Soviet Union vary from democracies to autocracies with everything in the middle. 
Needless to say this does not suggest pre-Soviet differences mattered more than the 
Soviet homogenizing effect, precisely because the former fail to provide a well-
grounded explanation of the hybrid regimes. Indeed, both, the literature regarding 
different regime outcomes as a result of differences in Soviet and pre-Soviet 
structures, and the literature regarding it as the result of external conditions and 
human agency successfully explain the clear-cut cases, i.e., democracies and 
autocracies. Yet, they leave hybrid regimes unexplained, as this chapter will 
demonstrate. It will begin by providing a larger scope of comparison by including the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia and will proceed by giving accounts of Soviet and 
pre-Soviet similarities and differences. Concentrating on such structural factors as 
legacies of modernization and ethnic composition and parliamentary polarization the 
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3.1.The Scope of Similarities and Differences 
 
The regimes that emerged in the countries of the former Soviet Union are highly 
dissimilar. Three groups can be classified: democracies, hybrid regimes and near- and 
full autocracies. To make a case for a larger comparison with other multinational 
states and to see whether the similarity logic works, I use the Freedom House Nations 
in Transit (FH NIT) composite score to measure regimes in the world. The FH NIT 
classifies countries into nearly every possible regime category.  The scores vary from 
1.93 (Estonia) to 6.93 (Turkmenistan). Thus, several of the fifteen countries are 
classified as ‘consolidated democracies’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) which I called 
democracies in the previous chapter; others are ‘transitional governments or hybrid 
regimes’ (Ukraine, Georgia) or hybrid regimes as classified in the previous chapter; 
Moldova and Armenia are regarded as a ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’ or 
hybrid and near-autocracies according to the previous chapter; all the remaining 
countries are classified as ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’ by FH or as my 
classification had it (near-)autocracies and autocracies (Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan).   
 
Yet, if we follow the similarity logic, one would not expect such differentiation. After 
the fifteen countries jointly constituted the Soviet Union, they should exhibit 
similarities at their starting points of departure - the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, 
belonging to the Union for many decades produced similar Soviet identities, revival 
of nationalism as a stronghold for the emergence of opposition, same state structures 
and policies, which are assumed to be highly dependent on the Soviet legacies. The 
similarity account leads one to expect the convergence in regime outcomes two 
decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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According to this logic, belonging to the same state for many decades, especially to 
such a state as the Soviet Union that featured administrative-command and a planned 
economy, can be expected to reduce disparities in economic development and bring 
the constituent republics to the same level of modernization. The processes of elite 
formation were the same in the Baltic States as they were in Central Asia, and 
centralized from the Kremlin. At the moment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the fifteen countries featured similar state institutions that were initially created top 
down from Moscow to secure hierarchical control and subordination.  
 
The homogenizing effect of belonging to the Soviet Union, as some scholars have 
noted, is not fully washed away by the emerging regimes following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Jones Luong 2002: 99). Another reason to consider the similarity logic 
is because it seems to be valid for the countries that constituted Yugoslavia.  
 
Using this historical parallel as a point of reference, Yugoslavia, a multinational 
country with comparable levels of ethnic-, linguistic-, religious- heterogeneity as the 
ones observed in the former republics of the Soviet Union, displays rather high levels 
of homogeneity in their respective political regimes. To be precise, twenty years after 
the initial disintegration processes began, the Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH 
NIT) composite regime, scores vary from 1.93 (Slovenia) to 3.86 (Macedonia). 
Almost all of the recognized countries of the Former Yugoslavia are, therefore, 
classified as ‘semi-consolidated democracies’.58 The only exception is Bosnia, 
                                               
58  Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2009. Accessed at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485 on February 24, 2010  
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classified as a ‘transitional government or hybrid regime’ with the score of 4.1859.  
 
These examples show that similar political regimes emerged in the successor states of 
Yugoslavia. Additionally, regimes in the former Yugoslavia are clustered around 
consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies, leaving the space of ‘consolidated 
authoritarian regime’ void. In other words, previous experience of belonging to the 
same state, in other cases than the Soviet Union, is associated with similar regime 
outcomes in their respective successor states. 
 
Taking into account historical analogies and similar Soviet pasts, this research 
acknowledges that the fifteen countries of the FSU were facing the same challenges to 
independent state-building, and shared, in this respect, a departure point at the 
moment of dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, to account for the diversity of 
regime outcomes one needs to move beyond recognizing the similarity of starting 
conditions, while focusing on the Soviet and pre-Soviet dissimilarity. 
 
The fifteen Soviet Republics were at different stages of economic development, had 
different experiences with statehood, and developed their respective state 
bureaucracies to a different degree prior to being integrated into the USSR. 
Accordingly, the fifteen countries or entities were at different levels of modernity and 
it is not surprising that they started from different positions once they (re-)gained their 
independence. In this sense, pre-Soviet legacies had overridden the Soviet experiences 
and the former republics started institutionally at the same point where they were left 
prior to being incorporated into the Soviet Union. The diversity logic takes us to the 
                                               
59  Another notorious exception is Kosovo, classified as an ‘Internationally-Administered Area’ with 
the overall regime score of 5.11. Accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485 
on February 24, 2010. 
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following hypotheses: if the newly emergent fifteen countries were in different 
starting points at the time when they (re)-established independence, it is expected that 
they exhibit diversity in their regimes which took roots twenty years into independent 
statehood. 
 
In what follows I will discuss the pivotal theories that were applied for three decades 
in the Third Wave of democratization literature and will draw attention to unexplained 
voids of hybrid regimes. The majority of theories are successful in explaining the 
extremes, i.e. in providing an all-encompassing account of why democracies emerged 
in economically advanced and historically privileged Baltic states, or why autocracies 
prevailed in rent-seeking, oil-rich Central Asian countries. The gray zone despite 
being accepted to exist and thrive, until recently, did not receive attention it 
deserves60. Hence, the task of this part of inquiry is to use the argument from the 
literature and empirical evidence to highlight the weak spots and to consider, if 




3.2. Structural Determinants of Regime Outcomes: Modernization, 
Ethnic Heterogeneity, Polarization 
3.2.1.Modernization theory 
 
When modernization theory is applied to find answers to questions in regime studies, 
it assumes that 'all good things go together'. As the major studies of classical 
modernization theorists Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Stein Rokkan (1973), 
                                               
60 Works of Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way and Valery Bunce constitute an exception.  
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Barrington Moore (1966) demonstrate, the more affluent, the more educated, the more 
experienced with statehood and nationhood, the more secular the country is, the 
greater are the chances that it is going to establish a democratic political regime. The 
subsequent amount of scholarly work that emerged in the aftermath developed series 
of hypotheses that tested modernization theory, and confirmed the association that 
exists between higher levels of development of a society and emergence of democracy 
in this country. The famous postulate by Seymour Martin Lipset engraved in minds of 
scholars during the Third Wave of democratization reads: 'The more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy'  (Lipset 1959: 75).  Later, 
Przeworski and Limongi in their seminal essay titled 'Modernization: Theory and 
Facts' managed to empirically derive a threshold for democratic sustainability: when 
GDP per capita equals 6,000 USD democracy is never going to break down 
(Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 159). 
Yet, it proves more difficult to provide an explanation of why it happens to be the 
case that more developed societies prefer to be ruled by the rulers selected through 
competitive elections and are governed according to the rule of law61.  
 
These theories and hypotheses are usually tested on a larger sample of countries than 
intended in this study. The statistically significant relationship, established on a 
universe of all of the countries of the world, fades away when tested on a sample of 
only fifteen cases. Indeed, operationalized by standard indicators as GDP per capita, 
literacy rates, etc. fail to be confirmed for the FSU states, mainly due to high levels of 
modernization that the fifteen countries achieved while being a part of the Soviet 
Union (table 1). A striking example is the absence of sound variation among the 15 
                                               
61  A notable exception are works  of Dahl (1971), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Tilly (2007), Frye 
(2010) 
 
 108  
states in literacy rates at the onset of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 (table 
14). The picture is even less clear with level of economic development: on the one 
hand, the most developed Baltic states (measured by GDP/capita) are democracies 
and, according to Przeworski and Limongi, are going to remain democratic. But on 
the other hand, as mentioned above, hybrid regimes are on average less affluent than 
autocracies. In studies that rely on use of statistics and mean values the u-shaped 
curve would be used to model this relationship. Although hybrid regimes are not on 
the same continuum as democracies and autocracies due to the mixed features of the 
two, relative 'poverty' of these governing arrangements discerns hybrid regimes from 
other forms of rule and will be considered in the analysis below.  
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Table 14.  Selected indicators of socio-economic development (GDP/capita62, 
literacy rate63) 
 GDP per capita  literacy rate  
 1991 2009 1990 2007 
Democracies 5947.67 11661.54   
Estonia 6114 13509.1 96 99.8 
Latvia 5359 10700.91 96 99.8 
Lithuania 6370 10774.62 96 99.7 
Hybrid rule 2139.67 2176.47   
Georgia 2954 2495.63 93 100 
Moldova 1093 1495.98 95 99.2 
Ukraine 2372 2537.8 95 99.7 
Near 
autocracies 2445 4134.47   
Russia 5610 8873.61 94 99.5 
Kyrgyzstan 617 872 93 99.3 
Armenia 1108 2658.05 93 99.5 
Autocracies 1589 3691.29   
Azerbaijan 1703 4863.81 93 99.5 
Belarus 2740 5121.79 95 99.7 
Kazakhstan 2753 6875.5 93 99.6 
Tajikistan 718 705 93 99.6 
Turkmenistan 1178 3488.81 93 99.5 
Uzbekistan 442 1093.27 93 96.9 
 
If we consider the growth data by comparing the level of development at the moment 
of the break-up of the USSR with that of 2009, a different picture evolves which will 
help to explain the persistence of hybrid rule. First of all, while democracies, 
autocracies and near-autocracies on average almost doubled their GDP/capita; the 
growth of on average only 40 USD can be seen in the hybrid regimes. It means that a 
relatively low level of economic development, as I will later demonstrate, becomes 
the result and not the origin of hybrid rule. Secondly, it also highlights that the need 
                                               
62   IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2009. Accessed at 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 on April 7, 2010, in current prices in US dollars, 
estimates. Mean values for each of the groups of the regimes is shown in bold.  
 The data for 1991 is taken from The Real Historical Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita in 
Baseline Regions in billions of 2005 dollars, accessed on January 12, 2010 
63  UNDP Human Development Reports. HDI Report 1993. Accesses at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1993_en_indicators1.pdf  on April 12, 2010. And 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/89.html on November 30, 2010. According to UNDP HDI, 
adult literacy rate is calculated as a percentage of population aged 15 years and over. 
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for international aid is not diminishing and is likely to remain persistent in hybrid 
regimes64.  
 
3.2.2.Legacies of modernization 
As demonstrated above, a straightforward glimpse into data on modernization does 
not provide an anchor to build an explanation of why fifteen countries had established 
particular regimes. This led scholars to look into the tendencies that dominated 
indicators of socio-economic development in the past to avoid causal proximity 
(Kitschelt 2003: fn1). A number of scholarly works thrived, raising questions about 
the role that legacies of prior modernization could have played in determining regime 
outcomes in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Pop-Eleches, for 
example, asks whether it mattered who was the major modernizing agent, the Soviet 
Union, or the state that preceded the formation of the union (Pop-Eleches 2007). In 
their joint effort to explain the persistence of communist parties (unreformed 
communist parties as a precondition for an absence of democratizing tendencies) after 
the fall of the Communism in Eurasia, Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse argue 
that ‘…precommunist schooling, which formed and fostered nationalist ideas… led to 
the delegitimation of communist rule’ (Darden/Grzymala-Busse 2006: 84). They 
found support for the hypothesis that 'the communist exit is more likely to occur in the 
countries where literacy preceded the onset of communism' by performing simple 
OSL regression on 28 cases of the former communist block (ibid: 90). 
Likewise, making more use of their data, pre-Soviet literacy proves to be a good 
predictor of democratic and autocratic regime outcomes: democracies are established 
                                               
64 Although the data shows that the autocracies on average displayed a greater potential for being aid-
seekers, it is the willingness to cooperate with international donors and their particular demands that 
will count for a need in support and aid-seeking by the domestic elites. This will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
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in the countries that were highly literate (over 77%) prior to being integrated into the 
Soviet Union. Countries with very low literacy rates before they became Soviet 
republics (4-42%) established autocracies. Hybrid regimes and near-autocracies 
present an evidence with blurred and overlapping boundaries, with a variation from 
46% to 65% in the former and from 12% to 56% in the latter. To assess change in 
literacy in each of the fifteen former Soviet Republics and to systematize evidence 
from several sources, I introduce the concept of a ‘modernizing agent’ and an index of 
change.  
 
There are two possible modernizing agents that are taken into consideration here: the 
Soviet state and the pre-Soviet state. The pre-Soviet state existed in almost a half of 
the countries in the sample (table 15 below), however it is hard to believe that those 
countries that maintained independent statehood for around eighteen months benefited 
from pre-Soviet modernization. 
 
The role of a state, either Soviet or pre-Soviet, as a modernizing agent is better 
assessed through literacy than by means of assessing economic development because 
it reveals the states’ attempts at creating a common identity: it is a more stable 
characteristic than the creation of, for example, a middle class in the countries where 
it was wiped out through property nationalization and repressions. Mass education is 
the channel for transmission of ideology, of a shared identity and views on history 
(Gellner 1983). Similarly, mass schooling can be a channel for diffusion of Soviet 
ideology. Looking back at what Darden and Grzymala-Busse have shown the 
legitimation of the Soviet rule was undermined where diffusion of mass literacy 
preceded accommodation into the Soviet Union. In this case the pre-Soviet state was 
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the modernizing agent. Consequently, where the Soviet Union was the modernizing 
agent in a multifaceted way of creating the first state and bringing mass literacy (even 
if it was not in the national language), an authoritarian governing arrangement  is 
viewed as a viable option for the newly independent republics, especially when the 
state is delivering on crucial public services.  
 
The index is calculated in the third column of the table … below by subtracting the 
value of the pre-Soviet literacy rate from that of the 199065. In other words, 
 
 Change = Soviet literacy rate (1990) – pre-Soviet literacy rate. 
 
Theoretically, the index of change varies from 100, if the pre-Soviet literacy was 
equal to 0 and the Soviet literacy rate was absolute 100, to -100, if the pre-Soviet 
literacy rate was at the level of 100 and decreased to 0 during the Soviet period. The 
second scenario is addressed here only as a theoretical possibility, as the majority of 
the countries receive positive values. 
The Soviet Union is considered to be the sole modernizing agent, if the index of 
change  takes a value between 75 and 100. It means that during the years of the Soviet 
rule the increase in literacy rate was more than 75%.  
 
If the index of change takes a value between 25 and 0 it suggests that the pre-Soviet 
state was the major modernizing agent. An increase in mass literacy that was 
experienced during the years spent by a country as a part of the Soviet Union is less 
                                               
65  Darden and Grzymala-Busse provide different measurements for Western and Eastern Ukraine; I 
used the mean value of the two. As the two data-sets on literacy use different bases, the change in 
literacy rates is a rough estimate, which however shows general trends in the spread of mass 
literacy. The negative value of change for Estonia may be partially due to the measurement error.  
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than 25%.  
If the value of the index falls somewhere between 25 and 75 it can be inferred that the 
countries encountered different modernizing agents that had an impact on the spread 
of the mass literacy. The authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union legitimized itself 
through the modernization benefits that it had yielded to the respective republics. The 
leadership in autocratic countries, predominantly of Central Asia, associated their 
position with the Soviets, while the masses enjoyed a steep rising learning curve in 
relation to literacy rates and relied on Soviet-educated local intelligentsia in building 
historical myths (Brown 2009: 550-551). 
 
 
The legacies argument seems to work rather smoothly for clear-cut regimes: 40 years 
interruption of independent statehood in the Baltic states yields confirmation to the 
modernizing agent hypothesis. Absence of any experience with statehood and 
nationhood, other than Soviet, also provides confirmation of the connection between 
the Soviet Union as the sole modernizing agent and the establishment of authoritarian 
regime. The cases in between, or the hybrid regimes call for a specification of this 
theory, because intuitively, seventy years of Communist rule is a break too long and 
the eighteen months of independent statehood is a period too short to carry those 
memories and loyalties through literacy. There must be an intrusion into the process 
of revival of “grandmothers' memories and experiences” by elites for this causal chain 
to work, for example, a claim by new national elites of existing continuity between 
pre- and post-Soviet statehoods.  
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Democracies      
Estonia 99 96 -3 22 years yes pre-Soviet 
Latvia 93 96 3 22 years yes pre-Soviet 
Lithuania 77 96 19 22 years yes pre-Soviet 
Hybrid rule       
Georgia 65 93 28 18 months yes both 
Moldova 46 95 49 0 
Romani
an  both 
Ukraine 61,5 95 33,5 18 months no both 
Near autocracies      
Russia 44 94 50 24 months yes both 
Kyrgyzstan 12 93 81 0 no Soviet 
Armenia 56 93 37 18 months yes both 
Autocracies       
Azerbaijan 20 93 73 22 months yes Soviet 
Belarus 42 95 53 6 months no Soviet 
Kazakhstan 18 93 75 0 no Soviet 
Tajikistan 4 93 89 0 no Soviet 
Turkmenistan 10 93 83 0 no Soviet 
Uzbekistan 11 93 82 0 no Soviet 
 
There is, however, an association that we find between the modernizing agent and the 
regime type. The causal mechanism, suggested by Darden and Gzymala-Busse does 
not seem to work without an additional promotional push from the current elites to 
revive the histories and bring “grandmothers' memories” back. This point is crucial 
for the investigation that will follow, as it allows combining structures and actors' 
decisions in the following way: structures (legacies of historical experiences, in this 
case), pave certain ways for actors to use them in order to reach their goals (usually to 
win the office and to hold on to power). A political regime that emerges in a country 
                                               
66 The data in columns 'change in literacy rates', 'independent state/length', 'pre-Soviet elections', and 
'modernizing agent'  are collected and calculated by the author  
67 Darden, Keith/Grzymala-Busse, Anna The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist 
Collapse. World Politics 59, 2006. Appendix 1 
68 UNDP Human Development Reports. HDI Report 1993. Accesses at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1993_en_indicators1.pdf  on April 12, 2010 
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is to a certain extent a result of this kind of interaction.  
The data also show, that modernization stems from both pre-Soviet and Soviet 
experience in the Soviet Union successor states. Hence, this structural factor accounts 
for both, producing similarities as well as differences in regime outcomes. As 
suggested in the beginning of this chapter, the countries joined the Soviet Union with 
different levels of development. The policies in the Soviet Union with some variation 
emphasized socio-economic convergence (sblizhenie), exercised through, among 
others, prospects of career advancements (Jones, E./Grupp F.W. 1984: 172)69.  
These policies aimed to homogenize different socio-economic factors in the 
Republics, and clearly succeeded, where mass literacy is concerned. However, as 
some data suggests, the initial divergence in the levels of economic development and 
ethnic fractionalization had been deepened. The next step will assess another 
structural factor – the ethnic makeup of the FSU successor states in its ability to shed 
light on emergence and persistence of hybrid regimes, with regard to similarities and 
differences that Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies had produced.    
 
3.3. Ethnic make-up and regimes 
 
Ethnicity, regarded as a structure, or its manifestation as an action in the form of 
ethnic mobilization, conflict or civil war had for a long time been considered to play a 
key role in the studies of political regimes. Dating back to John Stuart Mill who, 
according to Robert Dahl's interpretation urged that if a country has a representative 
government, its territorial boundaries and those of a national identity should coincide 
(Dahl 1971: 108). In other words the more homogenous a country's identity is, the 
                                               
69 The finding of the Sovietologists Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp also showed that ethnic 
equalization was more successful during the times of economic prosperity and deteriorated during 
the stagnation of the early 80s.  
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better are the chances for democratic institutions to emerge and prosper.  
 
Ethnic diversity complicates establishing democratic rule by creating obstacles to 
reaching a compromise (Lipset/Rokkan, Lijphardt, Dahl, Linz/Stepan). This claim is 
neither surprising, nor counterintuitive: irreconcilable differences between ethnicities, 
and frozen societal mobility make compromise and consensus building about the 
'rules of the game' difficult to achieve especially at an early stage of democratization. 
Moreover, those groups which experience (or perceive) an exclusion may engage in 
violent protest that can grow into an interethnic conflict followed by claims to secede, 
thus, delaying prospects for emergence of any regime, and democracy in particular. 
Consequently, the practices that authorities sometimes use to suppress ethnic uprising 
allow the assumption that an autocratic form of rule emerged (Linz/Stepan 1996: 27). 
 
However, as some studies have shown, a systematic evidence for the ethnic 
homogeneity – democracy hypothesis is absent. For instance, as the study by M. 
Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig shows, tested on the post-communist region, the 
hypotheses do not provide empirical evidence that ethnic diversity impedes the 
emergence of democracy. On the contrary, the challenges it creates may be conducive 
to a compromise and the establishment of democratic institutions (Fish/Kroenig 2006: 
838).  
 
Methodologically, the studies are pre-determined to rely on statistical analysis, while 
approximating a country's ethnic makeup by such crude indicators as ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (ELF). The problem with using ELF is that the data from Soviet 
ethnographers is used to calculate it. At its core are the estimates of the likelihood that 
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two people chosen at random will belong to different ethnic groups70.  However, apart 
from forcing us to believe in a complete absence of fluidity since 1965 (i.e. 
integration, assimilation, etc.), the indicator remains insensitive to the kind of division 
that exists (ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial)71. Either of the factors can be 
plugged into a formula (the Herfindahl's concentration index) and deliver completely 
different results. The advantages of using it concentrate around its availability for the 
majority of the countries that exist in the world and encompass a vast range of ethnic 
groups, in addition to being easily accessible.  
An attempt to overcome some of these problems was undertaken by Alberto Alesina 
and his collaborators72. They separated the ethnic, linguistic and religious dividing 
lines and calculated indices for the majority of the groups in the world. Their data for 
the FSU with a calculated average for all of the divisive cleavages along with the size 
of the largest is displayed in the table 16 below.  
 
When ELF is used in cross-country comparisons with a larger number of countries in 
the sample, it sometimes gives leverage for explaining certain social phenomena. For 
the fifteen FSU countries the amount of inference that could be drawn from the index 
is scarce. As table... below demonstrates, the countries that are classified as 
democracies and autocracies display an approximately similar average 
fractionalization index, created from the combined scores of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious divides (0.47 and 0.41 respectively).  Countries with hybrid regimes have 
the highest heterogeneity scores, which average to 0.54. From this it does not directly 
follow that the clear-cut regimes are associated with lower levels of ethnic divisions: 
                                               
70 Philip G. Roeder.  2001.   "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985." 
February 16.  <http//:weber.ucsd.edu\~proeder\elf.htm>.   
71 Latin D., Posner D. The Implication of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization 
Indices APSA-CP: The Comparative Politics Newsletter 12 (Winter 2001)  
72  Alesina et. al.  Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8, pp. 155 -194, 2003 
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the average scores are relatively high, the number of cases is rather small and the 
individual country scores vary from 0.35 to 0.57 in democracies and from 0.24 to 0.62 
in autocracies. This alerts us, however, to take a closer look to what is happening in 
hybrid regimes and what are the ways in which ethnic heterogeneity contributes to 
keeping hybrid regimes afloat. In part, possibly, through formation of national 
identities that was created during the first experiences with statehood and, to some 
extent, through polarization of the population, which is reflected in divisions of their 
parliaments.  
A similar tendency is in place when ethnicity, religion or language differences are 
considered73, namely, hybrid regimes are slightly more heterogeneous than 




Table 16 Ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the FSU states  
 
 
                                               
73 The table below includes only data on ethnicity, but the trend holds for linguistic and religious 
divides. 
country ELF (ave) ELF ethnic Size of the major ethnic group,%
Estonia 0.5 0.5 67.9
Latvia 0.57 0.58 57.7
Lithuania 0.35 0.32 83.4
Demo Ave 0.47 0.47 69.67
Georgia 0.54 0.49 83.8
Moldova 0.56 0.55 78.2
Ukraine 0.52 0.47 77.8
Hyb Ave 0.54 0.5 79.93
Armenia 0.24 0.12 97.9
Azerbaijan 0.3 0.2 90.6
Belarus 0.47 0.32 81.2
Kazakhstan 0.62 0.61 56.4
Kyrgyzstan 0.57 0.67 64.7
Russia 0.31 0.24 79.8
Tajikistan 0.47 0.51 79.9
Turkmenistan 0.34 0.39 85
Uzbekistan 0.35 0.41 80
Auto Ave 0.41 0.39 79.5
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As with the levels of modernization, ethnic divisions were at different levels in 
republics at the time when they joined the Soviet Union. The differences existed, but 
not to the extant that they could be found at the end of the USSR's existence74. Unlike 
with modernization, the Soviet Union, in this case, did not act as a homogenizer: the 
Soviet policies of forced and economically supported voluntary resettlement of the 
Soviet populace had deepened and diversified any ethnicity-related divisions that 
existed prior to formation of the USSR.  
 
To sum up, so far this chapter has considered modernization theory and ethnic 
heterogeneity as structural conditions in explaining regime outcomes. Modernization 
theory proved to shed some light on why democracies and autocracies emerge and 
endure. Pre-Soviet experiences and absence thereof proved vital in highlighting the 
differences that brought about autocracies and democracies. Hybrid regimes are to 
some extent more ethnically diverse than democracies and autocracies, and less 
affluent than the two. Yet, mere association does not give us a reason why it is so. It 
can be the pattern in modernization and industrialization, which reinforces certain 
regional differences in the countries, such as ethnic composition, that can shed the 
light on hybrid regimes and will be tapped into in the next chapters. The implication 
of ethnic diversity as seen in the voting patterns and potential for polarization of 
societies is considered in the next section.  
 
3.4. Political polarization and regimes 
The thesis that links political polarization with regime outcomes is not new to 
                                               
74 Unfortunately, there is no systematic data available to compare degrees of ethnic heterogeneity 
prior to joining the Soviet Union disaggregated to the republics' level. But the intensity of forced 
and voluntary resettling and reshuffling of the people's indicates that an increase in heterogeneity 
levels can be expected. 
 
 120  
political scientists. Robert Dahl argues that 'confronted by severe polarization, 
competitive regimes are prone to collapse, to coup d'etat, to civil war' (Dahl 1971: 
105).  
 
Largely agreeing with Dahl, Giovanni Sartori perceives party polarization as a cause 
of a democratic regime breakdown. Sartori convincingly argues, that a loss of voters’ 
support for parties with central positions on ideological left-right continuum to the 
parties in the extremes produces dysfunctional regimes that lead to constitutional 
breakdowns of democratic systems (Sartori 1976: 136). Following this logic, when a 
society is split into two groups that are representing ideological extremes, emergence 
of a democratic system is highly unlikely. Convergence of different groups of elites 
and masses over vital issues, such as who are the people, what is the nation, what 
geopolitical orientation is maintained, etc. creates an ideological center and leaves 
such issues as economic policies and system of government up to debates and 
compromise conducive to the emergence of democracy. However, the effect that 
polarization has on other types of regimes is not explored. The two scholars treat 
competitiveness of a regime as a given and a defining characteristic of a regime. For 
the majority of the FSU states, there is a long way in their institution-building 
processes to go before elections are always competitive. Hence, while polarization has 
a possibility to facilitate a break-down of a democratic regime, it also facilitates 
competitiveness of elections.   
 
The way to approach this is through taping into what issues the parties or leaders in 
the FSU states compete on and how polarizing they are for the population.  
The recently evolving literature on this matter includes an approach from political 
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economy by Timothy Frye in which he looks at the sources of economic growth in the 
FSU countries (Frye 2002) as well as at how connections between national identity 
and reform operate through endogenous polarization (Frye 2010). In these studies 
Frye argues that polarization in the short run produces policy volatility, which raises 
risks and therefore reduces investors' inclinations to commit. In the long run, these 
policies swings produce stalemates, modeled in the form of a 'War of Attrition' game 
that occurs in a legislative chamber, and hinder economic growth (Frye 2002: 313). 
Other scholars (Sasse) regard the stalemate produced by divisions as a road to 
stability and even democratization (2010: 100) 
 
Polarization does not necessarily have to be based on the issues of political economy, 
but can incorporate the sharpest divisive points for the newly independent states, for 
example questions of nation-building, such as, borders, language policy, geopolitical 
partnership, security block status, etc. Similarly, politicians use these rival issues as a 
relatively easy way to mobilize civilians’ support at the time of elections (Sasse 2010: 
99). Yet, it does not follow that politicians will stick to their campaign promises. Nor 
is there an interest in crafting a 'centrist' position on divisive issues, which means to 
lose a support base from the two poles and brings about the necessity to create a new 
one. Hence, this polarization is essential for keeping elections competitive. 
 
To validate his argument Frye defines a country as having a polarized political system 
when ‘…at least 20 % of seats [is] held by a traditional ex-communist 
(anticommunist) party when the executive is held by an anticommunist (ex-
communist) in a given year’ (Frye 2002: 318, fn. 28). The actual polarization vital for 
a political system is not captured by this approach, because the ex-communist-
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anticommunist divide is not of vital salience in the majority of the FSU countries. 
Precisely, it is ethnic, regional, or linguistic identity rather than ideological identity, 
which mobilizes the voters and, thus, underpins polarization of the population and 
their representatives in the FSU states and ensures competitiveness of elections.  
 
However in some cases, where ethnicity and other related identities were artificially 
depoliticized by disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, quasi-
class identities evolved that brought about the convergence of elites on the issues of 
nation-building, language policies, and geopolitical orientation (Pettai 1997: 21). 
 
 
To check for polarization in the parliaments of the FSU states I suggest looking at the 
composition of legislative chambers starting with the first founding elections and 
compare the data with the assessment of competitiveness that is provided by elections 
observers, coded in the previous chapter75.  
To operationalize polarization I adopt the approach suggested by Pelizzo and Babones 
(Pelizzo/Babones 2007). The argument that drives their operationalization is grounded 
in Sartori's claim on vitality of the center with which I introduced this section. To 
measure polarization, Pelizzo and Babones propose the following formula: 
 
(left vote + right vote) – center76 
 
 
                                               
75 In the next chapters I will be testing parties' positions on the divisive issues for hybrid regimes 
based on the Comparative Manifesto Project. Unfortunately, the data is not available to run the 
analysis for all of the fifteen countries.   
76  Adapted from Pelizzo/Babones 2007: 56 
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The index takes values from -100 to 100, where -100 indicates a perfect 
concentration, and 100 – a perfect polarization with a variation in between. This way, 
the index captures the presence and size of the center and contrasts it against the joint 
forces of the two ends on the right and the left (Appendix 14, 15). 
If left, right or center are not present, the index stands for the relationship between the 
other two major forces in the country. This is the way the formula is amended to 
assess competitiveness of presidential elections, especially in the second round 
(Appendix 16). 
The left and the right in the FSU states are neither classical ones, nor are they 
extreme. They represent the two different opinions on several issues that the 
population mobilizes around. The issue is not in the sharpness of their position, but 
how essential compromise is on these matters as well as the absence of the center.  
 
Although, as Pelizzo and Babones note in their work the real range of polarization 
scores in the countries of Western Europe they looked at is smaller than theoretically 
possible, the data from the FSU states offer the opposite results. In Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the parliaments are completely 
concentrated with the polarization score of -100, i.e. and absolute concentration. This 
score is tightly followed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan with the very low 
polarization scores that range between -80 and -100. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
demonstrate a greater scope of variation in their respective polarization scores. 
Kyrgyzstan, for instance, moved from a relatively concentrated parliament with the 
score of -70 to a more polarized one with the score of -1.67 after the recent outburst of 
violence resulted in changes in the electoral formula and allowed for a party system 
based on regional loyalties to evolve.  In Armenia and Russia, the parliament moved 
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from being more to less polarized (from -21.6 to 74.81 in the former and from 46.22 
to -48.44 in the latter) with crystallization of a one-party system in Russia and 
pluralization of pro-incumbent parties in Armenia. Despite being economically 
blockaded by two of its neighbours – Azerbaijan and Turkey since 1994 and 
supported by Russia 77 party cleavage around economic issues failed to emerge. 
Nevertheless, voters’ mobilization in recent presidential elections around the issue of 
the future of Nagorno-Karabakh namely, whether to preserve the status quo, to give 
concessions to Azerbaijan or to pursue the road to independence78 which involves 
redistribution of economic powers between the centre and periphery demonstrates a 
potential for more polarization in the future.      
 
The political systems in the three Baltic states show low polarization. Especially, 
Lithuania, with scores varying in different years between -48.94 and -33.33 and in 
Estonia and Latvia, where disenfranchisement of Russian minorities that comprised in 
the early 90s 30% to 40% of the total population contributed greatly to convergence 
of elites on issues of nationhood and geopolitical orientation thus aligning parties 
along classical socio-economic cleavage lines (Pettai 1997: 21-22).  
 
Highly polarized systems are found in the hybrid regimes of Moldova, and Ukraine. 
The nature and the origin of polarization spurs from ethnicity, language and regional 
differences that are largely rooted in identities and experiences with nationhood in the 
pre-Soviet period which are relatively easy to mobilize. According to Frye ‘[p]otential 
transfers of political power are often decisive moments in polarized political systems 
because all groups expect great swings in economic policy. Losers can quickly 
                                               
77  Out of Armenia, Something New? Economist, February 21, 2008 
78  Conflict overshadows Armenia Polls, BBC, February 18, 2008, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7250235.stm, last accessed on August 5, 2008 
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become winners and vice versa’ (Frye 2002: 315). This picture captures to a great 
degree the electoral hybrid regimes of Moldova and Ukraine. Emphasising the crucial 
role elections play in such a setting as a mechanism to gain power, and given that the 
stakes of holding power are very high, policy-making inside the electoral cycle is less 
concerned with institutionalizing ‘good governance’ but rather how not to lose voters’ 
support in the next round of contestation sometimes sliding to populist moves79. This 
is evident from the recent scandal with the former Prime Minister of Ukraine being 
held under investigation for the misuse of Kyoto funds of the environmental ministry 
to pay pensions in a populist move prior to elections in 200980. 
 
In Georgia, which has approximately the same score on ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization as Moldova and Ukraine81 , ethnic conflicts and civil wars in the 
early 90s that led to emergence of two break-away regions (Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), put any attempts made by political elites to question Georgian borders, 
nationhood, or language on a footing with committing political suicide82. The war 
with Russia that followed in August 2008 confirmed the unity of the population on the 
question, despite the loss of territories, but produced divisions on the way in which 
the President handled the conflict. This issue became very divisive and mobilized 
protesters on the streets in April of 200983, but due to restricted media access of the 
                                               
79  A recent example from Ukraine features Yulia Timoshenko’s move to compensate the savings lost 
in the early 90s which left Ukraine with the highest inflation rates in Europe (around 30%). (‘A 
Political Soap-Opera, Continued’ Economist, May 29, 2008 and ‘Inflation In the Near East’ 
Economist, July 13, 2008) 
80 Ukraine ex-PM Tymoshenko charged with misusing funds. BBC Europe, December 20, 2010. 
Accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12042561 on December 29, 2010 
81  ELF for Georgia is 0.54, Moldova 0.56, Ukraine 0.52, taken from  Alesina et. al.  Fractionalization. 
Journal of Economic Growth 8, pp. 155 -194, 2003 
82  Interview with a country expert, February 2008  
83 Georgia Protests Enter Fifth Day. BBC, April 13, 2009. At 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7996970.stm 
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opposition, the chances are low to bring it into the parliament84. For now, parties took 
positions mainly on economic cleavage, dividing elites and masses between more 
liberal supporters of economic reforms (usually young, Western educated people), and 
those who advocated more state interference into the economy along with provision of 
social benefits to those economically defeated by transition, war, structural 
unemployment and other social malaise.  
 
This political polarization in hybrid regimes, crafted along different cleavages would 
not be possible without autonomous economic centers of power or simply without 
independent from one another economic resources. These centers of power can create 
a challenge to the central state, undermine state capacity and democratization (Tilly 
2007), but once entrenched into a party system these centers become the state, or two 
quasi-states competing with each other. This accounts for elections to be, first and 
foremost, competitive in hybrid regimes. Hence, polarization is crucial to the 
endurance of hybrid regimes: on the one hand it stalemates reforms while on the 
other, produces competition. 
 
 
Concentration and convergence of elites in the countries with no prior experience with 
nationhood and where economic powers are merged with the political power of the 
centre, autocracies are most likely to emerge. In the cases where leaders changed one 
or more times (Azerbaijan, Belarus) or stayed the same since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) there seems to be a 
consistent policy-making process. Neither ethnicity, nor economic based cleavages 
                                               
84 In his talk at Harriman Institute, Columbia University, Irakli Alasania emphasized that Georgian 
society is highly polarized, but outside of the parliament. 
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gained saliency providing incumbents with an easy task to impose coherent and 
consistent autocratic institutions and practices. For example, ethnically divided 
Kazakhstan witnessed from the very beginning little political mobilization based on 
ethnicity, first, because many Russians preferred an exit strategy and immigrated 
(Laitin 1998) and second, because they had little financial support back then to 
confront the incumbent’s party: despite the Russian population comprising around 
40%, the Lad (Harmony Slavic) Party (backed by ethnic Russians) won four seats out 
of 177 in the general elections of March 7th 1994 (Jeffries 2003: 180).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the ability of structural factors that were considered in this chapter to 
explain why in certain countries of the FSU clear-cut regimes emerged, the grey zone 
continuously questions the validity of these theories. Rendering a confirmation of the 
hypothesis on the strength of initial differences, Soviet modernization contributed to a 
convergence, and ethnic policies to a divergence of the regimes. While during the 20 
years of independence economies in democracies and autocracies grew, legacies of 
the past revealed themselves in the paths that the countries took. However, the answer 
is not so straightforward for hybrid regimes. Such regimes stick out as being 
persistently poor, highly heterogeneous and polarized to varying degrees – the three 
aspects that will underlie the formation of an explanatory account of the endurance of 
hybrid regimes in subsequent chapters. Divisions in societies reflected in the political 
polarization of the parliaments on the issues of nationhood, and geopolitical 
orientation are placed at the core of the emergence of hybrid regimes. These divisions 
can be of different origins but need to be supported by autonomous economic sources 
for elections to be competitive.  
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Chapter 4 Explaining post-Soviet hybrid regimes 
 
'So you destroy a country because it's not competitive. What kind of reason is that?' 
'It's the best reason, Misha. Nowadays, if you don't have natural resources, you need 
USAID. You need the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.... If only 
we could get on America's top-ten list and score big like Jordan or Egypt.' 
 
Absurdistan, Gary Shteyngart. Random House, 2006 
 
The reason which Mr. Nanabragov, the newly-established dictator of Absurdistan is 
referring to is fairly simple: there is a need in a resource-less (imaginary) former 
Soviet Republic, and this need is going to be satisfied by the foreign aid. Yet, it does 
not look as simple for the protagonist Misha, the Western-educated, America-loving 
son of the 1 238th richest man in Russia. The following chapter is devoted to bringing 
this 'simple reasoning' of the elites in the FSU countries to the surface. 
 
The goal that I pursue in this chapter is to fill in an unexplained void in terms of the 
persistent nature of hybrid regimes. My theoretical argument states that the 
permanence of hybrid regimes through time (instead of the expected transition to 
either democracy or autocracy) is due to the incentives generated by an external 
conditionality to hold free and fair elections, as well as an internal power struggle and 
the will to remain in power in the settings with different degrees of polarization. 
Building on a set of peculiar structural conditions discovered in the previous chapter 
(relative lack of affluence and thriving ethnic heterogeneity), this chapter develops 
theoretical account that bridges the former together with the next chapter, which will 
concentrate on supplying empirical evidence. Therefore, the originality of this 
research is in finding out how structural pre-conditions, discussed in the previous 
chapter, together with international conditionality (to be introduced in this chapter), 
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create a set of incentives in which actors develop certain preferences that lead them to 
make a hybrid regime permanent.  
 
Using analytic narratives and elements of formal modeling this chapter will show how 
hybrid regimes become a solution, which brings the interests of domestic and foreign 
actors into equilibrium. The model will demonstrate how structures shape actors’ 
preferences, and how the latter enable the persistency of hybrid regimes. I will begin 
by introducing the premise of the study as a set of hypotheses that help us to test the 
theory in the next chapter. The hypotheses focus on different levels of polarization 
and the roles of various international actors. Therefore, I proceed by giving a detailed 
account of a variety of international influences that are actively involved with the 
countries in question. After specifying the international donors' interests and the 
countries' need for aid, I move on to suggesting a rationale by which the rulers in the 
countries operate and a mechanism that connects together structural preconditions and 
actors' strategic behavior. Specifically, how different degrees of polarization 
transform into competitiveness or non-competitiveness of elections and different 
degrees of performance in reform of governance in hybrid regimes, while assessing 
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4.1. The Premise of the Study: Internal Polarization and External Support  
 
An answer to the question of why so many countries maintained hybrid regimes for 
over a decade was not possible during the first few years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Two decades later, the amount of scholarly work has flourished 
addressing different aspects of hybrid regimes, from the processes specific to such 
regimes, such as, patterns of mobilization protests (Robertson 2010) to their general 
evolutionary trends around the world (Levitsky/Way 2010). However, the 
permanence of hybrid regimes, when they are traditionally expected to become either 
democratic or autocratic in the context of the FSU states is not addressed. This 
chapter is devoted to providing a theoretical framework to help better understand the 
endurance of hybrid regimes in the former Soviet Union states. This framework 
includes specification of preferences of domestic and international actors contingent 




As the next step in formulating an explanatory account of hybrid regime viability, I 
summarize the following set of hypotheses, thereby condensing the scarce knowledge 
available about the grey zone as shown in the course of this study. Relying on what 
we know so far about polarization in the former Soviet Union from the works of Frey 
(2002, 2010) which demonstrate how the former impedes reform as well as about 
identity – related behavior in hybrid regimes (Way 2005, Hale, 2005) I use these 
hypotheses as a guideline in formulating the causal mechanism and test them in the 
following chapter. 
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H1: Hybrid regimes emerge and endure in 
(a) the polarized countries;  
(b) where various international interests collide  
 
Despite a conventional thinking that aid from different sources will bring more 
prosperity and consequently, more democracy (Lipset 1959, Limongi/Przeworski 
2000), I suggest that it does not hold. As the previous chapter had demonstrated, 
countries with hybrid regimes do not prosper and remain in a grey zone for decades. 
This finding partially confirms the general pattern that political economist Brollo and 
his collaborators had established in connection to the windfall (foreign aid) 
government revenues85: '...an increase in resources available to a government leads to 
an increase in corruption of the incumbent (a moral hazard effect). This happens 
because, with a larger budget size, the incumbent has more room to grab political 
rents without disappointing rational but imperfectly informed voters' (Brollo et.al 
2010: 2). Moreover, the ideas of mercantilism that prevailed economic policies of the 
majority of the FSU governments during the firs years of independence gave a way to 
a variety of different ideas that framed the choices of cooperation with international 
institutions (Darden 2009: 309). An account of donors, which I am going to provide 
below, will show how different donors pursue different and sometimes contradictory 
interests, which stalemates the progress while reinforcing polarization and 
competitiveness of a regime.  
 
                                               
85 Economists define revenues as windfall, if a country either experiences a sudden discovery of 
oil or gas, or there is an increase in the world market price of the resources that the country is well 
endowed  with, or if a country is a recipient of large a scope and amount of foreign aid (Van der Ploeg, 
Venables 2009: 2) 
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H2: Hybrid regimes are viable in non- or low-polarized countries with a unified 
strategic interest 
 
This hypotheses puts into a test the relationship between the unity of elites and masses 
about their geopolitical orientation which draws international support for promoting 
the donor's interests and  the pace of reform of governance. While it is expected that 
the consensus of elites brings full reforms instead of partial ones (Hellman 1998, Frye 
2002), a hybrid regime with pronounced flaws in electoral flaws and achievements in 
the reforms of governance emerges and endures. Electoralism in regime studies 
assumes that electoral conduct is the major yardstick, against which the regimes are 
assessed by international community (Levitsky/Way 2010). However, in some hybrid 
regimes reforms in rule of law and other spheres of governance are valued higher than 
quality of electoral process, which as going to be shown later, depends on the 
strategies of donors. 
 
H3: Incentives of international actors are prone to promote more competitiveness in 
already polarized regimes and more reform in non-polarized regimes  
 
This hypothesis challenges the accepted democracy promotion claims and moves 
beyond the debate between rationalists and normativists (for ex. 
Schimmelfenning/Sedelmeier 2005, March/Olsen 1996). It does not take for granted 
that the international donors are interested in establishing a democratic regime. 
Instead, it suggests putting through a test the interests that international actors pursue 
and the incentives that they provide for cooperation with the domestic elites, as well 
as the strategies that the latter pursue to benefit from this cooperation. 
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Building on what we know about hybrid regimes, we can easily pinpoint an existing 
gap between elections and so-called governance, i.e. between the way the rulers get to 
power and the way they govern once there. This new phenomena, discussed in a 
greater detail in previous chapters, is not only the gap between the formal and 
informal institutions, observed by scholars during the Third Wave of democratization 
(Lauth 2000, Schedler 2002, Helmke/Levitsky 2006). Rather, it is a controversy 
between two major questions that are guiding this research from the beginning: how 
to get to power and how to rule once in office?  
Thus, the essence of hybrid regimes is in mixing the ways of attaining power, from 
democracies and autocracies, and combining the ways to govern from these two 
regime types. Precisely, as shown in previous chapters, free and fair elections (as in 
democracies) are combined with an absence of independent judiciary and some 
restrictions on civil rights (as in autocracies). Or, alternatively, elections may bear 
significant flaws, but the countries achievements in reforms of governance and rule of 
law are convincingly suggesting a pursuit of a democratic path. 
Specific requirements from international observers (that ensure international 
recognition of elections) are relatively easy and fast for the competing elites to learn 
and to comply with what is expected, and they guarantee that ways of taking power 
are in accordance with democracy. At the same time, a country-specific 
institutionalization of the rule of law, political rights and civil liberties requires a lot 
of time, and every attempt on the side of international actors to aid the learning 
process can be interpreted as an interference in domestic affairs86. Therefore, 
                                               
86  I draw this point upon a conversation with a EU Commission Delegation official in Ukraine, 
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domestic elites and international actors regard as mutually beneficial acting separately 
but in a way cooperating in keeping elections recognizable. To develop an argument 
based on this standpoint, we need to theorize and discern between the donors that are 
available to the countries as well as to accentuate the need for aid that the countries in 
question have. 
 
4.2. International Actors and Regime Outcomes 
 
The role of international actors in the context of regime and democratization studies 
went through a revision since the fall of Berlin Wall: at the dawn of the Third Wave 
of democratization scholars believed that regime change and democratic 
institutionalization is a product of solely domestic actors (O’Donnell/Schmitter 1986). 
This short-lived ‘domestic-international’ debate exhausted itself with the Enlargement 
talks of the European Union (EU) with the former Warsaw pact countries seen as a 
form of a swap of economic benefits (from the membership) for democratic 
governance (condition for the membership) (Huntington 1991: 85-88). 
Notwithstanding the obvious success of the EU as a promoter of democracy in the 
aforementioned countries, the scope of the countries, which it has engaged with, 
stayed limited. Until today, only the Baltic states received membership, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are participants of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and observers note the rising role of Russia in using 
soft cultural and economic powers in ‘…diffusion of certain ideas and norms’ 
throughout the FSU and in Central Asia in particular (Jackson: 2010). Accepting as a 
starting point that the EU indeed contributed to the emergence of democracy in the 
                                                                                                                                      
October 2008 
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countries, elites of which were in agreement on the European choice for their 
countries from the first days of re-established independence (Jeffries 2004), this 
section in a concise manner addresses some of the strategies that international actors 
play that may affect regime outcomes.  
 
And yet again, nothing is puzzling about the role that the EU conditionality, proximity 
and legacies played in the Baltic countries, as well as the role that negatively-
perceived Soviet legacies played in the speedy transition to democracies in those 
countries. Similarly, modernization by the Soviet state, in a broad sense of bringing 
the experience of statehood, bureaucratic institutions, industrialization, urbanization, 
literacy etc. and dependence on Russian products and markets in the majority of the 
Central Asian countries, helps to understand the 'seamless transition' from 
Communism and, broadly, from one type of autocracy to another (Brown 2009: 550). 
But, what are the roles that Russia and the West (the EU, the OSCE, the USA) are 
playing in the countries in the grey zone and whether these roles are shedding light on 
the persistence of either autocracies or democracies is less straightforward. 
 
Levitsky and Way have approached the 'proximity to the West concept' of Jeffrey 
Kopstein and David A. Reilly87, by assessing the actual 'Western leverage' that the EU 
and the US exercise over countries that strive to become democracies88. What drives 
this investigation, in particular, is the questionable intentions of the Western donors 
and of the elites in the majority of the FSU countries to democratize the countries, as 
opposed to keep the status quo, or even to de-democratize. The next section is going 
                                               
87 Kopstein, Jeffrey/Reilly, David A. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the 
Postcommunist World. World Politics, Volume 53, Number 1, October 2000, pp. 1-37 
88 Levitsky/Way Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 2010. p. 24 
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to look into the preferences of domestic and foreign actors, not normatively assumed, 
but empirically derived from their actions, to formulate a theoretical explanatory 
account of the persistency of hybrid regimes. 
 
4.2.1. International Aid: Donors and Recipients 
International environment and geographical location determine to a large extent the 
set of foreign actors that have interests in countries. After the Soviet Union broke up, 
almost half of the former Soviet Republics, and particularly, the three countries with 
hybrid regimes, as defined by this study, – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, - found 
themselves in the buffer zone bordering Russia89 on one side and the NATO frontier 
and the EU on the other and, hence, often attract, conflicted interests. Broadly defined 
here as Russia and the West, these two international players set conditions for further 
cooperation with the countries in question.  
To pursue these interests international actors offer countries in the buffer zone 
'rewards for cooperation' as well as 'punishments for deviations'. The countries find 
themselves in need of support and aid and thus, develop strategies that ensure that 
their needs are met. The section below articulates interests/needs through preferences 
of both types of international actors as well as of the domestic elites in the subject 
countries.  
 
4.2.2. Interests of International Actors 
An array of interests that the West pursues in the region of the FSU primarily 
concerns maintenance of peace and security at their borders, or at the borders of their 
strategic partners (the NATO members), prospective markets, and loyal governments 
                                               
89 Russia from this point on moves form being treated as a former Soviet Republic to be regarded as 
an international player. 
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in those neighboring countries. As the last two decades have demonstrated, 
democracy promotion efforts go hand in hand, if not uniquely channel, aid flows, 
which begs the question: Why is the West interested in having democratic neighbors? 
A commonly accepted answer stands on a quasi-law in international relations, 
according to which democracies very rarely go into war with each other90. Hence, 
establishing a democracy is a subordinated goal, a side-effect of a security-building 
effort.   
 
The Western appeal is not entirely foreign to the former Russian Empire: the debate 
of whether the state and the political system of Russia proper and its subjects should 
be built according to the Western values of democracies or whether Russia should 
follow its own way and come up with its particular type of democracy. This debate, 
known as the one between Zapadniki ('Westernizers' from the Russian word Zapad, 
the West) and the Slavyanofily (Slavophiles, Russian nationalists) that started in the 
middle of the 18th century continues to shape Russia's if no longer domestic, then 
beyond any doubt its foreign policies, as well as the domestic and foreign policies of 
its former territories.  
 
The incentives that the West uses to promote cooperation are based on the prospects 
of peace, security and economic prosperity that accompanied post-WWII European 
democracies and the US.  
 
Hence, the countries of the West, acting though their major funding agencies offer to 
provide financial support for governance in exchange for guarantees of peace and 
                                               
90  Starr, Harvey Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Community. Journal of Peace 
Research Vol. 29, no. 2, 1992 pp. 207-213 
 
 138  
some sort of democratic reforms. The conduct of free and fair competitive elections 
(or as Levitsky and Way call it an 'electoralist' strategy91) is one of the essential 
reform steps and priority areas as well as a requirement for further funding. Because 
elections happen regularly and are therefore more predictable and available for 
international observers to assess than various kinds of reforms that go through a long 
implementation phase and assessment of some of them requires waiting for long 
periods of time, the former moved to the forefront of assessment of democracy 
promotion efforts. Moreover, recommendations that are delivered on legislative or 
judicial reforms are oftentimes regarded as an attempt to interfere with domestic 
affairs.   
 
What are, correspondingly, Russia's interests? They are intrinsically similar to the 
ones of the West: peace and security; favorable market conditions and cooperative 
governments in the neighboring countries. This also calls for keeping NATO further 
away from its borders. Russia's arguments are based on highlighting the common 
history that dates many centuries back and has its supporters in the former Soviet 
Republics. Thus, Russia offers energy resources below market prices, direct subsidies, 
markets for imports coming from other countries, lucrative contracts for the 
neighboring businessmen (Jackson 2010: 108) as well as a promise of peace and 
security to be provided in exchange for, among other conditions, bases for its troops 
to be stationed in the FSU countries. In return it expects the aid-recipients to be loyal 
to Russian foreign policy and interests, as well as deter from seeking other alliances 
with military organizations. Russian government is not concerned with electoral 
                                               
91 Levitsky/Way Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 2010. p. 42 
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conduct, as long as the candidate that is endorsed wins office92. 
To understand why the international actors are capable to influence the strategies of 
elites in the countries of the FSU, it is essential to look at the depth of urgency in 
support that the countries display. 
 
4.2.3. The Scope of Needs and Aid-seeking by the FSU states  
In order for the international players to have leverage over the FSU countries, the 
latter must have a basic need in certain types of resources that cooperation with 
foreign powers yields. Levitsky and Way in their extensive study of leverage and 
linkage hybrid regimes focus mainly on the democracy promotional effort of the West 
in relation to the geographic proximity and the size of the population  (2010: 24). The 
scholars treat the willingness to seek aid from the international community as 
conditioned on these factors, while it is the contingency and type of economy and 
society as well as the scope of the required reform that determines how much aid the 
country will be seeking.  
 
As was shown in the previous chapter, when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the 
majority of the Republics were at a relatively low level of development, institutionally 
unreformed and industrially backwards to survive independently and to build a new 
country on their own. The lack of experience and difficulties associated with 
reforming or adapting the Soviet legislative framework and policies to rapidly 
changing socio-economic environment contributed to republics' remaining poor and 
                                               
92 Russian former president and now the Prime-Minister Putin has a tradition of naming a favorite in 
every  presidential or legislative race that takes place in the FSU countries, with the exception of the 
Baltic states. During the presidential election of 2004 in Ukraine Putin congratulated his preferred 
candidate Victor Yanukovich ahead of the announced results and the standstill that followed as a 
part of the Orange Revolution. This set a lukewarm tone for the next five years of his opponent's 
ruling in a relationship between Ukraine and Russia. 
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un-reformed for some years and later decades. Even the Baltic states would not pass 
the aforementioned empirically established threshold of democratic sustainability of 
GDP per capita of 6,000 USD (Przeworski/Limongi 1997: 159). But the first years of 
independence set them on the track of reforms, with the help of clear prospects of EU 
membership and rules on how to join the EU (Jeffries 2004: 137). This confirms the 
accounts of rationalists in international relations theory, by which the logic of 
consequentiality is reflected in conditionality or 'a reinforcement by reward' 
(Schimmelfenning/Sedelmeier 2004). When a clear membership prospect was at stake 
both the EU was more demanding on the delivery of reforms and each of the Baltic 
states was determined to show progress on each of the required policies. 
 
The economic conditions in well-to-moderately endowed with energy resources 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and to some extent Uzbekistan improved with 
the growth of the commodity prices in the late 90s' and set them on a path of 
economic independence and a way for their rulers to stay in power independently of 
the type of regimes and demands of the international community. 
 
The economies and societies of the remaining FSU republics were in a dramatic need 
of aid at the onset of their independent statehood and, as the GDP per capita data 
confirms, remain in short supply of resources. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine became the major aid-seekers and their 
political regimes turned into an arena for the international actors to cooperate and/or 
compete.  
 
To assess interactions between the aid-givers and the aid-seekers and to build an 
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argument that links together the actions of domestic and foreign actors and the 
emergence and the persistence of hybrid regimes I suggest investigating the role that 
the European Union through the European Neighborhood Policy (the ENP) and the 
US through its foreign aid funding agency US AID play in the process. Below, I shall 
discuss which dimension of a regime, ways to attain power (elections) or the ways to 
rule (governance), is each of the major actors particularly after in the context of the 
FSU states. 
 
4.2.4.The EU: The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
Unlike the Copenhagen Criteria that set the requirements for candidates for accession 
to comply with before enlargement talks begin, the ENP offers to ‘neighbors93’ ‘…a 
privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values 
(democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy 
principles and sustainable development)’94. The universal strategy common for all of 
‘neighbors’ is concerned with providing   ‘…support for democratic development, the 
rule of law and governance…’ which includes the obligation from the countries to 
ensure that elections are free and fair. Precisely, the mechanisms of cooperation are 
stated in the Action Plan95 as well as in country-specific strategies that from the 
standpoint of the EU deserve crucial attention, such as ‘…social and economic 
development, including actions to alleviate the consequences of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe…’ for Belarus, ‘…regulatory reform and administrative capacity 
building…’ for Moldova, or ‘…support for peaceful settlement of ...  internal 
                                               
93  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine  
94  Official web page of European Neighborhood Policy, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm last accessed on August 7, 2008 
95  All of the ‘neighbors’ have adopted their respective Action Plans with the exception of Belarus.  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_belarus_en.htm last accessed on August 7, 2008 
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conflicts…’ in Georgia96. The logic of appropriateness can be seen as the guiding 
theory under these conditions for cooperation, according to which the actor's behavior 
is driven by institutionalized rules that are considered normal and appropriate (March 
and Olsen 1996: 252). Hence, the EU expects its neighbors to adhere to the 'common 
values' out of mere finding them 'normal'. Yet, the reasoning may run much deeper 
than the debate between the rationalists (conditionality) and normativists (norms): it 
can be that the promotion of democracy is not at the core of the interests of the EU in 
its neighbors and that other interests guide the outreach effort. 
 
Notwithstanding the claims made by the European Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, that ‘… 
membership is not indispensable as a lever for reform… in areas including press 
freedom, energy and trade’97, the ENP is a constant target for critics both form 
scholars and practitioners, supporters of the rationalist logic of consequentiality For 
them, the only way that the EU can influence the pace of reforms in the target 
countries is by offering a membership agreement as a consequence of the 
achievements in reforms. Scholars argue, that ‘mixed messages’ (Beichelt 2007) 
result in ‘partial reforms’ (Frye 2002), which is never enough for ‘the neighbors’ to 
secure either the establishment of a democratic regime or accession agreement. 
Observers note that ‘[b]y mixing up apples and pears it helps put off the enlargement 
debate’ – implying a disagreement within the member-states on the possibilities of the 
                                               
96 Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_belarus_en.htm 
 Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf      
 Country Strategy Paper 2007-
2013http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf 
97  Europe’s Neighbors Feel Positive Effect, by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Financial Times, September 
7, 2007, accessed at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31ff2d2c-5cdb-11dc-9cc9-0000779fd2ac.html  on 
August 7, 2008 
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future enlargement98. Besides, the elites in the ENP targeted countries are interested 
in receiving aid99, given that the Action Plan is a manageable one and does not call 
for major policy changes.  
The conduct of free and fair elections is indicated to be in the priority area for the 
majority of the 'neighbors' and is assessed by the OSCE EOM standards100. 
Complying with the standards is a part of the learning process that elites in the 
countries are engaged in, they know what to expect from the observers and try to 
comply with those rules, without conducting major reforms101. 
These matters contribute to a situation when the EU knows it will not offer the 
membership, therefore, does not really control the pace of reforms. At the same time 
elites in the countries are aware that membership is not at stake any time soon, but 
there are immediate gains in cooperation, without actually having to deliver reforms. 
Hence, the EU promotes not democracy and reform, but rather a 'let things not get 
worse', a situation close to preserving the status quo. The domestic elites also favor 
this situation because it means that they do not need to engage in a series of reforms, 
but can as well focus on preserving the status quo or not letting the situation 
deteriorate. 
 
Elections, however, remain the major yardstick against which the countries' 
                                               
98  Europe’s funk over its neighbors, Financial Times, September 4, 2007, accessed at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/165f5234-5b1b-11dc-8c32-0000779fd2ac.html on August 7, 2008 
99  In the period between 2007 and 2010 Armenia had received 98.4, Azerbaijan 92, Belarus 20, 
Georgia 120.4, Moldova 209.7 and Ukraine 494 million Euro respectively.  
100 The EU provides assistance to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) in monitoring free elections and developing national electoral and human rights 
institutions in new democracies. (Source: The EU's Relations With The OSCE. Last accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/organisations/osce/index_en.htm on January 27, 2011) 
101 For instance, observers are persistently drawing attention to poor quality of voting lists in Ukraine 
ad Georgia. The costs of systematizing and maintaining lists are high, especially in Ukraine with its 
number of eligible voters rounding around 35 million, but there is an option to secure funding 
specifically for implementation of this project. The manipulations with lists are less visible and hard 
to register. Therefore, the elites are hiding behind a lack of political will to secure a more visible 
and fair conduct of elections. (from an interview with an official from one of the observation 
missions in October 2008). 
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performance is assessed and further support is allocated. To demonstrate the 'aid for 
elections' link a recent example from Belarus is in order. After another violent episode 
of dealing with his electoral opponents and their supporters, but still trying to 
maintain the facade of fair elections president Lukashenka deprived his country of the 
support of the West at least for some years to come. As Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of some of the EU countries had announced, '...prospects of money from the West to 
save a deteriorating economic situation have in all probability gone up in smoke. 
Investors will be wary of a country that has so spectacularly shown its contempt for 
the law'102. Moreover, it means the necessity for a rapprochement with Russia after a 
recent 'gas row' that the two countries went through: indeed, Russia had offered $4 
124 bln in subsidies for duty-free oil103. 
 
Hence, the conditions that the EU is putting on the non-member countries of the FSU 
include first and foremost the conduct of free and fair elections. Secondly, the donor 
is looking at some level of performance in reforms, from the judiciary to 
harmonization of trade regulations. Security issues are of a lesser concern for the 
ENP, as all of the countries that are members of the EU and share borders with the 
FSU states are also members of NATO, which is more profoundly engaged with the 
issue. The scheme of aid is the following: achievements in elections in exchange for 
funds to be used on other spheres. The until recently popular idea of equating the EU 
with democracy promotion efforts hardly holds for the FSU states, as it is not 
democracy which is at stake, but support of already existing democratic elements in 
exchange for additional funding. 
                                               
102  Lukashenko The Loser. OpEd By Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek Sikorski and 
Guido Westerwelle for The New York Times, December 23, 2010 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24iht-edbildt24.html?_r=2 
103  Belarus To Get $4.124 Bln in Subsidies – Putin. Rianovosti, January 20, 2011 at 
http://en.rian.ru/business/20110120/162224399.html 
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4.2.5. The USA (USAID) 
The US, despite being separated by thousands of nautical miles from the majority of 
the FSU states, assigns a particular importance to the area. As a pragmatic actor it is 
interested in assuring security and economic interests of the country itself and of its 
partners104. Hence it operates through two channels: military security, which is 
provided through NATO and civil/economic security through USAID. 
 
USAID was created in 1961 to separate military assistance from non-military, and to 
promote security and development in the parts of the world where the US has 
economic and security related interests105. In 50 years of its activity it became the 
major civilian foreign aid provider in the world106.  
When the Soviet Union broke up the USAID showed a deep commitment to the FSU 
states and has allocated since then '...roughly $8.2 billion in grants for economic and 
technical assistance to the region... to facilitate [the countries'] transition to democracy 
and free market economies...'107.  
The amount of money that USAID spends is very persuasive and generous, however 
the conditionality that they use is related to the level of performance of the countries 
competing for the same pool of funds in '...undertaking economic and political reform, 
whether they are following international standards of human rights, whether they are 
adhering to international treaties, and whether they are denying support to 
                                               
104 Mark P. Lagon. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the UA and the International 
Community. Council on Foreign Affairs. Markets and Democracy  Brief, February 2011, p.1 
105 US AID History Summary. Accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html  on 
Januray 28, 2011 
106  United States Is The Largest Donor of Foreign Aid, Report Says. America.gov, May 24, 2007. 
Accessed at http://www.america.gov/st/develop-
english/2007/May/20070524165115zjsredna0.2997553.html on January 28, 2011 
107  The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The 
Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 2 
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terrorists.'108 The approach is neither 'electoralist', nor focused on promoting 
democracy. The funding from the USAID from the very beginning of cooperation was 
largely associated with the governance sector and provided strong support to 
governments' initiatives and reforms. The support to the non-governmental sector as 
well as to opposition parties at the times of elections became visible after the wave of 
Colored Revolutions rolled through some of the FSU states109. However, the funding 
is not conditioned on the conduct of free and fair elections, and is granted to support 
the countries' achievements in tax code legislation drafting or reforms in pension 
system. It seems also that a breach of the security alliance with the US (as was the 
case with Ukraine when it was charged with selling the Kolchuga radar systems to 
Iraq in 2002 in violation of the US sanctions110) results in freezing of funding while 
the infringement of media freedom, political rights, or electoral fraud did not provoke 
such measures.  
Thus, various accomplishments in governance can result in continuation of support 
despite the failure to ensure the conduct of free and fair elections. In the menu of 
conditions that USAID offers, elections are not the major focus. Rather, the conduct 




                                               
108  Ibid p. 10 
109  Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, became a part of a continuous effort to ensure free and fair 
elections by USAID and its sub-program for Elections and Political Process in the Office of 
Democracy and Governance. Source: Elections and Political Process Program. Office of 
Democracy and Governance. Accessed at www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/cent.../pdf/dg932-
002.pdf on January 29, 2011 
110  The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The 
Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 12 
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4.2.6. Russia as an international actor 
Ever since Boris Yeltzin stepped back form the power in 2000 and Vladimir Putin 
being set in charge, the Russian political regime started to move in authoritarian 
direction which was combined with a growing state capacity (Tilly 2007). Re-
nationalization of the energy sector is an encompassing example to illustrate both 
tendencies. Combined with a favorable world market conjuncture for energy 
commodity prices (a windfall revenue), Russian energy policy as an instrument of its 
foreign policy became a successful tool of reinforcement by reward. The increase in 
gas prices, cuts in gas supplies are widely expected moves whenever a country intends 
to leave ‘Moscow's orbit’111. However, this is the strategy best characterized as post-
colored-revolutions syndrome, prior to which Russia was trying softer mechanisms of 
influence such as forming regional alliances with other FSU states. A good example is 
an initiative to create a United Economic Space that came from Russia in September 
2003. The original idea is to create a free trade zone between Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine under the umbrella of the Russian ruble as a common 
currency was rejected by both Kazakhstan and Ukraine as an attempt ‘…to reestablish 
“a soft empire”’ and therefore was restricted only to free trade and customs union and 
continued development (Blagov 2003). 
 
Russia also uses military stations in the FSU states, a legacy of the Soviet Army, to 
pursue its security interests. In return for keeping the foreign army on their now 
sovereign territories, the FSU countries are rewarded with discounted energy prices, 
and other favorable conditions to conduct business with Russia. The requirements that 
Russia imposes on the countries are largely related to Russia's economic and 
                                               
111  Russia ready to cut off gas supplies to Belarus, Georgia, Financial Times, December 14, 2007, 
accessed at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bc3e259c-8b17-11db-8940-0000779e2340.html on August 
7, 2008 
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international security, and gives less attention to elections and governance.  
 
Russia does not expect countries in the FSU to hold free and fair elections: as long as 
the endorsed candidate that agrees to cooperate further with the Russian government 
on economy and security wins, elections are recognized as valid. Below is an example 
of how special  institutions (indirect soft power) are created to guarantee Russia's 
exercise hard economic power directly. One such institution is CIS Election 
Monitoring Organization created as a response to the OSCE Elections Observation 
Mission (OSCE EOM) that is enlarging its engagement in Monitoring of elections in 
the region. Albeit the two missions declare their commitment to similar principles of 
observing and reporting electoral processes, comparing the reports of the CIS EMO 
with the coded previously OSCE EOM yields in 100% of instances contradictory 
reports112. Namely, whenever the OSCE would label elections as 'neither free nor 
fair', the CIS would categorize them as 'free, fair, and democratic’. Some examples 
worth mentioning are elections that preceded the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, all of elections in Belarus since 2001, in Kazakhstan since 
2004, in Russia since 2003, in Uzbekistan since 2004. All of these events were 
assessed with negative connotations by the OSCE and with positive ones by the CIS. 
Not only does it indicate the utilization of different notions of democracy and what 
constitutes free and fair elections, but at the same time the desire of Russia to diffuse 
its own values and norms of democracy by assuring autocratic leaders of their 
legitimacy in the eyes of Russia and CIS. Besides, the gist is not only in Russia's 
support for rigged elections (Jackson 2010), but in support of incumbents in the cases 
of Central Asian states, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, i.e. Russian allies, and in 
                                               
112  Commonwealth of Independent States . Accessed at  http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=20  
on August 5, 2008 
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support for the opposition in Georgia113.  
 
 
To sum up, the interests that international actors pursue in the FSU region can be 
narrowed down to a menu of conditions that refer to the conduct of elections, reforms 
in the governance sphere and security issues. Russia and the US are concerned with 
the security (including economic security) and forming/maintaining strategic 
partnerships and alliances, more than with the conduct of elections. In fact, Russia is 
not at all interested in reforms in the FSU countries, and any conduct of elections is 
acceptable, as long as the 'chosen', cooperative candidate wins. The EU focuses on 
elections (through cooperation and financial support to the OSCE) and conditions its 
further support of governance on electoral conduct. The international actors are not 
that much focused on promotion of democracy, but rather on peace and stability. The 
strategies Russia and the West pursue and the incentives that they create are 








                                               
113  Russia Protests Irregularities in Georgian Vote. January 2008. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,  
www.rferl.org 
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4.3. Hybrid regimes: a well – supported space  
 
As previous chapters have shown, hybrid regimes in the FSU come in two forms: 
competitive and non-competitive. In competitive, the way to power for the rulers is 
paved through free and fair elections that are conducted in a competitive environment. 
Non-competitive regimes also hold free and fair elections, recognized by international 
observers, but the campaign lacks general competitiveness. The two types are 
connected to and, as will be argued in the course of this study, are a result of a 
polarization, or the lack of thereof, that penetrate the societies.  
 
To understand the differences between the two kinds of hybrid regimes, I will first 
highlight the similarities. Precisely, both types of regimes hold elections that are 
acknowledged by international observers as free and fair, as a democratic part of the 
mixture. To reiterate, I attribute this feature to both 1) clarity from the standpoint of 
international observers as to what qualifies as a free and fair election, and 2) 
comprehensibility from the standpoint of the elites, due to the learning process in the 
last decade during which the rulers familiarized themselves with the “dos” and 
“don'ts” of how to get elections positively 'certified' by the international community in 
general and the key observer – the OSCE, in particular. The reason why elites in the 
camps of both, the incumbent and a challenger look forward to this 'certification' is 
that it opens a channel to external financial resources, after international observers 
confirm the winner in free and fair elections as a legitimate one. The two share 
problems in the domains of governance, especially in the rule of law sphere.   
 
At this point, similarities start producing differences: free and fair elections can be 
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held in competitive or non-competitive environments, depending on how polarized 
the voters are. These differences stem from the ways that rulers attain power 
(elections) and penetrate how the rulers rule (governance). 
 
In competitive hybrid regimes, elites know that campaigns, voting and election results 
will be contested. High levels of polarization in the society secure the intensity of a 
campaign. As in democracies, there is an uncertainty about the results until the 
moment they are announced. Sometimes, however, unlike in democracies, this 
uncertainty stretches out into the post-announcement of the results because it is 
unclear whether the defeated camp is going to accept the results and the winner as a 
legitimate ruler. (This situation travels beyond the countries of the FSU and is widely 
observed in post-conflict societies in Africa, as the elections in December 2010 in 
Côte d'Ivoire have shown).    
 
Being aware of this, elites in power do not invest as much time and resources in 
judiciary reform or crafting of new social or economic policies as they do in changing 
of electoral formulas, the scope of presidential (chief executives') powers, or other 
institutions that allow them to win in the next electoral cycle. For them, the less rule 
of law is exercised in the country, the greater the chances of winning the competition 
in the next round, as well as the more corruption in the country, the better the chances 
to stay in power.  
 
For the rulers, reforms are costly: not only do they bear the actual cost in monetary 
equivalent into policy research and implementation (usually sponsored by the Western 
donors), but also risk being punished at the electoral urn for performing certain 
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reforms or leaving a portion of their constituency worse-off114. This voter reaction to 
reform, in the form of punishing the implementer (incumbent) first via popular ratings 
and later at the polling booth, is common also in democratic societies (especially in 
polarized ones)115. The populace of both democratic and non-democratic societies 
reacts in the same way to similar actions of politicians, which contributes to the 
greater debate on political culture as a negative attestation to some cultures being 
more democratic than the others. The motivation and legitimization of the leaders, 
however, differs in democracies from that in hybrid regimes. In democracies, leaders 
understand that they will lose elections at some point, their tenure is limited and they 
even stand a chance to be voted out if not acting in the interests of the voters. Elites 
are accountable to their voters and their legitimacy is domestic. In hybrid regimes, 
leaders also use elections as a way to legitimize their rule but they largely rely on 
international observers to legitimize their claim to power and thus be eligible to 
receive foreign aid to support reforms and economy.  
 
Indeed, operating under an assumption that rulers' preference is to stay in power, the 
point of the crucial challenge comes during elections. International recognition and 
legitimatization of elections as free and fair transforms into another preference that 
the rulers in hybrid regimes have: to make sure that the funds to support economy are 
                                               
114 Ukraine's borrowing history with the IMF demonstrates this point: right after being elected as the 
president in 2010 Victor Yanukovich and his government agreed to a package of pension reform in 
return for the funding to fix the country's balance of payment problems since the high inflation 
crisis in 2008. By February 2011 non of the required steps had been done, but the country is in the 
need for next tranche, as parliamentary elections are approaching. But exactly because the country 
had entered the new campaign cycle, analysts predict that no reforms will be conducted before the 
actual elections (See Pavel Korduban, Ukraine Struggles to Secure Next IMF Tranche. Jamestown 
Foundation, Vol. 8, Issue 28). 
115 For example, in the United States, President Obama's rating of popular support  suffered after he 
implemented the stimulus package in 2009. As James Surowiecki of The New Yorker put it quoting 
from Prof. Jonathan Baron, '...who studies the role of psychology in public policy,... if you take 
actions and things go wrong, you're often held more responsible than if you do nothing, even when 
the failure to act would lead to a disastrous outcome'. The observer concludes, that '… when Rome 
is burning, trying to put out the fire may cost you more than just sitting by and fiddling'. James 
Surowiecki Second Helpings. The New Yorker September 20, 2010, p. 52  
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coming from the outside (given the general level of various resource and/or market 
dependency and relatively low level of affluence).  The major donor, be it the 
European Union or Russia, has to approve of the conduct of the elections (in the case 
of the former) or the outcome of elections (in the case of the latter), as shown above, 
to secure further support of the state.  
 
While in competitive hybrid regimes free and fair elections are held in a highly 
combative atmosphere, in their non-competitive counterparts elections are considered 
to be free and fair, but there is no real competitor to the major (incumbent) candidate 
(or party). Non-competitive hybrid regimes are produced by a strong agreement 
among the population and elites on their long-term geopolitical commitment to their 
allies, which has a long history and dates back to the years of the first independent 
state. Elites and masses converge on major state- and nationhood issues and polarize 
on the ones that do not reach the parliaments. The material support from the country's 
foreign allies that such a strategy renders, is a basis to keep elections acknowledged, 
although devoid of rivalry, at a cost of oppressing alternative opinions in media, and 
using force against the demonstrators. Besides, these windfall revenues in the form of 
foreign aid tend to produce even more corruption than there was before (Brollo et.al. 
2010). Knowing that there is no cleavage dividing the population, if there is an 
uprising, it usually means the end for the ruler. If there is a revolution, the former 
leader becomes an outcast – flees, is exiled, etc. as under autocracies. In competitive 
regimes, the former leader and/or his team have a chance to become re-involved in the 
political system  by pacts with other political figures, becoming a head of an 
opposition party or movement, or heading an NGO. Often these leaders can nearly 
count on being able to mount a comeback, due to their preexisting pacts with other 
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political figures. In other words, it is a winner-take-all situation in non-competitive 
hybrid regimes as opposed to the possibilities for a comeback or shared arrangements 
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4.4. The Argument 
 
In order to explain the endurance of hybrid regimes, one needs to envision the two 
goals pursued by their rulers:  
1) to hold office and to stay in power at all cost (Geddes 1999: 129) 
2) to ensure that elections are free and fair.  
 
The first of the two goals is not unique for hybrid regimes: the rulers in democracies 
are also seeking to stay in power. The second goal, however, discerns elites' 
motivation: in democracies it is to secure legitimacy, while in hybrid regimes elites 
aspire to receive external support to keep the country afloat.  
From the position of hybrid regimes the two goals are incompatible. This is because 
alternation of power is what elections are meant to deliver. In addition, a tenured time 
of a chief executive in the office is limited to two consecutive terms in the majority of 
countries. In such an ambivalent situation, in order to reach both goals, the rulers are 
involved in activities that go beyond a fair campaign and involve moderate to gross 
interference into the natural course of elections. This becomes possible because there 
is a gap between what is expected for elections to be recognized and what can be done 
to ensure that a certain candidate wins.  
 
If the environment is generally very competitive, and the ruler estimates the risks of 
losing as high, he or she engages in undercover bribery. However, knowing well what 
observers will be looking at and for, there is a high chance that elections are 
recognized as free, fair and competitive. In polarized societies, this may also involve 
abstention from serious reforms which can lead to the loss of constituencies.  
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The pursuit of two goals simultaneously is costly and requires resources. Assuming 
that a country is distributing its national product and foreign aid between the 
dimensions of its political regime, committing to two goals at the same time means 
that there will be resources withdrawn from other places where they are needed. This 
hinders development of democratic governance and entrenches the hybridity. 
 
Let us assume that the leadership needs a certain amount of funds dedicated to 
maintenance of a hybrid regime. These funds are distributed between elections and 
governance. The funds are compiled from the domestic and international sources. 
The domestic financial support is limited by the un-reformed economy, ambiguous 
tax codes, shadow businesses and is more or less constant. The way to increase funds 
for regime maintenance is to ensure an increasing or at least consistent influx of 
foreign assistance, in the form of investments, credits, assistance and aid. The elite’s 
preference is to maximize funding for a regime by maximizing its foreign component, 
because to reform the country is a very costly enterprise given the countries' low 
levels of economic and institutional development and also raises the probability of 
losing elections. In its turn, the foreign aid is provided in exchange for recognized free 
and fair elections or for achievements in reform in the governance component. It is 
indeed, as scholars have argued, foreign aid as a windfall revenue, which is not fully 
earned, taxed, accounted for, creates opportunities for incumbents to enrich 
themselves without disappointing their voters (Brollo 2010: 39).  
 
Hence to maximize international support, rulers need to ensure acknowledgment of 
elections, by either providing their own financial support to the elections component 
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or by maximizing the reforms in the governance unit. Thus, funding of a hybrid 
regime as a whole is a product of maximizing funding of elections and/or governance 
in order to maximize the influx of foreign aid.  
 
In polarized societies, there is always a way to make elections competitive. This is 
beneficial for elites trying to stay in power, as they know that elections will be 
competitive and the heated campaign will be positively acknowledged in the 
international community. This is also beneficial for the challenger, as he knows that 
there is a chance of winning, especially when one knows the rules of the game and 
plays according to them (fraud, voters lists manipulation, bribery, etc.). Both, the 
incumbent and the challenger are keen on manipulating campaign and elections, 
however it is the incumbent who has an access to 'administrative resource' and is 
usually watched with more precision than the challenger. They both usually come 
from the same set of actors who were previously involved with the incumbents' 
government116. The challenger's job is to blow the whistle after his camp already 
commits the fraud as well. Moreover, if the challenger loses, there is a relatively new 
tendency to question the results of elections by bringing the supporters to the streets, 
filing complaints to Supreme Courts and demanding a recount of the votes (Georgia 
2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005, 2009, Moldova 2009).  
 
Elites are confident about the support that the polarized population will vest in them; 
                                               
116 For example, In Moldova, Marian Lupu, the challenger to the Communist Party, was prior a 
member of the party and a speaker of the parliament. Victor Yuschenko, served as a Prime Minister 
under Kuchma. The future challenger to pro-government party in Georgia, Irakli Alasania had served in 
several key positions under President Mikheil Saakashvili, which include, among others, acting as the 
President’s Special Representative to Georgian-Abkhaz talks and becoming the Georgia’s UN envoy 
Alasania had served as the adviser to the President of Georgia on the Abkhaz conflict resolution issues, 
effective March 17, 2006 (See Irakli Alasania – Biography at 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20101). 
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this is because identities associated with the competing camps are deeply rooted in 
historical consciousness. They are cultural legacies - commonly understood, easily 
inflamed and revived to mobilize voters' support. However, because fraud becomes a 
part of the game, both incumbent and challenger engage in rigging elections and 
corrupting their results, with whatever resources available to them.  
 
In low-polarized hybrid regimes, it is easier to keep elections under control on the 
actual elections day, by oppressing the opposition and its access to media. However, 
the observers' report will capture that. What elites can provide to the donors instead is 
reform achievements in governance. 
 
 
Another point is that it is costly to maintain such a situation where a presence of some 
democratic institutions, imperfect competition, and autocratic governing practices 
coexist117. Yet, it is even more costly to deviate to either democracy or to autocracy. 
To go to autocracy will mean repressing and oppressing half of a country's population 
in polarized regimes and maybe the same amount in low-polarized, where the level of 
opposition mass mobilization on the streets usually exceed the level of opposition 
mobilization in the parliaments. The problem is that there will be people on the streets 
and negative assessment from the international community, resulting in sanctions and 
cuts in aid, credits, and contracts. In a democracy, a political figure is not able to use 
the judicial system for his/her own benefit. In addition, he/she risks being held 
accountable by the voters and faces the possibility of losing elections since he/she 
cannot ‘grease the wheels’ through bribery and other forms of corruption (hiring a 
                                               
117  David A. Lake, Matthew A. Baum The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and 
the Provision of Public Services Comparative Political Studies 2001 vol. 34 No 6 pp. 587-62 
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good lawyer is usually a more expensive affair than bribing a judge). To act 
democratically will also mean to conduct reforms as well as to risk losing elections.  
With this ambivalent situation the domestic elites figured out a way to keep the best 
of the two worlds: a two-faced Janus vis-a-vis both their population and international 
donors. Moreover, the donors become the nurturers of hybrid regimes without 
providing incentives to democratize. 
 
 
4.4.1. Causal Mechanism 
 
The forces that set a causal mechanism in motion are the following: 
A high cost of holding a hybrid regime together (pursuing the two ambivalent 
strategies) reinforces a lack of affluence and reform in the countries. Inability of the 
latter to produce its own resources, the countries defer to international donors’ help. 
Donors give help to reward progress (or a status quo, i.e. absence of deterioration) in 
the sphere of elections or the governance, depending on which of the dimensions of a 
regimes are less costly to keep according to the required standards, elections (in the 
case of a polarized system), or governance (when there is a convergence in low-
polarized countries).  
Thus ethnically polarized countries, with ethnic sentiment being channeled through an 
institutionalized party system, receive help from several donors or are voted out. 
Reforming economic and social policies raises risks of losing the elections. Where 
there is no or low polarization grounded in ethnicity, there is a reliance on just one 
donor and political parties are competing on mainly economic and social policies. 
Here, reforms are the only way to prove to the outside donors that the country is 
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committed to cooperation. 
 
Hence, in polarized systems, treating elections as a pivotal point, the rulers invest 
time, efforts and resources to make sure that they either stay in power themselves, or 
by leaving a successor, or by ensuring that their respective party secures a majority in 
the legislative branch. Because pursuing both strategies means paying the cost of each 
one, the total cost raises significantly.  
 
In a  more encompassing picture of a political regime, seen as an aggregate of the 
ways by which the rulers attain power and of the methods by which they govern, their 
strategy concentrates on elections at the cost of downplaying or, as in happens in 
some cases, ignoring the governance domain. This is a scenario in which elections are 
competitive in polarized societies and the task of remaining in power in a free and fair 
competitive setting is a more challenging and costly task. As discussed before, 
competitiveness of elections is a function of an ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
polarization of political system and gravitating towards one or another geopolitical 
pole, that follow. These are countries, in which tensions are an integral part of their 
national identity since the first modern state had been established on their territory; 
competitiveness is entrenched into the way this country functions. The ruling elites 
know that there always is going to be a competitor and the results of elections are 
always uncertain. It is beneficial for them as they do not need to fake competitiveness, 
by creating a puppet opposition and can only focus on satisfying the observers' search 
for clues on free and fair elections conduct. There is also no need to bridge the 
identity gap and aim at building a civic nation, as it will put an end to 
competitiveness. The common nation-building project does not bring as much 
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political credit as do polarization and divisions. Hence, to keep the regimes 
functioning, elections recognizable and each side on the polarized continuum 
accountable, elites will continue invest into what divides electorate. 
 
Elites also do not see much added value in controlling civil rights and liberties. They 
also do not need to subjugate all the media available in the country in order to win 
elections. They know that media outlets owned by their major financial donors in the 
country will bring the necessary point across to their supporters. It also gives a 
positive acclaim from the side of international observers on media freedom and 
multiple sources of media ownership. Besides as the recent study conducted by Pop-
Eleches and Robertson on information and elections show, subjugating all the media 
and letting it be revealed during elections ruins the chances of an incumbent to stay in 
power (Pop-Eleches/Robertson 2011: 25). Figure 9 below demonstrates the forces that 
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If elections take place in a non-competitive setting, it is not necessary for the ruling 
elites to engage in the stealing of elections on the actual day, but rather only on 
pleasing their donors, thus ensuring external legitimacy. However under such 
circumstances, elites involve in greater violations of the ways they govern, to make 
sure that when the voters head to the polling stations, they 'vote' for and not 'elect' out 
of series of options. This includes oppression of opposition, constraining the right to 
assembly, both on the streets and in the parliaments and restraining media freedom. 
 
However, if the population and the elites agree on their foreign policy and geopolitical 
alliance with a foreign supporter, it brings more resources and benefits to the elites 
and to some parts of the population and implies a permanent reform process. These 
resources (financial, professional skills, knowledge, etc.) are usually captured by the 
think-tanks that assess courses of reforms and give such countries higher evaluation 
scores. Besides, elites do not need to re-allocate money from the 'democratic 
institution-building and reforms' to bribes in order to secure the victory for their 
Ethnically  
diverse 
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candidate, as is done in competitive regimes with mixed geopolitical orientation.  
Figure 10 below demonstrates the forces that provide for viability of non- or low-
polarized hybrid regimes.  
 









Either scenario is more costly to maintain, than just the oppression or just the free 
competition. But it does not mean that these regimes are fragile: it means that less 
services will be provided and hybrid regimes will remain less affluent than the clear-
cut regimes. 
 
The explanation that I put forward here has two sides: a demand-driven pillar and a 
supply-driven pillar; both pillars are from the point of view of the elites.  
The demand side is resources that elites are going to receive if their elections are 
recognized. The supply side is the voter's support that the elites are going to receive if 
they properly problematize and emphasize the ethnic differences, entrenched in 
legacies of statehood and nationhood and channeled through geopolitical orientation. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at delivering an explanatory account of persistency of hybrid 
regimes in the former Soviet Union states. It argued that ambivalent preference of 
elites to stay in power and to keep elections recognizable internationally is the driving 
force behind the persistence. Polarization of the population helps to keep election 
competitive and thus recognizable. The absence of polarization, however keeps the 
reform process flowing persistently. Both contribute to receiving of international aid 
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Chapter 5 Empirical evidence: interaction between the 
domestic and foreign actors 
 
A tender calf sucks from two cows 
A Ukrainian Folk Proverb 
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence in support of the thesis here defended that 
explains the persistence of hybrid regimes in the FSU states. Using Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine as examples that were singled out as hybrid regimes in chapter 2, this 
chapter  discusses how domestic power struggles and internationally-provided 
incentives created opportunities for elites to perpetuate the hybrid regime. I address 
the role that political polarization played as an intervening factor in channeling the 
way in which domestic elites in the countries chose either to comply with democratic 
practices or to retain autocratic ones.  
 
In order to test the hypotheses derived from the argument I compile data on structural 
and behavioral factors that underpin the degree of polarization in the three countries. 
Here, polarization is the result of an overlap (even if not a perfect one) between 
regions inside the state, the state’s economic, linguistic and ethnic structure and its 
voting patterns.  
 
I begin by demonstrating how ethnic identities and regional modernization together 
anchor the political participation of the masses, as well as how elites are exploiting 
these patterns in their choices of international orientation. Zooming into the electoral 
geography of the three countries, I look for regional voting patterns to better 
understand the origins of polarization. To proceed, I specify the divisive issues that 
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elites use to mobilize voters by analyzing party programs from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 1987, 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994, 2007) with 
regard to how parties align in their preferences towards the West or Russia.  
 
Given that the majority of such issues are in part related to the international 
orientation which the elites and the population support and aim to follow, I will look 
at the kind of incentives that international donors offer to elites that help them to stay 
in power (win elections, secure financial support).  I show the amount of aid that the 
countries receive for specific achievements in their regimes' dimensions building on 
the levels of aid seeking in each country , as were assessed in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, in the last part of this chapter I scrutinize the support for elections and 
reforms, which the international donors provide in different hybrid regimes of 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.  
 
5.1. Cleavage structure in hybrid regimes of Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova 
 
The analysis of socio-economic structures in the FSU presented in previous chapters 
revealed several patterns in hybrid regimes that are calling for additional exploration. 
Particularly, of interest is the combination of relatively high ethnic heterogeneity and 
relatively low level of economic development and growth. This is consistent with 
cross-country findings of Alesina et.al. (2003) where they attribute  this combination 
to the high probability of ethnic conflict and war that slow down both growth and 
development (155-156). It also supports the findings of Timothy Frye (2010), where 
he shows that polarization slows down reforms. However, the specific regional 
constellation of the structure of industrial production and ethnic composition is set to 
 
 167  
reinforce or to weaken mass polarization, competitiveness of elections, divisions in 
the parliaments, economic dependency on a single industry. In other words the ethnic 
and economic differences reinforce each other. 
 
5.1.1. Ukraine 
These cleavages are very strongly reinforced in Ukraine, whereby the industrialized 
Eastern part along with higher levels of urbanization is providing a larger number of 
voters in their constituencies118 . Here, electoral geography plays an important role in 
the argument. As electoral data systematized by regions in Ukraine (see appendix 17) 
shows, there is a clear regional division in voters' support for the parties. The voters in 
Eastern, Southern, and Central119 regions supported the Communist Party in 2002, 
and the Party of the Regions from 2006 onwards. This 'switch' does not appear to be a 
drastic one under a closer examination: the Party of the Regions institutionalized the 
transition of the former  CP of the USSR members, 'Red Directors' and other high-
ranked administrative officials from the Communist party of Ukraine which had been 
persistently losing its constituencies (see Colton 2011).  
 
Industrialization provided potential ethnic entrepreneurs with economic resources 
vital for the mobilization of voters (Tilly 2007). Economic liberalization and 
                                               
118 The East and Center dominate the country demographically, with the West being inhabited by 20% 
of the population and the South by just 15% (see Colton 2001:15). The Eastern and Southern 
regions of Ukraine that traditionally support pro-Russian candidates and parties voted in the 2010 
presidential elections in the following numbers: Crimea 1 049 591, Dnipropetrovska 1 840 682, 
Donetska  2692815, Zaporizska 1 023 624, Luganska 1 391 438, Odeska 1 171 349, Kharkivska 1 
059 246. The Western regions voted in much smaller numbers, supporting a pro-Western candidate: 
Volynska 600 853, Ivano-Frankivska 823 292, Rivnenska 642 081, Ternopilska 678 403, 
Khmelnytska 767 646. The total number of those who voted is 25493529. Data is available on the 
Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011.  
119 Recently scholars (Sasse 2010, Colton 2011) agree that the commonly used in the Western media 
impage of Ukraine as to be divided into just Eastern and Western is a simplification used for 
propagandist purposes. They are increasingly using the traditional macro-regions (East, Center, 
South and West) that every Ukrainian learns at school and by watching the mere weather forecasts 
on the television. I am using macro-regions here as well.    
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privatization after the countries became independent created owners from the former 
chief managers of industrial enterprises with strong links to Russia (due to the 
commonly shared Soviet market). Widely subsidized mining and heavy industries, 
with a loop for tax evasions and in particular VAT manipulations enriched higher 
management of industrial plants: as observers argue, '...the government uses its state 
monopolies to subsidize heavy industry, mostly owned by Ukraine’s richest 
citizens120'. The South of the country apart from being industrialized and urbanized is 
bordered by the Black Sea, harboring major seaports and terminals (Odessa, 
Illichevsk, Nikolaev, Kherson). Transit and transportation industries were a part of the 
common Soviet market as a trade gate with the outside world. Ukraine inherited some 
of the trading partners (60% of the transit comes from Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan121) but also remained highly linked with Russian producers. These links 
contribute to support of pro-Russian sentiments and parties. 
 The industrially developed South and East of the country122 contributed to the 
emergence of political parties and presidential candidates that rely on ethnic, 
territorial or linguistic appeal. This appeal is based on identity, which defines the 
Europe (the West) as 'the other' (Protsyk 2008: 4).  
 
In Western Ukraine agricultural production prevails in less urbanized mountainous 
regions. Belonging partially to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and partially to Poland 
before being incorporated into the Soviet Union, the regions are the strongholds of 
support for Ukrainian identity, language and becoming a part of the European Union – 
                                               
120 Natalya Kravchuk. 'Public subsidies go to richest private firms'. Kyiv Post, June 18, 2009 at 
https://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/43628/ 
121 Grigori Gerenstein. Ukraine Sea Ports Jan. Throughput on +10.5%. Dow Jones Newswires. 
February 9, 2011. At http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/02/09/ukraine-sea-ports-jan-
throughput-year-m-tons/ 
122 Donetska, Dnipropertovska, Luganska and Kharkivska regions are the industrial strongholds of the 
country and happen to be Russian-speaking regions (see appendix 17) 
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an umbrella that holds nation-states together. The political elites that represented the 
country on the national level at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were rarely from the 
Western regions, creating ‘under-representation sentiments’ (Wolczuk 2001). 
Geographic concentration combined with prior exclusion of the Ukrainians is 
favorable conditions for ethnic voting: this makes it relatively easy for ethnic 
entrepreneurs to build on both anti-Russian sentiments and the so-called 'perpetual 
complex of national inferiority'.  
 
The financial support for the candidates comes from the newly-emerging 
businessmen, who otherwise do not have a chance to get into power. Their businesses 
are already built through an access to European credits, and may benefit more if the 
policies towards European integration are chosen123. However, once in power, these 
businessmen (for example, Petro Poroshenko's cross-industrial assets) are swinging to 
whichever partners are providing better conditions, (which is usually Russia) and 
ethnic ideology does not matter that much. Indeed, even after the relationship with 
Russia reversed its course in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Russia remains 
the major trading partner124.  
 
As the electoral data shows, support for parties with 'pro-Western' appeal comes 
predominantly from the regions that are geographically situated in the West of the 
country and in Kyiv. There is, however, some variation in support: first, the swinging 
of the voters from one pro-Western party to another, as happened in both 2006 and 
2007 when Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) got a hold of the voters that supported 
Victor Yuschenko in 2002; and second, the swing of Central regions from supporting 
                                               
123 See Wolczuk (2006) in which she  argues that business elites  ‘infiltrated’ political parties and are 
interested in the European integration only as it benefits their interests 
124 Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine. http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, tables further in the text 
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the Communists to voting for BYT. 
 
In 2006 the two pro-Western parties BYT and Our Ukraine received 22.29% and 
13.95% of voter's support respectively, which together was just enough to beat the 
pro-Russian Party of the Regions (32.14%)125. It is clear that without the predominant 
support form all the Western regions and from the Central regions there the East of 
the country the chances to defeat the pro-Russian party with a support base 
concentrated in the East and the South, are low126 . 
 
5.1.2. Georgia  
 
There are no evident geopolitically defined cleavages in Georgia that are linking 
together the structure of economy, ethnicity and voting (see Appendix 18). Despite 
some regional differences, and strong regional identities (Ajara, Guria, Samegrelo, 
Svaneti, Kakheti, etc.), there has not been found any systematic evidence on ethnic 
voting (Nodia/Scholtbach 2006, George 2009). Two notable exceptions are worth 
mentioning: the first is a persistent pro-incumbent (president or party) support that the 
ethnic Armenians that live in Samtskhe-Javakheti127 provide in every elections since 
1991 as well as the ethnic Azeri from Kvemo Kartli128. And second, a high, yet not an 
                                               
125 The coalition-building talks that followed are not of the concern here. 
126 The swinging base of the Central regions in Ukraine is noted to correlate with the swinging between 
Russian and Ukrainian 'languages of use' that is common for its population (see Dominique Arel, 
“La face cachée de la Révolution Orange: l’Ukraine en négation face á son probl`eme régional,” 
Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest 37 (December 2006): 3; see also 
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20RECEO%202006.pdf. 
127 The single administrative region Samtskhhe-Javakheti is composed of two regions Samtschkhe with 
an administrative center in Akhaltsikhe (around 50% of Armenians), and Javakheti with centers in 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda (about 90-95% population is Armenian). Kvemo Kartli with the 
center in Marneuli, Dmanisi, Bolnisi, Gardabani densly populted by the Azeri provides the highest 
support to the incumbent president and the ruling party. (Interview with the experts, Tbilisi, October 
2008) 
128 Central electoral commission of Georgia. At http://www.cec.gov.ge/  
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overwhelming, support for opposition parties in the capital city of Tbilisi as 
demonstrated in electoral geography tables in the Appendix 18. With an absence of a 
coherent explanatory account on why it is so, some speculations suggest that the first 
is due to 'leave us alone to do our business, do not force Georgian culture through 
education on us, allow us to use remittances from the kin-states (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan) such as money, schoolbooks, etc. – and in return, we will support you at 
the ballot box'129. In the case of Tbilisi, education seems to play the key role: critical 
thinking skills acquired in various education institutions in the West, as well as an 
access to various media outlets is favorable to the mobilization efforts by the 
opposition, known to cater a narrow circle of intellectuals130. 
 
The de-facto loss of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the civil war in the 
early 1990s, excluded any ethnic-based mobilization for party formation. The loss of 
territories also homogenized population ethnically131, leaving Abkhazians and 
Ossetians outside of the demos and, therefore, the voters.  
 
Moreover, the structure of industrial production in the regions did not create rent-
seeking, regional oligarchic owners out of former directors that could compete with 
the center for the control over the whole country132. A unified structure of economy, 
                                               
129 Interviews with country experts. Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2008. 
130 This point is often emphasized as the persistent failure of opposition parties in Georgia: even the 
nationalist revival movement in the 80s was initiated by the dissidents and intellectuals, the fact 
which is used to describe the loss of a broader appeal later on by Zurab Kostava and Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia. Interestingly enough, regional identity has a precedent of nurturing support for 
politicians in Georgia: Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Mengrelian, had his largest support base in 
Mengrelian region, and even after his death has an appeal among some of the region's population. 
131 According to the census data in 1989 Georgians constitutes 70.7% of the country's population, and 
83.2% in 2002. 
132 An exception is the Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze, whose personal connections with the former 
President Eduard Shevarnadze, open pro-Russian stance, and local business involvements put him 
at odds with the new President Saakashvili. Abashidze's continuous claims to power in the region 
put the country on the verge of yet another secession conflict, but did not have enough support to 
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with tourism and agricultural production prevailing, provided for a more unified 
distribution of the population among regions than in Ukraine. Tbilisi remains the 
center of attraction for the money and power and this concentration makes it difficult 
for an opposition party with a regional base to derive resources (Dahl 1971, Tilly 
2007). The party cleavages and alignments are likely to evolve around economy, but 
so far, as was discussed in the previous chapter, mobilization from the streets does not 
reach the parliament in large numbers. In those cases when some of opposition party 
members make it to the parliament, they are too weak to change the course of political 
development. 
 
The Rose Revolution brought to power Mikheil Saakashvili, who introduced a vivid 
anti-Russian rhetoric and guaranteed a full-endorsement and support from the West, 
while simultaneously, '...Georgia opened its doors to Russian capital, which has 
continued to flow despite the embargo on Georgian exports that Russia initiated in 
spring 2006'133. This is crucial evidence for the argument of this thesis: due to the size 
of the Russian economy and the history of a common market, doing business with 
Russia is hardly avoidable. The situation changed dramatically and understandably 
after the war in August of 2008, with Ukraine, Turkey and Azerbaijan emerging as the 
top trade partners by April, 2011. But prior to the war, with there being no Russian 
minorities or pro-Russian electorate to rely on for political support, the pro-Western 
geopolitical orientation card was played. Economically, as long as and as far as 
possible the business is done with both the West and Russia, i.e., 'the two cows are 
sucked from' as the Ukrainian proverb suggests. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
compete at the national level. 
133 Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 2008 
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5.1.3. Moldova 
 
In Moldova the cleavage lines of regionalism, industrial production and ethnic 
composition resemble those of both Ukraine and Georgia. This is not contradictory, 
but complementary: nationalist movements prior to the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union took root in all three countries; in Georgia and in Moldova they resulted in 
ethnic conflict and in the loss of territories. Yet, even after losing control over the 
breakaway Tiraspol, Moldova ended up with an ethnically diverse population (around 
75% of the population are Moldovans), the majority of which is best described as the 
Russian-speaking population (see appendix 19 for the census data). Similar to 
Ukraine, the Russian-speakers reside in urbanized, industrialized areas. 'Pluralism by 
default' – the term used by Lucan Way to describe competitiveness of elections in 
Moldova - is a term equally suitable to Ukraine (Way 2002). 
 
As with Ukrainian regional disparity in the structure of economy, Transdniestria, 
which composed 12.5% of Moldovan territory and 15% of its population, contributed 
around 40% to GDP, producing almost 90% of electric power of the former Soviet 
Republic134. This territorial division and industrial production created an alternative 
power center (Tilly 2007) in Tiraspol by which oligarchic business owners controlled 
the area.  Similarly to Georgia, on the wave of nationalist revival movement, and 
intensified by the natural border by the river and, even to a greater extent, by the 
presence of the Russian army, Chisinau lost control over the region. Hence after the 
secession, the remaining 87.5% of the country's territory turned out to be highly 
                                               
134 Republic of Moldova 2004, Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; Public Information 
Notice on the Executive Board Discussion and Statement by the Executive Director for 
the Republic of Moldova. Accessed at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0548.pdf. p. 6 
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agricultural135.  
 
Thus within the de-facto controlled territory in Moldova, Moldovan and Russian 
identities are mobilized, while interests of both Russia and the West, and in particular 
the EU, are strong. The European factor grew stronger since Romania became the EU 
member in 2007. Moldova held three elections in the course of one and a half years 
(April 2009 – November 2010): one scheduled in April 2009 triggered mass protests 
and what became known as the Twitter revolution, early elections in July 2009 and 
another early elections of November 2010, after each parliament failed to elect the 
president136. One of the reasons that it proves very challenging to choose a president 
by a much divided parliament brings us back to one of the features used to classify 
political regimes in chapter 2: failed attempts of the chief executive to change the 
constitution. Not only does it prove difficult to gather a constitutional majority of 60% 
of 101 legislative bodies to alter the basic law in a polarized society, but also pass any 
other decision with such a high threshold.   
 
As electoral geography in appendix 19 suggests Moldovan voters choose to support 
parties based on a different principle than regional, ethnic or linguistic loyalties. That 
being said, however, the regions where the Communist Party (CP) of Moldova failed 
to gain the majority of votes were rural areas with predominantly (over 90%) 
Moldovan population.  
 
Hence, the territorial concentration of ethnic groups (Russian-speaking population in 
                                               
135 CCCP: После распада/ Под общ. Ред. Маргания Спб Высшая Школа Экономики, 
Экономикус 2007 p. 364 
136  All the three elections followed the new administrative division of the country, there is data 
that can shed light on regionalism in voter's choices. 
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the Eastern and the Southern Ukraine, Armenians and Azeri in Georgia) is reflected in 
electoral geography. Knowing this in the case of Ukraine elites will place emphasis on 
it and mobilize the voters using ethnic appeal. In the case of Moldova, knowing how 
persistently competitive elections are and how persistently polarized the parliaments 
are we should expect parties to use both pro-Russian and pro European rhetoric in 
their campaigning. Given the electoral geography in Georgia, the cleavage in the 
population is not reflected in the party system, and there is no polarization that can be 
detected from the voters' choices. The pro-Western appeal should then be dominating 
campaigns. 
 
In order to measure the degree of political polarization in the country concerning 
whether foreign policy priorities should be pro-West or pro-Russia –which in turn 
depends on the electoral geography of the country – I am going to measure the 
positions of parties along the geopolitical-orientation-of –foreign-policy dimension 
(or Russia-West dimension). It is a way to approach the polarization of the society 
from the angle of the elites' desire to amplify divisions to ensure both competitiveness 
of elections and the likelihood to win them. As the argument suggests, polarization is 
beneficial for elites that seek cooperation with different donors. Assuming that in 
order to mobilize population around these divisive issues, the parties will devote some 
of their campaigning space to the latter, I will examine party programs to determine 
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5.2. Geopolitical choices from the party programs' perspective 
 
Many scholars point to the different degrees of saliency of the cleavages and their 
reflections in the geopolitical inclinations in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, and use 
the voting data to confirm their claims. The actual voting does show us how the voters 
form their preferences. However, what I am interested to see with this inquiry is how 
the elites form their preferences about what voters will support, given the ethnic 
makeup and economic conditions of their countries. The party programs reveal this 
best. In addition to seeing how the elites are mobilizing the voters, we can trace the 
relations that the domestic elites have with the ideas of forming strategic partnerships 
with the major international actors.  
 
The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) analyzes the sentences (or quasi-
sentences) of party manifestos which are coded into 56 categories from a wide range 
of socio-economic, cultural and political issues (Volkens 2001). The dataset calculates 
the percentage of sentences dedicated to each of the 56 categories (saliency scores). 
The majority of the issue categories are crafted in a way that include two opposing 
views on the same issue: for example, 'Russia/USSR/CIS: positive' and 
'Russia/USSR/CIS: negative'. Because of the way the categories are constructed, it is 
possible to determine party positions on the issues as a whole by creating a positional 
scale. 
 
To calculate the saliency and the positions that parties in Moldova, Georgia and 
Ukraine took in their respective electoral manifestos on issues related to their 
international orientation, I need first to create an 'International Orientation' issue 
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dimension differentiating the party programs devoted to pro-Russian issues and those 
dedicated to pro-Western ones137. 
 
 
5.2.1. Choice of the categories 
 
Out of 56 categories in the CMP database, I chose eight categories on the pro-Russian 
side and eleven on the pro-Western part of the scale (their precise definition is 
provided in table 17 below). I expect the pro-Western side to be more pronounced 
because of this. However, it makes sense to keep all the possible reference to either 
Russia or the West on a scale because it will capture the full picture that the party 
programs offer. 
 
Table 17. Categories on the international orientation scale (the number 
corresponds to the code number of the category in the dataset) 
   
Pro-Russia Pro-West 
110 European Community/Union: Negative 108 European Community/Union: Positive 
602 National Way of Life: Negative 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative 603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
1011 Russia/USSR/CIS: Positive 1012 Western States: Positive 
1022 Western States: Negative 1021 Russia/USSR/CIS: Negative 
2023 Lax Citizenship 1031 Russian Army: Negative 
6012 Rebuilding the USSR 1032 Independence: Positive 
 1033 Rights of Nations; Positive 
 2022 Restrictive Citizenship 
 6013 National Security 
 
                                               
137 I borrow from Kligemann et. al. (2001: 21) on creating the Left-Right dimension and build on 
Alonso/Fonseca (2011: 8) Immigration issue dimension. 
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There are several principles that guided the selection of categories. The first and most 
intuitive is to group those categories that mention Russia positively together on the 
side of pro-Russia (such as 1011), and combine those that mention the West positively 
on the pro-West end of the scale (108, 1012). Second, I assume that parties which use 
the pro-Russian appeal are also building on the connections to the USSR and 
multiculturalism that the nostalgic population associates with (607, 6012) as well as 
the negative mentioning of nationalism, traditionalism, exclusiveness and 
independence (602, 604, 2023). I expect that parties embarking on the pro-Western 
platform in the FSU are both nationalistic (601, 603, 1032, 1033, 6013), 
monoculturalist (608) and exclusive (2022). While some scholars believed that the 
European integration brings parties with nationalist-populist appeal to oppose the EU 
(Mudde 2007: 159), others suggest that a pro-EU platform can attract ethno-
nationalist parties (De Winter, Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002: 484), especially in the 
countries of the Eastern Europe after the latest accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
(Bustikova 2009: 223). On the other hand, I suspect that nationalist parties in the FSU 
are trying to capture those voters 'revolting' against the Soviet (or Russian Slavic 
brotherhood) internationalism and multiculturalism by opting for the European 
internationalism. For them, the Soviet Union was 'the prison of nations'138 while they 
hope that the EU is the union which lets the nations thrive. In their nationalism, pro-
Western parties are also restrictive in their citizenship laws which, until recently, go 
along the restrictive citizenship and naturalization laws in some of the EU member 
states139.  
                                               
138 The term actually first used in the Soviet propaganda to refer to the Tsarist Russian. It was later 
picked up in the nationalist rhetoric of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his followers as a part of 'Georgia 
for Georgians. Soviet Union – the prison of nations' campaign. 
139 The EU as a part of accession requirements in 2004 pressured Estonia and Latvia to loosen 
requirements for naturalization and citizenship for their ethnic Russian persons without citizenship. 
During the accession negotiation talks this also flashed back on Germany and its very rigid 
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Third, as the scale goes from support for Russia to support for the West, I assume that 
negative references to the West count for support of a pro-Russian position (110, 
1022). And vice versa, negative mentions of Russia (1021, 1031) suggest support for 
the West. 
 
5.2.2. The analysis of party programs: scale, positions 
To borrow the Left-Right scale by Klingemann and collaborators '...the scale is made 
up by adding percentage references to the categories grouped as...' pro-Russia and 
pro-West '... and subtracting the sum of the...' pro-Russia '...percentages from the sum 
of the...' pro-West '...percentages' (Klingemann et. at. 2001: 21).  
 
If we imagine the Russia-West (RW) scale, it runs from the extreme point R (parties 
that take only pro-Russia position) to the extreme point W (those parties that take only 
pro-Western positions).  
 
Scoring 100% on pro-Russia or pro-West issues is theoretically possible but 
empirically very unlikely. It would mean that a particular manifesto is dedicated 
exclusively to pro-Russia or pro-Western sets of issues and to nothing else.  
 
Secondly, I turn to determining the saliency of the RW dimension in parties’ 
manifestos. The relevance that international orientation issues have in the manifestos 
of the country’s parties, put together in the table 5 below puts Georgia beneath 
Moldova and Ukraine (the latter two have almost identical mean values), emphasizing 
lower degree of average saliency of the pro-Russia vs. pro-West line. Out of the 
                                                                                                                                      
naturalization law, which resulted in a reform of 1999.  
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sample of 96 party manifestos the saliency varies from 0 to on average 45.16140.  
 
The data in table 18 tells us that international orientation issues are more salient in 
Moldova and Ukraine than in Georgia on average. However, the range of saliency 
scores tells us that parties in Ukraine are much more diverse in the relevance they 
give to international orientation issues, either because the same party changes a lot 
between elections or because parties are different among themselves: with this level 
of aggregation we cannot tell which of the two alternatives is true. 
 
Table 18. International orientation saliency scale summary 
Country  Number of observations/ 
party programs 
Mean SD Min  Max 
Georgia 37 7.94 5.45 0 23.33 
Moldova  14 13.44 4.12 0 22.03 
Ukraine 45 13.43 9.35 0 43.47 
Total 96 11.31 7.83 0 43.47 
 
 
To determine where each party stands in each election on the issues and towards 
which end of the scale each of them scores, we need to define an R-W position. The 
formula used to define the pro-Russia-pro-West position on the R-W scale is built by 
adding up all the pro-Russian categories and subtracting from it the sum of the pro-
Western categories:  
                                               
140 The score is in the category 'Constitutionalism' which makes sense because the sample contains 
elections that took place before the countries adopted their respective constitutions and the 
constitutional debates were a part of campaigning. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were relatively 
late, compared to the rest of the FSU states, to adopt their constitutions in 1995, 1994, and 1996 
respectively. 
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International Orientation Position = (pro-Russia) – (pro-West). 
 
This scale ranges from -100%, when all sentences are dedicated to pro-West to 
+100%, when all sentences are dedicated to pro-Russia. 
 
Table 19. International orientation: R-W positions summary 
Country  Number of observations Mean SD Min Max 
Georgia 37 6.01 4.9 -1.27 23.33 
Moldova  14 5.43 8.72 -21.42 13.22 
Ukraine 45 5.68 10.52 -34.29 36.71 
Total 96 5.77 8.41 -34.29 36.71 
 
Table 19 synthesizes the average scores of positions that parties, aggregated at a 
country level, take. The mean values in the three countries over time are 
approximately the same. Georgia has the lowest standard deviation and its values 
oscillate towards one end with the positive values, which indicates an overwhelming 
attention given to the pro-Western agenda.  
Both Ukraine and Moldova again perform in a similar way, with Moldova on average 
leaning towards the pro-Russian agenda, and party programs in Ukraine being almost 
equally devoted to the two sides. 
  
The number of observations consists of four elections in Georgia and Moldova, and 
five in Ukraine, but it is obvious that the number of parties is much lower in Moldova, 
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a parliamentary republic since the reform of 1996 and the parliament is elected by the 
system of political representation (PR). This confirms the claim made by Robert 
Moser (1999) on the joint effect of PR and parliamentary system of government to 
institutionalize party system and to reduce the effective number of parties in the post-
Communist European countries.  
 
Regardless of there being 96 manifestos in the sample and 12 elections, the major 
challenge is to find continuity in each party's dedication to the issue of international 
orientation and the position that it assumes between at least two elections. Parties 
enter the political arena and leave it, transform, merge, making the one-to-one 
comparison not possible (this is what happens in Georgia). Another problem is that at 
the time of running this analysis the dataset was not entirely up to date: in the case of 
Moldova there is a delay in coding of the last three elections (April 2009, July 2009, 
November 2010), which is unfortunate, because there is a potential of a well-
pronounced party positions continuity. Particularly interesting will be to track the 
change in the positions of the Communist Party, the Liberal Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party that took place after Romania joined the EU. The same goes for 
Georgia, where the coding of the 2008 elections is still in the making. 
There is, however, data for all of the elections that took place in Ukraine and this is 
what I am going to look at in the next step.  
 
Table 20 below brings together the position on the RW scale that the three major 
parties in Ukraine chose to take in their programs. There is a general tendency to 
emphasize the pro-Western agenda in all three parties (hence the positive sign). 
However, Our Ukraine, as the longest standing party, went from being somewhat pro-
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Western in 2002 to much more pro-Western in 2006 to reducing its emphasis on the 
issues into half. The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko was rather high on the pro-Western 
side of the scale and increased the emphasis in the next elections. The party has the 
'strongest' among other pro-Western position. The biggest shift in the position comes 
from the Party of Regions: just within one year it had swung from taking a pro-
Russian stance to a pro-Western one, even overrunning its rival Victor Yuschenko's 
Our Ukraine.  
 
Table 20. Positions of parties in parliamentary elections in Ukraine (2002-2007) 
on the Geopolitical Orientation dimension 
Party 2002 2006 2007 
Our Ukraine (NU) 2.97 10.92 5.98 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BUT)  9.52 12.62 
Party of Regions (PR)  -3.92 8.99 
 
 These tendencies reflect in general the campaigning, with the Party of Regions hiring 
an American spin doctor, Paul J. Manafort, as a campaign advisor and reaching out to 
pro-West oriented voters, while keeping his solid base in the East (Sussman/Krader 
2008). Also, the tendencies contradict the view, traditionally used by the western 
scholarship and media, on purely pro-Western and pro-Russian positions among the 
elites. Similarly, Yulia Tymoshenko had embraced more pro-Western stance and on 
regional level won over several Western regions – the strong-hold of supporters of 
then president Victor Yuschenko and his party Our Ukraine. The latter, facing the 
waning support and perceived in the East and the South of the country as a nationalist, 
pro-NATO and anti-Russia141, reduced the pro-Western emphasis in his party's 
program.  
                                               
141 Taras Kuzio. Inferiority complexes of Baloha, Yushchenko led them to each other. Op-Ed. Kyiv 
Post. February 5, 2009 
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As the party programs data is available by each year of elections, we can assess the 
dynamics of average saliency of the issues, depth of cleavages and whether any sort 
of reforms or campaign promises were achieved and the issue lost its saliency with 
time. To do so, I compare the average values party positions take on the issues, i.e. 
how much time is devoted to Russia or the West (figure 1). 
 
The years of parliamentary elections on the x-axis are of the first, second, third and 
the fourth for each country142. 
 























Figure 11 demonstrates that on average the agenda is predominately pro-Western, as 
the election-points lie in the positive side of the position scale, which can also be 
attributed to the way the scale was created with more variables on the Western scale. 
Taking this into account, Moldovan parties in 1992 were on average slightly more 
prone to take pro-Russian positions then into pro-Western. Over time, however, the 
                                               
142 Elections years: (1) Georgia 1992, Moldova 1994, Ukraine 1994; (2)  Georgia 1995, Moldova 1998, 
Ukraine 1998; 
  (3) Georgia 1999, Moldova 2001, Ukraine 2002; (4)  Georgia 2004, Moldova 2005, Ukraine 2006 
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parties in Moldova, on average grew drastically pro-Western. Georgian parties' pro-
Western stance grows steadily and persistently. In Ukraine there is an average shift 
between more pro-Western stance to more pro-Russian from 1998 to 2002, with pro-
Western position winning on average by 2006. 
 
This tells us that the issues on the Russia-West scale are not fading, especially for 
Moldova and Ukraine, which calibrate between the two, while Georgian parties 
showing persistent growth in emphasizing pro-Western agenda. Moreover, the 
extremes in Moldova and Ukraine are continuously reinforced not only by the existing 
socio-economic divisions in the societies but also by the will or inability of the 
politicians to deliver on their campaign promises. One such example is the language 
policy in both Moldova and Ukraine. In the constitutions of the two competitive 
hybrid regimes Moldovan and Ukrainian respectively are declared as the only state 
languages. However, since the constitutions were adopted in 1994 and 1996 
respectively, the status of the Russian language as the second state language is the 
matter of heated debates during the campaigns and occupy substantial part in the party 
programs (as the scores on the Russian side of the scale had shown). Without being 
reflected in a language policy reforms, the claim remains to be a campaign promise 
for over than a decade143. One can argue, that the agreement to keep just one state 
language was a result of a compromise that was reached during the relatively long and 
time-consuming process of constitution-making (Wolczuk 2001) and it needs time 
and the right 'constitutional moment' (Ackerman 1998) to come for the second 
language to receive a state status. 
                                               
143 Vladimir Socor. Moldova's Political Landscape on the Eve of General Elections: Part Three. 
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 54, March 20, 2009 
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5.3. Competitive hybrid regimes: Moldova Ukraine  
Additionally, as was mentioned before, constitutions in divided societies become 
extremely rigid: to reach the required two thirds of the votes proves to be close to 
impossible. In Ukraine, it took five years to accept the new constitution; the 
compromise was very hard to be reached on many questions, language and the state 
structure (a federation or a unitary state) being among the hottest issues (Wolczuk 
2001). It took president's will to lock the door of the parliament from the outside for 
the constitution to be voted on in the early morning hours of June 28th 1996 with 315 
votes for (only 15 more than was required). The attempts to change the constitution 
that were initiated in 2000 by president Kuchma failed (as was shown in chapter 2) 
precisely due to the polarization of the society. There needed to be mass protests on 
the streets during the Orange Revolution for then-President Kuchma to include the 
constitutional changes into the pact that settled the situation.   
 
In similar vein, Moldova’s the constitution first adopted in 1994. In response to the 
governing crisis it was amended in 2000 introducing the indirect presidential elections 
thus transforming Moldova to parliamentary republic. And an attempt to change the 
constitution via referendum in 2010 had also failed. 
 
Not surprisingly scholars had been showing an interest in the language policy and 
linguistic identities as predictors for voting behavior in Ukraine (see Arel 2006, Sasse 
2010, Colton 2011). Timothy Colton provides an account of ecological inference, in 
which language of use is singled out as the best and strongest predictor of the votes in 
the last two presidential elections (Colton 2011: 19). Thus, bridging this divide, i.e. 
constitutionally anchoring the second state language, would deprive the Party of the 
Regions in the case of Ukraine and the Social-Democrat Party of Moldova or the 
 
 187  
Centrist Union of one of the major mobilization tools, and is also a very challenging 
task to complete. Hence polarization is a connecting node in the mechanism, which 
keeps hybrid regimes in place (H1) and the appeal to both donors matters in keeping 
the system afloat.  
 
 
5.4. Non-competitive hybrid regime of Georgia 
The non-polarized and non-competitive hybrid regime in Georgia is hypothesized to 
be a result of a single-donor orientation track that the country's elites and masses set 
themselves on. Despite there being a long history of intensive cooperation between 
Georgia and Russia, the relationship between the two countries in the period since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union took an upsetting turn in the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution and reached its low in the war of August 2008. When President Mikheil 
Saakashvili came to power in 2003, he had vowed to preserve Georgian territorial 
integrity according to the borders of 1921 (when the country was absorbed into the 
Soviet Union), which meant keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia under control of 
Tbilisi. However, the growing support of the two separatist regions by Russia (whose 
government had facilitated acquirement of the Russian citizenship and claimed that 
the support is aimed at its citizens) contributed to a growing anti-Russian rhetoric in 
Tbilisi144. The West, and the US in particular, had always shown a deep interest in 
Georgia and supported various programs through USAID as well as was supporting 
Georgia's application to the NATO. These two factors resulted in a unified orientation 
of the elites and the masses on the Western countries and donors, thus uniting the 
people against the common threat, and leaving those, who support Russia in the 
                                               
144  Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 
2008 
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separatist republics unable to exercise their support politically on Georgian national 
level145. This meant oftentimes the loss of economic benefits and opportunities from 
doing business with Russia and, hence, resulted in orientation on just one side of 
possible donors – the West. 
 
This relationship between Georgia and the West was mutual: as scholars and 
practitioners would agree, Mikheil Saakashvili embarked on fast paced reforms, 
which left many unsatisfied within the country, but guaranteed good reviews from the 
Western democracies146. High visible achievements guaranteed further support by the 
latter and resulted in the turning of a blind eye on other un-democratic tendencies147. 
Paradoxically, this ambiguous situation of a reformed governance and limited 
competitiveness (i.e. hybrid regime) is perpetuated by the donors, whose goals are to 
promote democracy in Georgia. 
 
Thus, the rest of the chapter will be devoted to discovering what actually are the 
targets of support from the donors and how it affects the perpetuation of hybrid 
regimes. 
 
                                               
145 They are deprived of the right to vote in Georgian elections by their local government. For Tbilisi 
this means a loss of jurisdiction over the territories, as of today elections are held only on what is 
referred to as Georgia proper. 
146 The World Bank's Doing Business Report for 2006 registered the country on the top of the former 
Soviet Union states, the top ten performer and the country that made the biggest jump in a single 
year in the ranking from 112th place to 37th. At 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/GEORGIAEXTN/0,,con
tentMDK:21042336~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:301746,00.html 
147  Vladimer Papava. Georgia's Hollow Revolution. Harvard International Review. February 27, 
2008 
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5.5. International donors’ support of hybrid regimes 
 
The third hypothesis used to test the argument connects the incentives that the 
international donors create to the response of the domestic elites, i.e. whether they 
choose to promote more free and fair elections or reforms of governance. 
 
One case is hybrid regimes with high polarization in Moldova and Ukraine. As I have 
shown in the previous chapters, the two countries hold elections that are competitive 
and generally positively ratified by the observers. The interests of both Russia and the 
West resonate on the elites' level and find support in the masses due to the ethnic 
composition and the will of the elites to revive the memories of the past. Their 
intentions to do so are 'profit-maximizing', i.e. to be reelected to office and to keep 
elections recognizable by the international donors?.  
 
Another case is of non-polarized Georgia, with a unified vision of the West as the 
major donor and supporter. The elites know that they can achieve maximum benefits 
if they show achievements in reforms, i.e. to comply with the donors' 
recommendations in the governance arena and ignoring and thus bypassing the 
recommendations on elections and political participation.  
 
Elections were identified as the time of a crucial challenge that the elites and masses 
in the countries are exposed to. However, to see a complete picture I will consider the 
scope and type of incentives and punishments that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
received from the Western donors and Russia during each electoral cycle (i.e. both 
preceding and following elections). 
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Figure 12 below grasps trends of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided to 
the countries by the Western donors that the World Bank collects and publishes 
annually148.  

















There is an overall growing trend in Moldova with a slight decrease in 2003 and 2004 
and a substantial decrease in 2009. A more fluctuating tendency in aid-flows took 
shape Georgia, with the upward tendency until 1996, and downward till 2000, with 
another low point in 2003 and growing ever since to double after the war with Russia 
in 2008. An extremely fluctuating aid-flow seen in Ukraine – partially explained by 
the Kolchuga scandal – a charge that Ukraine sold radar systems to Iraq in 2002 in 
violation of the US sanctions149 and the Kuchmagate (the tape scandal after the 
murder of an independent journalist) that caused the freeze in USAID funding after 
2003. The support resumed and grew, to only reach the pick levels of 1992, and 1999 
by 2008.  
 
In relation to elections, the downward tendency in the Western support of Moldova 
may be due to fraud that happened during elections in April of 2009. In Georgia, the 
                                               
148 The World Bank at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/299947-
1266002444164/index.html 
149  The former Soviet Union and US Foreign Assistance. Congressional Research Assistance. The 
Library of Congress. February 20, 2003, p. 12 
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downward tendency during president Shevarnadze's rule could be in part attributed to 
the mixing donor strategies that Georgia played, by accepting aid and conditionality 
from both Russia and the West. In Ukraine, after parliamentary elections of 2002 and 
2006, and 2007 there seems to be a cut in the Western support, probably related to 
each new parliament and government attempts to renegotiate the conditions of 
cooperation with Russian and the West, i.e. maneuvering in the 'two-vector'150 
approach.   
 
Given these general trends, what is worth pursuing her is more specific international 
financial support to enhance either competitiveness of elections or reform and benefits 
as well as sanctions (or just non benefits), associated with it.  
 
The support for elections comes usually from Western donors, with special grants 
allocated by both USAID through the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and the 
European Union through the European Commission. While in the case of Moldova 
the intention is to support transparency at the national level elections, with the 
European Commission offering a 3 million Euro grant to assist free and fair elections 
in 2009 (to help Moldova to comply with the ENP Action Plan to hold free and fair 
elections)151 and Eurasia Foundation providing $ 400 000 in 2004 for the same 
purpose152, in Georgia the focus is on the local elections. A grant to increase 
transparency in the local elections in 2010 was awarded by the U.S. Government, 
totaling $ 450,000153. Moldova's elections were competitive and relatively fair 
throughout its history as an independent country, and these grants may be more 
                                               
150 The term is credited to president Kuchma in his approach to the country's foreign policy. 
151 European Neighborhood Policy. http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=18324&id_type=1 
152 USAID. Eurasia Foundation. http://www.eurasia.org/publications/news/view.aspx?ID=19 
153 US Embassy in Georgia. http://georgia.usembassy.gov/programs-and-events/embassy-news-
2010/ambassador-bass-presents-ifes-grants-april-21.html 
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beneficial if directed to reform the judiciary system. Georgia however needs a greater 
support in letting the opposition parties and candidates to be heard during the 
campaigns for the national level elections and would benefit greatly from such an 
assistance. 
 
One aspect that was brought up in every conversation and united the otherwise 
diverse opinions of different experts in Moldova and Ukraine is the need for reform of 
the administrative system in general and of the judiciary in particular. The 
interviewees cited the inadequacy of the judiciary as the major impediment to any 
other reforms (social policies, political, economic), thus prioritizing this feature of a 
political regime over its outcomes154. The Georgian experts had mentioned a need in 
further reforms of the judiciary, but praised the government highly for visible 
accomplishments (reforming the police force, the court system and fighting 
corruption155) during the first term of president Saakashvili, achieved clearly with the 
donor's aid156. 
 
The various voices of my interviewees are validated by the Judiciary Reform Index 
(JRI) assigned by the American Bar Association (ABA) project157. Out of 30 factors 
(merged into six groups: quality, education and diversity; judicial powers; financial 
resources; structural safeguards, accountability and transparency; efficiency) that are 
assessed as either negative, neutral or positive in Georgia between 2005 and 2008 the 
                                               
154 Indeed, the backwardness of Soviet-style state administrations in ministries in Moldova and 
Ukraine stroke as very similar, with senior computer-illiterate staff occupying key positions. In 
contrast in Georgia the ministerial administrative work is computerized  and is run by young staff. 
155 Interview with the Council of Europe representative in Tbilisi in 2008. 
156 One expert from the Council of Europe admitted, to demonstrate the progress that Georgian state 
made in fighting crime, that when his tenure started in the early 90s, it was dangerous to even go 
out on the streets after dark. 
157 Judiciary Reform Index available from the American Bar Association at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/judicial_reform_index.shtml 
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number of negative categories was reduced from 15 (a half) to 6. The net 
improvement (from neutral to positive) was observed in 4 categories, with most of the 
progress occurring in the spheres of accountability and transparency, structural 
safeguards and efficiency. The same index for Moldova compared between 2007 and 
2009 revealed 12 negative categories in the former and 9 in the latter, with only one 
case of net improvement. Although the index for Ukraine is available only for one 
year 2005 and thus does not provide for a comparison, it is worth mentioning that as 
in Georgia in 2005 there are 15 categories assessed as negative, out of which all of the 
categories in the financial resources group were negative.  
 
Indeed, judiciary reform has been an ongoing process in Georgia: supported by the 
USAID since 1995, later sponsored by the World Bank between 1999 and 2006. In 
2011 additional 'Judicial Independence and Legal Empowerment Project' (JILEP) was 
launched which 'is a four-year $19.3 million program that focuses on areas critical to 
justice: 1) judicial institutions; 2) civil society support; 3) legal education; and 4) 
commercial law' - by the USAID through Eurasia Foundation158. Thus, the reform of 
the judiciary was brought to the attention of international donors since the 90s in 
Georgia, whereas in Moldova it was only in 2011 that the EU began conditioning its 
aid on the conduct of judicial reform in order to proceed with the association 
agreement and free trade agreement159. As for Ukraine, the special project to promote 
Rule of Law was launched by the USAID in 2006160. Although the reform of the 
judiciary is prioritized as a major step to be completed in any further cooperation with 
the EU, there is no commitment from the domestic elites to reform and there is no 
                                               
158 USAID Georgia. http://georgia.usaid.gov/news/usaid-news/2011/02/24/723 
159 http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/eu-says-moldova-aid-depends-on-judicial-reform 
160 US Embassy in Ukraine. http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/usaid-judicial.html 
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further funding to be conditioned on the conduct of this reform161. 
 
One should, however, keep in mind that all three countries are defined as rather weak 
states according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) scores162, which 
means that the states' monopoly over political participation is not full and in the 
context of the FSU states means that opposition can emerge and thrive (Tilly 2007). 
But in Georgia strong ethnically inflamed issues are absent from within its (de-facto 
controlled) territory, in order for opposition groups to emerge around them. And, 
unlike in Ukraine and Moldova, the judiciary reform involves subjugating the existing 
judges to cooperate with the state, so changing the constitution becomes a less 
challenging task. Whereas in Ukraine and in Moldova there is a tension rooted in 
ethnic and regional cleavages, which makes it hard for the central power to unify its 
policy and reform, as there is a potential of disobedience in the 'other' regions163. 
Hence, it is easier to reform in Georgia, because there is no opposition in the 
parliament that can block decisions. Hence, the polarization of society penetrates 
political system as a whole: from population, to political parties, to judicial system, to 
foreign policies.  
 
 
The Russian government does not engage in giving recommendations on the 
countries' electoral conduct and is satisfied as long as its favorite endorsed candidate 
                                               
161 Some analysts had been noticing that by the end of the ENP in 2010 Ukraine complied with only 4 
out of 60 reform priorities (Evhenia Sleptsova: Shedding Light on the ongoing EU-Moldova Trade 
Liberalization. Eastern Partnership Community. January 27, 2011. At 
http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/shedding-light-ongoing-eu-moldova-trade-
liberalisation 
162 The BTI scale goes from 0 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). In 2008 the BTI for the item 'Monopoly 
on use of force' assigned Georgia with 4, Moldova with 3 and Ukraine with 7. 
163 A good example is the decision of Donetsk Regional Court ruling illegal the bestowing of the Hero 
of Ukraine title to the controversial leader of Ukrainian Insurgent Army Stepan Bandera, which was 
later appealed against by the President. 
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wins. The interests that Russia pursues in the FSU countries are that of economic 
security and hence fall into a category of governance. Indeed, by offering certain 
benefits Russia may influence the course and the pace of the reform process. This 
happens mainly when interests of the West and Russia collide, for instance in creating 
free trade zones and sharing market spaces. This has been happening particularly in 
the last decade, i.e. since Russia regained its power from a beneficial energy market 
conjuncture and aimed to keep its former monopolist position in the markets of the 
FSU states. To maintain this position, Russia can raise gas prices to what is claimed to 
be market prices (i.e. withdraw subsidies) as a punishment, or threaten to build a 
customs 'border' across what was used to be a common market. Because Russia 
remains the major trade partner of the FSU states, this may prevent its neighbors from 
seeking other markets164. 
 
 
Unquestionably, the EU Free Trade and Association Agreements are the major 
instruments by which the countries that are seeking cooperation are assessed and 
included into further integration process. The process of synchronizing the legislature 
is very time-intensive but the free trade union is part of the origins of the EU and is 
therefore the first step in any association165. Moreover, trade association agreements 
with the EU and the Customs Union are mutually exclusive166, because of the 
                                               
164 Russia also punishes governments of FSU states by banning it s products from its markets, as had 
been the case with Georgian wine and mineral water after the Rose revolution (at this time any 
other support of Georgia had stopped), Moldovan wine in 2006, as well as Ukrainian dairy products 
the same year.  
165 According to experts from the European Commission Mission to Ukraine, it was a very hard task to 
bring the legislature in accordance, because despite there being a political will on the part of the 
government (headed at that moment by Yuliya Tymoshenko) the opposition in the parliament (the 
Party of the Regions) was blocking or largely hindering the process. The major challenge was the 
legislature accompanying agricultural market, because being highly subsidized, it crossed interests 
of many in the ruling elites.  (from interview on October 30, 2008, Kyiv, Ukraine). 
166 Pavel Korduban for Eurasia Daily Monitor March 30, 2011—Volume 8, Issue 62 The Jamestown 
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individual multiple regulations that each of the Unions carry. This means that the 
countries have to make a choice, the 'two-vector' strategy results in deadlocks, 
absence of reforms and the perpetuation of a hybrid regime.  
 
 
The threat that the Russian government puts forward involves creating a 'trade border' 
to protect its market from EU products. And it is a real one for Ukraine, which is 
relying heavily on exporting its goods to Russia. Other benefits (for Ukraine) than 
keeping its current markets are not clear: the 30% discount on gas prices were already 
guaranteed in return to the renewal of the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Crimea which was due to expire in 2017 for 25 more years167. Besides, being a part of 
the Customs Union from its conception and evolution from the Common Economic 
Space, Belarus was not saved from the gas row over prices in 2007 and 2010168. The 
EU is also interested in its neighboring Ukrainian and Moldovan markets. However in 
Ukraine169, for instance, the talks initiated in 2008 are not moving much forward: the 
common market dependence on Russia and the far-stretched promise of a possible 
close association with the EU is void of any immediate benefits. Ukrainian elites 
calculate that the funding from the West will be continuously provided basing their 
judgment on the growing trend in the aid supply.  
 
To demonstrate the point on the 'swinging' interests that Ukrainian politicians have 
towards both the EU and Russia, the figure 13 captures the volume of trade between 




168 Russia-Belarus gas row leaves bitter aftertaste. EuroActive. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/russia-belarus-gas-row-leaves-bitter-aftertaste-news-495592 
169 In this paper I address only the case case of Ukraine as the one mostly affected by both integration 
into the European and Russian markets. 
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Ukraine and Russia. If the export from Ukraine remains more or less stable, the 
















Figure 13. Trade volume between Ukraine and Russia (2006-2011) 
 
The decline during the rule of the 'Orange' governments and president Victor 
Yushchenko, followed by a sharp increase by the end of his term in the office 
associated with the power transfer to the current pro-Russian president Victor 
Yanukovich indicate how much is at stake for Russia if Ukraine does not join the 
Customs Union. As of 2011, the volume of imports from Russia on the Ukrainian 
market is over 50%170, losing it would harm both countries. This also shows that 
Ukraine has a valuable stake in considering joining the Customs Union. The same is 
not however true for Moldova, which is much more heavily integrated into the 
European market with estimated over 50% of trade is with the EU and less than 20% 
with Russia171. And as of late, Moldova is embarking steadily on the European 
integration track, leaving the "two-vector" approach to relations with the West and 
Russia in the past. If the integration with the Western markets continues, the 
challenge will come at the next round of elections, when the parties with the 
continuous pro-Russian appeal will have to mobilize its voters.  
                                               
170 Ukrainian State Department of Statistics at http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
171 Andrew Wilson. Moldova: Europe's poorest pawn? July 29, 2009. At 
(http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_wilson_moldova_elections/) 
 
 198  
 
Putting the three hybrid regimes with their different degrees of competitiveness into 
comparison allowed the discernment of polarization of the population and elites as the 
major factor that channels historical and ethno-linguistic differences into elections and 
to confirm the first hypothesis. It also helped to distill different patterns of support 
(reform-oriented or elections-oriented) that international actors provide and domestic 
actors choose to cooperate on (as suggested by the first and second hypotheses). 
Entrenching competitiveness in the case of Moldova and Ukraine and reforms in 
Georgia are the two models that sustain hybrid regimes and help them endure, thereby 
confirming the third hypothesis. The analysis revealed that economic ties with Russia 
matter, and it is a way in which Soviet legacies are playing their part in keeping 




To sum up, the evidence collected in this chapter emphasizes a continuous effort by 
both the EU and the US to assist the conduct of the judicial reform in Georgia since 
the time that the country started its recovery from the civil war in the onset of 
independence in the early 90s. However, the pace of support of elections to be free 
and fair is not of the concern to the donors, and it is only the local elections that are 
the focus. Knowing this, domestic elites pursue reforms without attending to the 
quality of electoral conduct. Absence of polarization and competitiveness results in 
persistent non-competitive reform-oriented hybrid regime. 
 
In the case of Moldova, despite high polarization and competitiveness the persistent 
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domination of the 'nominal' Communists in the parliament alarmed the EU and the US 
to support the conduct of free and fair elections after 2005. Yet, only by 2011 the 
completion of judicial reform became a condition to ensure further funding from the 
EU. Domestic elites' expectation of competitive recognizable elections allows them to 
continue benefiting from the outside support without reforming other domains of the 
regime.  
 
In Ukraine, support for judicial reform is only nominal, elections are always 
competitive and the external support growing, elites are willingly exploiting the 
historical divide of the population to keep elections recognizable. Moreover, the idea 
of gaining support form both Russia and the West prevents domestic elites form 
executing reforms, but provides issues to reinforce competitiveness in the up-coming 
electoral cycles.  
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Conclusion 
 
The twentieth anniversary of independent statehood in the fifteen FSU states is a 
fitting opportunity to assess the political regimes that have emerged in this region, 
now that enough time has passed for these countries to establish the 'rules of the game' 
and to put those rules through a real life test. This dissertation has aimed to 
characterized the mixed regimes that emerged in the FSU countries and to identify the 
factors that keep them in place. 
 
Analyzing all fifteen countries under the same framework has allowed me to discern 
more clearly the nature of hybrid regimes, the specific forms that combine features of 
democracies (in how power is attained through elections) and autocracy (in how a 
more coercive use of state power is employed in governing). It has offered an 
explanatory account with political polarization at the core of the causal mechanism. In 
hybrid regimes the domestic elites rely on divisions among the electorate to make sure 
elections are recognized as democratically meaningful. Because agreeing on reforms 
is a challenge in a divided parliament, elections become the sole democratic feature of 
the hybrid regime. The degree of polarization inside a polity, in turn a reflection of the 
competitiveness of elections, is picked up by the international donors as the signal of 
fair elections and is a key to their further support of elections and aid-provision. This 
is the scenario for the competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and Ukraine, where the 
promotion of contestation is prioritized over the rule of law. 
 
When polarization is low, the elites find it relatively manageable to implement 
reforms, in particular in the sphere of the rule of law. The achievements in reforms 
become the beacon of democracy for international donors. When elections are 
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persistently non-competitive and not fair, as the case of Georgia has demonstrated, 
international observers ratify elections as free and fair as a praise for achievements in 
reforms. Thus, the two processes –one elections-driven, another reform-driven– are at 
the center of the interactions between domestic elites and international actors that 
contribute to make hybrid regimes a stable equilibrium.  
 
The dissertation makes a contribution to democratization scholarship by 
differentiating between competitive and non-competitive hybrid regimes and links 
together the choices of international and domestic players.  
 
This narrow set of findings allows us to suggest a broader range of implications. First, 
the international legitimacy of elections, unlike in democracies, is a key factor to the 
continuous functioning of hybrid regimes. Elections are the major criterion by which 
countries are assessed on their regime performance, and further aid is usually 
conditioned on internationally ratified conduct. The domestic legitimacy of the newly-
elected rulers is preceded by the international authorization. This puts a great deal of 
pressure on the reports that international observers provide. The problem with the 
observation guidelines is that they are available to the running elites and they can try 
to comply to the required minimum degree in order to keep their elections recognized 
as free and fair. Moreover, as it was shown that elections in non-comparative settings 
could be recognized, the decision becomes a political one, and a better assessment is 
given in return for a promise of a strategic alliance. This contributes to the ongoing 
debate in international relations on the kind of aid and conditionality that international 
organizations and donors should provide, and what its ultimate role should be.  
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Secondly, the dissertation revives the question of the value of Soviet legacies by 
showing the importance of pre-Soviet and Soviet legacies alike. The Soviet legacies 
were taken for granted by the students of democratization and attention shifted to the 
pre-Soviet ones. The pre-Soviet legacies ('the memories of grandmothers') need a 
political will to be revived, while the Soviet legacies are in the memories of the 
current generations of voters and not always as negative ones. The interaction 
between the two contributes to the political polarization of hybrid regimes.  
 
Thirdly, in connection to the previous one: Russia matters. This serves as a reminder 
to those who think that if a country within the scope of Russia's interests declares its 
intention to follow a European choice, that Russian strategic and economic interests 
will disappear. In the FSU region, Russian interests are of particular importance, due 
to these states’ history of belonging to the common Soviet market with Russia 
inheriting the vast part of it. When a country proclaims the Western vector in its 
geopolitical orientation and an intention to join the European market, it means that the 
old foreign trade connections with Russia will need to be revised and eventually 
abandoned. In the case of Ukraine, for example, Russia is its largest trade partner and, 
as Chapter 5 has demonstrated, remains so independently of the course the Ukrainian 
leadership takes with Russia. Even when the interests of Russia are not articulated in 
the state’s policies and anti-Russian rhetoric is used, the interests do not disappear and 
the countries continue doing their business with Russia, as was shown in the cases of 
Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, Russia is important to the West as well. As each of 
the 'gas wars' with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia has shown, the EU and Russia 
remain committed to their contracts and to their partnership, leaving the 'transit' 
countries to solve their issues with Russia bi-laterally. This is the role that the internal 
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political polarization plays in international politics. 
 
Lastly, this dissertation has helped to identify the following directions for future 
research:  
- National electoral geography in Ukraine has revealed that there are regions in 
the center that swing, and that there are regions in the South and in the West 
where one party or another wins only by a slight margin. It means that there is 
strong competition going on within each region. While the city mayors are 
elected to their positions, it would be interesting to know their party affiliation 
and whether it always coincides with how the region votes. Taking 
polarization one level down from the national one would complete the picture 
on the degree of electoral competitiveness in the country. 
- The argument should be tested on an expanded number of cases, especially on 
those in post-colonial Asia and Africa, where ethnic divisions and aid-seeking 
are high, and where there are also special ties to the former colonies. 
- The rigidity of constitutions in polarized societies would be an interesting 
subject to research and to expand the sample. The questions that arise are: 
How often are constitutions actually amended, and are these amendments 
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Appendix 1. Elections coding scheme 
 
Reports used: in all of the cases OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights Elections Observation Mission’s final reports. 
There are two dimensions according to which elections were coded. The first reflects 
the general description of electoral process using broadly speaking two groups of 
qualifiers, which place countries, either in a group ‘in compliance’ or ‘not in 
compliance’ with internationally recognized democratic standards. The score of 0 is 
assigned when elections are ‘in compliance’, 1 is assigned when qualified as ‘not in 
compliance’.  




In compliance, (generally 
and mostly free) 
improvement, closer to 
standards, some 
shortcomings, met standards, 
free of problems, in 
accordance, consistent, in 
line with standards (0) 
Not in compliance, fell short, did not 
meet, not in accordance, failed to 
comply, shortcomings, did not comply, 
failed to meet, fell significantly short (1) 
Elections Armenia 95, Armenia 99,  
Belarus 94, Belarus 95, 
Georgia 04, Georgia 04, 
Georgia 06, Kyrgyzstan 95, 
Kyrgyzstan 05, Moldova 96, 
Moldova 98, Moldova 01, 
Moldova 03, Russia 93, 
Russia 96, Russia 99, Russia 
00, Ukraine 94, Ukraine 06 
Armenia 96, Armenia 98, Armenia 03, 
Armenia 03, Azerbaijan 95, Azerbaijan 
98, Azerbaijan 00, Azerbaijan 03, 
Azerbaijan 05, Belarus 00, Belarus 01, 
Belarus 04, Belarus 06, Georgia 99, 
Georgia 00, Georgia 03, Kazakhstan 94, 
Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 99, 
Kazakhstan 04, Kazakhstan 05, 
Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 00, 
Kyrgyzstan 05, Moldova 2005, Moldova 
2007, Russia 03, Russia 04, Tajikistan 
00, Tajikistan 05, Tajikistan 06, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine 98, Ukraine 99, 
Ukraine 02, Ukraine 04, Uzbekistan 99, 
Uzbekistan 04  
 
 
The second dimension represents the degree of violations that occurred during the 
campaign period, on election day and in the aftermath of elections in the following 
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fields: dependence of Central Electoral Committee on executive, restrictions on 
registration of opposition candidates, restrictions on freedom to campaign and on use 
of media, problems with voter lists, ballot stuffing, deterioration during vote count, 
voter fraud, violence during elections and after. Scores from 1 to 5 are assigned, the 
higher score indicating the greater violations. The following coding rules are used: 
(the qualifiers are taken from the OSCE reports terminology) 
1 –  minor problems mainly concerned with organizational aspects   
2 – major problems mainly concerned with organizational aspects and with elections 







BTI scoreboard indicators: 10 – the highest, 1 – the lowest; 1-6 (0 violated), 7 (0,5 
some violation, but generally respected) 8-10 (1 respected) 
Political rights: To what extent can political and/or civic groups associate and 
assemble freely? 
Civil rights: To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express 
opinions freely? 
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Appendix 3 
Referenda to change rules of the game (expand powers/prolong tenure in the office) 
  Democracy Hybrid Autocracy 
Initiated/attem
pted 
Succeeded   + 
Failed  +  






Years of elections in the FSU, assessed by the OSCE  
Armenia                                   Azerbaijan                               Belarus 
1 1995 parliamentary 1 1995 parliamentary 1 1994 presidential 
 2 1996 presidential 2 1998 presidential 2 1995 parliamentary 
3 1998 presidential 3 2000 parliamentary 3 2000 parliamentary 
4 1999 parliamentary 4 2003 presidential 4 2001 presidential 
5 2003 presidential 5 2005 parliamentary 5 2004 parliamentary 
6 2003 parliamentary 6 2006 parliamentary 6 2006 presidential 
7 2007 parliamentary 7 2008 presidential 7 2008 parliamentary 
8 2008 presidential  
 
Estonia                                      Georgia                                      Kazakhstan 
1 1999 parliamentary 1 1999 parliamentary 1 1994 parliamentary 
2 2007 parliamentary 2 2000 presidential 2 1999 presidential 
   3 2003 parliamentary 3 1999 parliamentary 
   4 2004 presidential 4 2004 parliamentary 
   5 2004 presidential 5 2005 presidential 
   6 2006 local 6 2007 parliamentary 
   7 2008 presidential  
   8 2008 parliamentary  
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Kyrgyzstan                                   Latvia                                Lithuania 
1 1995 presidential 1 1998 parliamentary 1 1996 presidential 
2 2000 parliamentary 2 2002 parliamentary 2 2009 parliamentary 
3 2000 presidential 3 2006 parliamentary  
4 2005 parliamentary  
5 2005 presidential  
6 2007 parliamentary  
7 2009 presidential  
 
Moldova                                    Russia                                    Tajikistan 
1 1996 presidential 1 1993 parliamentary 1 2000 parliamentary 
2 1998 parliamentary 2 1996 presidential 2 2005 parliamentary 
3 2001 parliamentary 3 1999 parliamentary 3 2006 presidential 
4 2003 local 4 2000 presidential  
5 2005 parliamentary 5 2003 parliamentary  
6 2007 local 6 2004 presidential  
7 2009 parliamentary 7 2007 parliamentary  
8 2009 parliamentary 8 2008 presidential  
 
 
Turkmenistan                                   Ukraine                         Uzbekistan 
1 1999 parliamentary 1 1998 parliamentary 1 1999 parliamentary 
2 2004 parliamentary 2 1999 presidential 2 2004 presidential 
3 2007 presidential 3 2002 parliamentary 3 2007 parliamentary 
   4 2004 presidential  
   5 2006 parliamentary  
   6 2007 parliamentary  
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Appendix 5. Conduct of elections in the FSU 1991-2011: competitive and non-
competitive172 
  Competitive Not competitive 
In compliance  Armenia 95, Armenia 99, 
Armenia 08, Belarus, 94, 
Belarus 95, Estonia 99, 
Estonia 07, Georgia 04, 
Georgia 08, Kyrgyzstan 95, 
Kyrgyzstan 05, Latvia 98, 
Latvia 02, Latvia 06, Latvia 
10, Lithuania 96, Lithuania 
09, Moldova 96, Moldova 
98, Moldova 01, Moldova 
03, Moldova 09, Moldova 
10, Russia 96, Russia 99, 
Russia 00, Ukraine 94, 
Ukraine 06, Ukraine 07, 
Ukraine 10 (N=30) 
Georgia 04, Kyrgyzstan 10 (N=2) 
Not in compliance Armenia 96, Armenia 98, 
Armenia 03, Armenia 03, 
Azerbaijan 95, Azerbaijan 
2000, Azerbaijan 2003, 
Georgia 99, Georgia 00, 
Georgia 03, Georgia 08, 
Moldova 2005, Moldova 
2007, Moldova 09, Ukraine 
98, Ukraine 99, Ukraine 02, 
Ukraine 04 (N=18) 
Azerbaijan 98, Azerbaijan 2005, 
Azerbaijan 2006, Azerbaijan 2008, 
Azerbaijan 2010, Belarus 00, Belarus 
01, Belarus 04, Belarus 06, Belarus 
08, Belarus 10, Kazakhstan 94, 
Kazakhstan 99, Kazakhstan 99, 
Kazakhstan 04, Kazakhstan 05, 
Kazakhstan 07, Kazakhstan 11, 
Kyrgyzstan 00, Kyrgyzstan 00, 
Kyrgyzstan 05, Kyrgyzstan 07, Russia 
03, Russia 04, Russia 07, Tajikistan 
00, Tajikistan 05, Tajikistan 06, 
Tajikistan 2010, Turkmenistan 04, 
Turkmenistan 07,  Uzbekistan 99, 
Uzbekistan 04, Uzbekistan 07, 
Uzbekistan 10  (N=35) 
 
                                               
172  Source: Dataset compiled based on OSCE reports. Available at osce.org 
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Appendix 6. Conduct of elections in the FSU: competitive, mixed and non-
competitive173. 
Country Compliance and 
competitiveness 
(years) 











Estonia 1999-2007       
Latvia 1998-2010       
Lithuania 1996-2009       
Armenia 1995, 1999, 2008 1996, 1998, 2003, 
2003 
    
Moldova 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2003, 
2009, 2010  
2005, 2007, 2009     
Ukraine 1994, 2006, 
2007, 2010  
1998, 1999, 2002, 
2004 
    
Georgia 2004, 2008 1999, 2000, 2003, 
2008 
2004   
Belarus 1994, 1995     2000, 2001, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010  
Russia 1996, 1999, 2000     2003, 2004, 2007 
Kyrgyzstan 1995, 2005   2010 2000, 2000, 2005, 
2007 
Azerbaijan   1995, 2000, 2003   1998, 2005, 2006, 
2008, 2010  
Kazakhstan       1994-2011 
Tajikistan       2000-2010 
Turkmenistan       2004-2007 





                                               
173  Source: Dataset compiled based on OSCE reports. Available at osce.org 
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Appendix 7. Formal and informal restriction of political rights in the FSU. 
Country Restrictions of political rights BTI 
score 
EIU FH PR 
  Right to 
participate/ 
/citizenship 
Right to association (in 
constitution and/or laws on 
parties) on ethnic, religious, 




2008 2008 2008 
Lithuania 0 0 0 10 6.11 1 
Estonia 1 0 1 9.3 5 1 
Latvia 1 0 1 9.3 6.11 2 
Ukraine 0 0 0 7.6 5.56 3 
Georgia 0 1 1 7.6 4.44 4 
Moldova 0 0 0 7 6.11 3 
Kyrgyzstan 0 1 1 6.3 3.89 5 
Armenia 0 0 0 5.3 3.89 5 
Russia 0 1 1 5 5.56 6 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 4.3 3.33 6 
Kazakhstan 0 1 1 4 2.78    6 
Belarus 0 0 0 3 3.33 7 
Tajikistan 0 0 0 3.3 2.22 6 
Uzbekistan 0 1 1 2.3 2.22 7 
Turkmenistan 0 1 1 1.3 2.22 7 
 
Appendix 8. Civil rights measured by BTI, FH, EIU 
Country 
BTI Freedom of 
Expression 





 FH CL 
2008 EIU 2008 
Estonia 10 10 10 1 8.82 
Lithuania 10 10 10 1 9.12 
Latvia 10 9 9.5 1 9.12 
Ukraine 8 8 8 2 7.94 
Georgia 7 7 7 4 6.47 
Kyrgyzstan 7 7 7 4 5.29 
Moldova 7 7 7 4 7.94 
Armenia 4 6 5 4 5.88 
Azerbaijan 4 6 5 5 5 
Russia 4 5 4.5 5 5 
Kazakhstan 4 4 4 5 5.29 
Tajikistan 4 4 4 5 1.18 
Belarus 3 2 2.5 6 3.53 
Uzbekistan 2 2 2 7 0.59 
Turkmenistan 1 1 1 7 0.59 
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Estonia 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Lithuan
ia 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Latvia 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Ukrain
e 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 
Georgi
a 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 
Kyrgyz
stan 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Moldov
a 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Armeni
a 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Azerbai
jan 5 5 6 6 6 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Russia 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Kazakh
stan 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Tajikist
an 3 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Belarus 4 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Uzbeki
stan 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 
Turkme
nistan 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
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Appendix 10. BTI scores of the FSU states on separation of powers and independent 
judiciary  
Country 





Estonia 10 10 
Lithuania 10 9 
Latvia 10 8 
Ukraine 7 7 
Kyrgyzstan 6 4 
Georgia 5 5 
Moldova 5 6 
Armenia 4 4 
Azerbaijan 4 4 
Russia 4 4 
Kazakhstan 3 4 
Tajikistan 3 3 
Belarus 2 4 
Turkmenistan 2 3 
Uzbekistan 2 3 
 
Appendix 11. Freedom House Nations in Transit independence of judiciary 2000-2008. 
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0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Estonia 2 2 1,75 1,75 1,75 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Lithuania 2 1,75 2 1,75 1,75 1,75 1,5 1,75 1,75 
Latvia 2 2 2 2,25 2 1,75 1,75 1,75 1,75 
Ukraine 4,5 4,5 4,75 4,5 4,75 4,25 4,25 4,5 4,75 
Kyrgyzstan 5 5,25 5,25 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 6 
Georgia 4 4 4,25 4,5 4,5 5 4,75 4,75 4,75 
Moldova 4 4 4 4,5 4,5 4,75 4,5 4,5 4,5 
Armenia 5 5 5 5 5 5,25 5 5 5,25 
Azerbaijan 5,5 5,25 5,25 5,25 5,5 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 
Russia 4,25 4,5 4,75 4,5 4,75 5,25 5,25 5,25 5,25 
Kazakhstan 5,5 5,75 6 6,25 6,25 6,25 6,25 6,25 6,25 
Tajikistan 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 6 
                                               
174 The question that the country coder is asked is: To what extent is there a working separation of powers 
(checks and balances)? (BTI Manual, 2010, p.12 at http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/) 
175 Here the question is: To what extent does an independent judiciary exist? (BTI Manual, 2010, p.21 at 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/) 
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Belarus 6,5 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 
Turkmenista
n 6,75 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Uzbekistan 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,25 6,75 6,75 6,75 
  
 
Appendix 12. Constitutional changes in the FSU states 1993-2004176 





























g to stand for 
the 3rd term 
Belarus 94 + (+) (95) + (97)  ++ (2004) 
Moldova 94 + (-) (99-00)    
Ukraine 96 + (-) (95)   + (-) (2004) 
Russia 93  + (2000)  +(-) (?) 
Armenia 95  + (+) (95)    
Azerbaijan 95 + (+) (95) + (02)   
Georgia 95 +(no ref) (93)    
Kazakhstan 93  + (95) + (95) + (98) 
Kyrgyzstan 93 + (+) (96)  +  + (+) (98) 
Tajikistan 94    + (99)+ (03) 
Turkmenistan 92    +(94) + (+) 
(99) 
Uzbekistan 92   + (95) + (02) 
Estonia     
Latvia     
Lithuania     
                                               
176  Sources: data collected by the author from Jamestown Foundations archives. 
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Appendix 13. Combined measures of political regimes 
Estonia     Latvia     Lithuania     
 additional FH BTI EUI  additional FH BTI EUI  
additiona
l FH BTI EUI 
election
s high    elections high    elections high    
political 
rights mixed high high high 
political 
rights mixed high high high 
political 
rights high high high high 
civil 
liberties high high high high 
civil 
liberties high high high high 
civil 
liberties high high high high 
separati
on of 
powers high high high  
separation 
of powers high high high  
separation 
of powers high high high  
               
Turkme
nistan     Uzbekistan     Tajikistan     
 additional FH BTI EUI  additional FH BTI EUI  
additiona
l FH BTI EUI 
election
s low    elections low    elections low    
political 
rights low low low low 
political 
rights low low low low 
political 
rights low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
separati
on of 
powers low low low  
separation 
of powers low low low  
separation 
of powers low low low  
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Belarus     Kazakhstan     
Azerbaija
n     
 additional FH BTI EUI  additional FH BTI EUI  
additiona
l FH BTI EUI 
election
s low    elections low    elections mixed    
political 
rights low low low low 
political 
rights low low low low 
political 
rights low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
separati
on of 
powers low low low  
separation 
of powers low low low  
separation 
of powers low low low  
               
Russia     Kyrgyzstan     Armenia     
 additional FH BTI EUI  additional FH BTI EUI  
additiona
l FH BTI EUI 
election
s mixed    elections low    elections low    
political 
rights low low mixed mixed 
political 
rights low low mixed low 
political 
rights low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low low low 
civil 
liberties low low mixed mixed 
civil 
liberties mixed mixed mixed mixed 
separati
on of 
powers mixed low low  
separation 
of powers mixed low mixed  
separation 
of powers low low low  
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Georgia     Ukraine     Moldova     
 additional FH BTI EUI  additional FH BTI EUI  
additiona
l FH BTI EUI 
election
s mixed    elections mixed    elections low    
political 
rights mixed mixed mixed mixed 
political 
rights mixed mixed mixed mixed 
political 
rights mixed mixed mixed mixed 
civil 
liberties mixed mixed mixed mixed 
civil 
liberties mixed mixed mixed mixed 
civil 
liberties mixed mixed mixed mixed 
separati
on of 
powers low low low  
separation 
of powers mixed low mixed  
separation 
of powers mixed low low  
 




Recipes to calculate polarization in parliaments: (left+right) - center 
 
Armenia  
1999: (Communists + Dashnak (ARF)) – Unity 
2003: Justice Alliance – (Republican Party) 




1995: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party 
2000, 2001: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party 
2005: Azerbaijan Popular Front – New Azerbaijan Party 
2010: – New Azerbaijan Party 
 
Belarus 
1995: no legal quorum 
2000: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents) 
2004: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents) 
2008: - (Communist Party + Agrarian Party + Independents) 
 
Estonia 
1992: Fatherland Alliance – Popular Front/Center Party 
1995: Republican and Conservative Party – Estonian Central Coalition 
1999: Pro Patria – Estonian Center Party 
2003: Pro Patria – Estonian Center Party 
2009: Pro Patria and Res Publica – Estonian Center Party 
 
Georgia 
1995: National Democratic Party – Citizen's Union 
1999: Democratic Union Revival of Georgia - Citizen's Union 
2004: Rightist Opposition – National Movement 
2008: Joint Opposition – United National Movement  
 
Kazakhstan 
2004: - (OTAN+ Agrarian+ Independents) 
2007: - OTAN 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
2007: Communist Party- Ak Zhol 
2010: (Ata Zhurt + Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK)) 
 
Latvia 
1993: (National Harmony + Latvian National Independent Movement) - Latvian Way 
1995: (Socialist Party + Latvian National Independent Movement) – Democratic Party 
Saimnieks 
 
 228  
1998: (Latvian Socialist Democratic Workers' Party + For Fatherland and 
Freedom/LNNK) – People's  Party 
2002: (For Human Rights in United Latvia + For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK) – 
People's Party 
2006: (For Human Rights in United Latvia + Coalition of Latvia's First Party) – 
Greens and Farmers+  People's Party 
2010: (Center Harmony + National Alliance (LNNK)) – Unity + Greens and Farmers 
 
Lithuania 
1992: Lithuanian National Union – Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania  
1996: (Social Democratic Party +  Lithuanian National Union) – Homeland Union 
2000: (Lithuanian Peasants Popular Union + Young Lithuania) – Social Democratic 
Coalition 
2004: - (Labor Party + Brasauskas/Paulauskas Coalition + Peasants Party) 
2008: Social Democrats – (Homeland+ National Resurrection+ Liberals) 
 
Moldova 
1994: (Socialist Union(L) + Peasants and Intellectuals Block(R) + Christian 
Democratic People's Party  (R)) – Democratic Agrarian Party  
1998: (Communist Party + Electoral Block Democratic Convention) – Electoral Block 
Democratic and  Prosperous Moldova 
2001: (Communist Party + Christian Democratic Party) – Braghis Allians 
2005: (Communist Party + Christian Democratic Party) – Democratic Moldova Block 
2009: (Communist Party + Liberal Party) – Liberal Democratic Party 
2009: (Communist Party + Liberal Party) – Liberal Democratic Party 
2010: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party) – Democratic Party  
 
Russia  
1993: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Russia's 
Democratic Choice 
1995: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Our Home 
Russia  
1999: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – Unity 
2003: (Communist Party + Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)) – United 
Russia 




2005: - People's Democratic Party  
2010: (Communist Party + Islamic Renaissance Party) – People's Democratic Party  
 
Turkmenistan 
2004: - (Democratic Party of Turkmenistan) 
 
Ukraine 
1994: (Communist Party + Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists(R) + Rukh(R)) – 
Independents 
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1998: (Communist Party + Rukh) – Independents 
2002: (Communist Party + Our Ukraine) – For United Ukraine 
2006: (Communist Party + BUT(R) + Our Ukraine (R)) – Party of the Regions 
2007: (Communist Party + BUT(R) + Our Ukraine (R)) – Party of the Regions 
 
Uzbekistan 
2009 – 2010: - (Liberal Democratic Party+People's Democratic Party+ National 




Appendix 15 Polarization in parliaments 
 Left Right Center 
polarization 
index 
Armenia 99 12.1 8 41.7 -21.6 
Armenia 03  8.396947 30.53435 -22.1374 
Armenia 07  5.343511 80.15267 -74.8092 
Azerbaijan 95  2.4 95.16 -92.76 
Azerbaijan 2000, 2001  1.6 60 -58.4 
Azerbaijan 05  4 44.8 -40.8 
Azerbaijan 10  2.4 96 -93.6 
Belarus 2000   100 -100 
Belarus 2004    -100 
Belarus 2008  6.363636 93.63636 -87.2727 
Estonia 92  28.71 14.85 13.86 
Estonia 95  4.95 40.59 -35.64 
Estonia 99  17.82 27.72 -9.9 
Estonia 03  6.93 27.72 -20.79 
Estonia 07  18.81 28.71 -9.9 
Georgia 95  13.42 38.96 -25.54 
Georgia 99  25.63 42.7 -17.07 
Georgia 04  10 90 -80 
Georgia 08  11.33333 79.33333 -68 
Kazakhstan 99   0 -75.32 
Kazakhstan 04   92.20779 -92.2078 
Kazakhstan 07   100 -100 
Kyrgyzstan 07 8.889  78.88889 -70 
Kyrgyzstan 10 21.67  23.33333 -1.66667 
Latvia 93 13 15 36 -8 
Latvia 95 5 8 18 -5 
Latvia 98 14 17 24 7 
Latvia 02 25 7 20 12 
Latvia 06 6 10 41 -25 
Latvia 2010 29 8 55 -18 
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Lithuania 92  2.836879 51.77305 -48.9362 
Lithuania 96 8.511 2.836879 49.64539 -38.2979 
Lithuania 00 2.837 0.70922 49.64539 -46.0993 
Lithuania 04   18 -18 
Lithuania 08  17.7305 51.06383 -33.3333 
Moldova 94 26.92 19.23 53.85 -7.7 
Moldova 98 39.6 25.74 23.75 41.59 
Moldova 01 70.29 10.89 18.81 62.37 
Moldova 05 55.44 10.89 33.66 32.67 
Moldova 09 59.41 14.85 14.85 59.41 
Moldova 09 47.52 14.85 17.82 44.55 
Moldova 10 41.58 31.68 14.85149 58.40851 
Russia 93 14.41 26.57 18.01 22.97 
Russia 95 44 22.22 20 46.22 
Russia 99 29.77 7.55 16.44 20.88 
Russia 03 8.88 8 26.66 -9.78 
Russia 07 12.67 8.888889 70 -48.4444 
Tajikistan 05   0 -77.7 
Tajikistan 10 3.17 3.17 87.3 -80.96 
Turkmenistan 04    -100 
Ukraine 94 10.8 3.2 48.2 -34.2 
Ukraine 98 43.53 14.22 19 38.75 
Ukraine 02 26.22 31.1 32.7 24.62 
Ukraine 06 4.6 46.6 41.3 9.9 
Ukraine 07 6 50 38.8 17.2 
Uzbekistan 09-10    -100 
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Appendix 16 Presidential elections 
     Alternation 
Armenia 96 Ter-Petrosian 51.75 Manoukian 41.29 1 10.46 
Armenia 98 Kocharian 56 Demirchian 44 1 12 
Armenia 03 Kocharian 67.25 Demirchian 32.48 0 34.77 
Armenia 08     1 0 
Azerbaijan 98 Aliev 76.1 Mamedov 11.6 0 64.5 
Azerbaijan 03 Aliev son Ilham 76.84 Isa Gambar 13.97 0 62.87 
Azerbaijan 08 Ilham Aliev 87 Igbal Aghazade 2.83 0 84.17 
Belarus 94 Lukashenka 80.1 Kebich 14.2 1 65.9 
Belarus 2001 Lukashenka 75.65 Goncharik 15.65 0 60 
Belarus 2006 Lukashenka 82.6 Milinkevich 6 0 76.6 
Belarus 2010 Lukashenka     0 
Georgia 95 Shevarnadze 74.3 
Patiashvili (former 
communist secretary) 19.3 0 55 
Georgia 00 Shevarnadze 80.4 
Patiashvili (former 
communist secretary) 16.6 0 63.8 
Georgia 04 Saakashvili 96.24 Sashiashvili 1.87 1 94.37 
Georgia 08 Saakashvili 52.21 Gachechiladze 25.26 0 26.95 
Kazakhstan 99 Nazarbaev 81.75 Abdildin 12.08 0 69.67 
Kazakhstan 05 Nazarbaev 91.15 Tuyakbai 6.61 0 84.54 
Kyrgyzstan 00 Akaev 74.5 Tekebaev 13.5 0 61 
Kyrgyzstan 05 Bakiev 88.71 Bakir uulu 3.93 0 84.78 
Lithuania 93 Brazauskas 60    60 
Lithuania 97-98 Adamkus 50.31 Paulauskas 49.69 1 0.62 
Lithuania 02-03 Paskas 54.91 Adamkus 45.09 1 9.82 
Lithuania 04 Adamkus 52.6 Prunskiene 47.4 1 5.2 
Lithuania 09 Dalia Grybauskaite 69.08 Algirdas Butkevičius 11.83 1 57.25 
Moldova 96 Lucinschi 54 Snegur 46 1 8 
Russia 96 Yeltsin 53.8 Zyuganov 40.3 0 13.5 
Russia 00 Putin 52.94 Zyuganov 29.21 0 23.73 
Russia 04 Putin 71.31 Kharitonov 13.69 0 57.62 
Russia 08 Medvedev 70.28 Zyuganov 17.72 0 52.56 
Tajikistan 06 Rahmonov 79.3 Boboev 6.2 0 73.1 
Turkmenistan 07 Berdimuhammedov 89.23 Atajukow 3.23 n/a 86 
Ukraine 94 Kuchma 52.15 Kravchuk 45.06 1 7.09 
Ukraine 99 Kuchma 56.25 Simonenko 37.8 0 18.45 
Ukraine 04 Yuschenko 51.99 Yanukovich 44.2 1 7.79 
Ukraine 10 Yanukovich 48.95 Timoshenko 45.47 1 3.48 
Uzbekistan 00 Islam Karimov 91.9 Jalolov 4.1 0 87.8 
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Appendix  17 Ukrainian electoral geography (Source: Central Electoral Commission 
of Ukraine at http://www.cvk.gov.ua/) 
 
2002
Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) For United Ukraine (pre-PoR) Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E) Donetska (E) Volynska (W)
Luganska (E) Lvivska (W)
Dnipropetrovska (E) Zakarpatska (W)
Kirovigradska C Rivnenska (W)
Mykolaivska (S) Ternopilska (W)
Odesska (S) Khmelnitska (W)
Khersonska (S) Ivano-Frankivska (W)
Zaporizska C Chernivetska (W)
Crimea (S) Zhytomyrska C
Sevastopil (S) Vinnitska C





Party of the Regions (PoR) Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc (BUT) Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E) Volynska (W) Zakarpatska (W)
Luganska (E) Rivnenska (W) Ivano-Frankivska (W)
Dnipropetrovska (E) Ternopilska (W) Lvivska (W)
Mykolaivska (S) Khmelnitska (W)
Odesska (S) Chernivetska (W)
Khersonska (S) Zhytomyrska C
Zaporizska C Vinnitska C
Crimea (S) Kyivska C
Donetska (E) Cherkasska C






Party of the Regions (PoR) Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc (BUT) Our Ukraine (Yuschenko)
Kharkivska (E) Volynska (W) Zakarpatska (W)
Luganska (E) Rivnenska (W)
Dnipropetrovska (E) Ternopilska (W)
Mykolaivska (S) Khmelnitska (W)
Odesska (S) Chernivetska (W)
Khersonska (S) Zhytomyrska C
Zaporizska C Vinnitska C
Crimea (S) Kyivska C
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Tbilisi 1.95% 8.66% 10.72% 62.49% 
Kakheti 1.02% 8.27% 6.58% 78.55% 
Kvemo Kartli 0.74% 6.67% 5.41% 77.96% 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti 1.48% 10.54% 22.31% 58.34% 
Shida Kartli 1.17% 8.42% 5.91% 78.78% 
Samtskhe-Javakheti 0.96% 7.08% 3.65% 81.10% 
Racha-Lechkhumi and 
Lower Svaneti 1.64% 14.52% 5.36% 68.63% 
Imereti 1.27% 11.12% 4.81% 73.66% 
Guria 2.33% 12.16% 3.90% 68.65% 
Samegrelo and Upper 
Svaneti 0.83% 6.32% 4.17% 68.40% 
















Tbilisi 4.51% 10.58% 42.14% 31.70% 7.10% 
Kakheti 3.94% 7.03% 64.08% 14.23% 8.18% 
Kvemo Kartli 2.37% 4.90% 73.10% 11.82% 5.87% 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti 4.49% 19.42% 60.32% 9.58% 4.35% 
Shida Kartli 3.19% 8.18% 73.02% 8.98% 4.89% 
Samtskhe-
Javakheti 1.75% 4.05% 81.28% 6.24% 4.63% 
Racha-Lechkhumi 
and Lower Svaneti 5.63% 5.09% 61.39% 18.26% 5.18% 
Imereti 5.33% 6.96% 55.49% 15.24% 12.89% 
Guria 4.10% 3.56% 60.29% 15.74% 12.03% 
Samegrelo and 
Upper Svaneti 2.13% 4.36% 61.94% 17.68% 10.05% 
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Appendix 19 Moldovan electoral geography (Sources: April 2009, July 2009, 2010 
Electoral Georgraphy. Moldova. At 




July 2009 PCRM AMN PL PLDM PDM
Chisinau 38.34% 6.19% 24.40% 17.82% 10.57%
Balti 58.16% 2.87% 7.64% 12.82% 15.60%
Anenii Noi 47.58% 4.98% 15.16% 17.44% 11.31%
Basarabeasca 52.05% 7.59% 5.50% 13.25% 10.49%
Briceni 56.57% 7.45% 7.37% 9.77% 15.00%
Cahul 38.36% 7.69% 15.89% 23.52% 10.66%
Cantemir 40.81% 9.79% 11.04% 24.93% 10.07%
Calarasi 32.10% 16.35% 19.71% 17.59% 10.02%
Causeni 43.08% 18.01% 12.45% 12.14% 8.84%
Cimislia 43.98% 10.50% 9.33% 16.51% 16.10%
Criuleni 32.93% 11.56% 20.64% 16.79% 13.69%
Donduseni 58.94% 3.91% 5.57% 10.08% 14.16%
Drochia 49.69% 5.13% 8.57% 16.22% 16.28%
Dubasari 67.92% 4.55% 7.51% 8.55% 8.68%
Edinet 57.29% 6.98% 4.82% 8.15% 18.34%
Falesti 74.40% 2.07% 3.69% 8.21% 8.23%
Floresti 54.65% 4.91% 4.88% 17.43% 15.07%
Glodeni 47.72% 7.59% 8.43% 18.90% 13.44%
Hincesti 34.94% 5.49% 14.15% 25.52% 16.83%
Ialoveni 25.02% 11.81% 23.16% 24.79% 11.91%
Leova 34.80% 10.89% 9.27% 12.89% 12.13%
Nisporeni 27.74% 15.51% 24.42% 23.33% 5.66%
Ocnita 65.92% 3.81% 3.67% 9.00% 14.72%
Orhei 29.51% 7.95% 18.74% 20.78% 16.93%
Rezina 47.42% 5.23% 11.00% 20.04% 11.74%
Riscani 50.86% 6.66% 8.89% 13.50% 16.01%
Singerei 43.43% 6.18% 9.36% 16.97% 20.09%
Soroca 49.19% 9.77% 8.22% 13.76% 15.76%
Straseni 32.38% 11.15% 21.85% 18.12% 12.10%
Soldanesti 43.88% 14.38% 7.54% 13.67% 13.59%
Stefan Voda 35.86% 8.47% 13.81% 22.71% 8.45%
Taraclia 80.70% 1.93% 1.20% 2.97% 10.05%
Telenesti 31.93% 12.98% 11.78% 26.09% 12.64%
Ungheni 46.68% 7.56% 12.96% 14.52% 13.51%
UTA Gagauzia 77.78% 3.73% 0.43% 1.28% 5.88%
 
 235  
2010 PDM PL PCRM PLDM Moldovans Ukrainians Russians Gagauzians 
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UTA Gagauzia 15.67% 0.52% 59.99% 6.28% 
7,481  
4.81% 
4,919  
3.16% 
5,941  
3.82% 
127,835  
82.13% 
 
